

JPRS 75584

28 April 1980

# West Europe Report

No. 1570



FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

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# WEST EUROPE REPORT

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## CONTENTS

### THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES

#### FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Press Comments on Schmidt's Missile Suggestion (Various sources, 16 Apr 80).....	1
Impetus for USSR Talks Schmidt, Genscher in Agreement	

#### FRANCE

Military Strategists Assess Risks of Nuclear Conflict (LE MONDE, various dates).....	4
Detente, Soviet Military Buildup, by Francois Maurin	
Detente, Third World Decolonization, by Jacques Huntzinger	
Third World Instability, by Pierre Lellouche	
U.S., Soviet Strategic Parity, by Alain Joxe	
Nuclear Weapon Taboo, by Dominique Halevy	

### COUNTRY SECTION

#### INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Mechanisms of Communist Power, Influence, Intervention (Annie Kriegel; LE FIGARO, 27 Feb 80).....	26
Analysis of Soviet Interventionist Policy, Western Reactions (Annie Kriegel; LE FIGARO, 19 Feb 80).....	29

## CONTENTS (Continued)

Ineffectiveness of Western Response to Soviet Aggression (Patrick Wajzman; LE FIGARO, 29 Feb 80).....	34
Analysis of PCF, PCI Differences on Afghanistan Intervention (Annie Kriegel; LE FIGARO, 24 Jan 80).....	37
Detailed Overview of French Forces in FRG (Wolfgang Flume; WEHRTECHNIK, Apr 80).....	40
General Brasart Interviewed on Force's Duties (Pierre Brasart Interview; WEHRTECHNIK, Apr 80).....	54

## CANADA

Quebec Papers Comment on PLQ Congress (Various sources, 3 Mar 80).....	59
Congress of a New PLQ, by Michel Roy	
Beige Book Remains Intact, by Marcel Adam	
Ryan's Liberals, by Claude Beauchamp	

## DENMARK

Afghanistan, Pre-Stockage Issue Raise Interest in Security Debate (Various sources, various dates).....	65
Military Speaks Out, by Rolf Bagger	
MP's See 'Allies Pressure', by Jorgen Dragsdahl	
Security Policy Committee Urged, by Jorgen Dragsdahl	
Three Percent Seen Inadequate, by Christian Brondum	
Consortium To Begin Test Drilling in South Jutland (BERLINGSKE TIDENDE, 5 Mar 80).....	74
Business Institute Sees 39 Billion Gross for North Sea Consortium (BERLINGSKE TIDENDE, 13 Mar 80).....	75
Consortium Will Provide 23 Percent of Oil Needs by 1985 (INFORMATION, 18 Mar 80).....	77



CONTENTS (Continued)

Oil Exploration Group Acts To Aid Danish Firms (INFORMATION, 10 Mar 80).....	79
Briefs	
Gas, Oil Consumption Down	80
Radical Liberals Quit Panel	80
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY	
Officials Discuss Arms Projects, Cooperation, Budget (Karl Schnell Interview; WEHRTECHNIK, Apr 80).....	81
Hauff Visit to Israel, Near East Policy Noted (DER SPIEGEL, 24 Mar 80).....	94
Debate Within Trade Unions on Youth Work, Communism (Ernst Guenter Vetter; FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE, 24 Mar 80).....	96
FRANCE	
Western Incomprehension of Soviet Motives, Reasoning (Editorial; Max Clos; LE FIGARO, 24 Jan 80).....	100
ICELAND	
New Government Sends Budget to Althing (MORGUNBLADID, 11 Mar 80).....	102
Finance Minister Arnalds Defends Budget in News Conference (MORGUNBLADID, 12 Mar 80).....	103
Paper Attacks Budget for Inflationary Factors (Editorial; MORGUNBLADID, 12 Mar 80).....	105
Budget Bill Proposes 65.3 Percent Increase in Outlays (MORGUNBLADID, 12 Mar 80).....	107
Final Calculations Show Inflation Reached 61 Percent in 1979 (MORGUNBLADID, 13 Mar 80).....	108

CONTENTS (Continued)

Briefs

Effects of Dollar's Rise

109

SWEDEN

Scientific Researchers Forced To Seek Jobs Abroad

(Peter Sandberg; DAGENS NYHETER, 18 Mar 80)..... 110

## PRESS COMMENTS ON SCHMIDT'S MISSILE SUGGESTION

## Impetus for USSR Talks

DW161528 Munich SUEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 16 Apr 80 pp 1, 2

[Bonn Correspondent's report signed MES.: "Schmidt Wants To Animate Arms Control Talks With His Suggestion to Moscow"]

[Text] Bonn, 15 April--Federal Chancellor Schmidt is pursuing the aim with his surprising disarmament policy move of creating a new impetus for talks with the Soviet Union despite the stalemated international situation. According to reliable information, Schmidt has gathered from recent reports submitted to Bonn that giving a signal to Moscow on the resumption of arms control policy contacts would not be completely without a chance. The Federal Chancellor received full backing from the Presidium of his party for the suggestion that the West and the East should temporarily renounce the stationing of additional medium-range missiles and use the time for negotiations. Franz Josef Strauss, the CSU chairman and candidate for chancellor of the CDU/CSU union, termed the suggestion "an open affront against NATO and an undisguised provocation against the United States."

Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher also appealed to the Soviet Union to be prepared for disarmament talks. He stressed on Tuesday to the FDP Bundestag faction with special emphasis that the decisions made by NATO last December remain on the table "unchanged." It is being concluded in Bonn from the statement of the foreign minister that he wants to avoid the impression at any rate that the Federal Government in some way is softening up on the jointly worked out suggestions of the Western alliance.

It was stressed again on Thursday in government circles that with his formulations Schmidt did not deviate from the current decisions. The SPD Presidium, which met on Monday night in Berlin, stressed in a communique the recent statements of the Federal Chancellor with the words that Schmidt has stated the expectation that, on the one hand, the second agreement on the limitation of [words illegible], SALT II, should be ratified [words illegible] while, on the other hand, the Soviet Union ought to show preparedness to negotiate on medium-range arms. The statement goes on to say: "The Presidium firmly supported in particular the opinion of the Federal Chancellor that for a

certain number of years both sides should renounce the stationing of new or additional medium-range arms, and that this time ought to be exploited for negotiations." This ought to take place according to the principle that the military balance must be preserved as a prerequisite for security and cooperation, and that "unambiguous political priority" must be given to arms control and arms limitation.

According to the assessment of well-informed Bonn circles, Schmidt wanted to signal to Moscow preparedness for talks in the interest of German-Soviet relations, talks in a field where German policy must not oppose the policy of the American ally. It seems possible to gather from some Moscow information-discussion contacts on the level that was recently exploited by Wehner's aide Eugen Selbmann in the Soviet capital--are probably meant--that the Soviet leadership is also increasingly concerned about the absolute standstill in the disarmament dialogue between East and West. It is being interpreted in Bonn that the Federal Chancellor has therefore made a new attempt to interest Moscow in again taking up the thread of talks. The assessment also exists in the Federal Government that the Soviet attitude not to negotiate as long as NATO's double decision is not shelved need not necessarily be Moscow's final word.

In its double decision NATO linked its decision to produce and station modern medium-range missiles in Western Europe (Pershing II and cruise missiles) with an offer of immediate negotiations on the limitation of such arms and on disarmament in this field. The decision was a reaction to the fact that for years the Soviet Union has been continuously replacing its medium-range arms potential with long-range missiles of the SS-20 type.

The Federal Government, however, does not foster any illusions with regard to the chances for success of Schmidt's move. For the Soviet Union it is certainly of decisive significance as a prerequisite for negotiations that the U.S. Congress ratify SALT II, which is not to be expected at present. The recent Soviet disarmament suggestions which were addressed to the United Nations, in Bonn's assessment, do not contain new elements and are therefore being considered as Soviet propaganda maneuvers. As regards an analysis of this point, the Federal Government and the BDU/CSU opposition agree to a large extent.

Strauss said in an interview with the Bonn paper DIE WELT that Schmidt's suggestion is a capitulation to Herbert Wehner. The result is "the suggestion that was made long ago by the Soviet Union via all diplomatic and political channels aimed at dropping NATO's Brussels decision to close the arms gap, and to merely have disarmament talks with the Soviet Union for an indefinite number of years." The chancellor intentionally accepts that the Kremlin would be able to develop its medium-range potential "even more recklessly and quickly."

Between Schmidt and Federal Foreign Minister Genscher there is either "double dealing with secretly marked cards" or "no genuine common interests."

Schmidt, Genscher in Agreement

DW171015 Stuttgart Sueddeutscher Rundfunk Network in German 1030 GMT  
16 Apr 80 DW

[Excerpts from Bonn Correspondent Middelndorf Commentary]

[Excerpts] As far as the chancellor candidate of the CDU/CSU is concerned, the proposal by the chancellor to discontinue the deployment of medium-range missiles in Europe for a specific period is tantamount to Helmut Schmidt's capitulation to Herbert Wehner. This is the manner of speech of the CDU/CSU chancellor candidate in an election campaign dispute: permissible but not true.

The discussion is vehement, the positions are controversial, What people see in particular is a dispute between the chancellor and the Federal foreign minister. Genscher's publication struck some people like a public reprimand and another commitment of the Federal Government to decisions made jointly with the alliance partners. But last fall the foreign minister himself termed the postponement of additional missile deployment helpful to a negotiated solution in the field of the grey area weapons.

Thus in principle there is no difference in view, even if the coalition partner was probably not very pleased with the way the chancellor's proposal had been advanced. But there is neither cause nor room for quarrel in such an explosive situation where German politics is involved internationally and has tasks to perform.

Tehran must prepare for German sanctions. Moscow will be shocked by the German Olympic boycott in the next few days. So the chancellor's proposal to the Soviets may be interpreted as a signal for the need for negotiations, a need which continues to exist. The coalition is agreed on this.

In that respect Genscher is restricted in his enthusiasm. But for the Federal Republic the continuation of the dialogue with the East continues to be vital. The visit by top SED politician Guenter Mittag is a signal made on behalf of the Eastern side. The suggestion concerning deployment--which is not to be applicable without limits--is one from the West German side and part of a risky balancing attempt between the two blocs.

CSO: 3103



MILITARY STRATEGISTS ASSESS RISKS OF NUCLEAR CONFLICT

Paris LE MONDE in French 20 Feb 80 p 10

Detente, Soviet Military Buildup

[Article by former Army Chief of Staff Gen Francois Maurin (Ret), chairman of the National Liaison Committee for Defense, Armed Forces and Nation: "What Detente?"]

[Text] What is new today is the fact that the world to which we had become accustomed after the end of the Second World War, with its East-West bipolarization, is now completely destabilized.

This destabilization has ensued from the courses of action of the United States and the Soviet Union, in pursuit of their different aims, that have led to the destruction of the equilibrium they needed to perfect their dialog and conduct the affairs of the world. Under cover of detente, the USSR has continued to build and improve its conventional and nuclear military forces as rapidly as the discovery of new technologies has permitted it.

The cost of modern equipment, which makes the Western countries thing long and hard before embarking on any new program, is not an essential consideration to this country, whose economy is a closed one and whose masses are not fundamentally concerned with the exchange rate of the ruble or the inflation rate.

The Basic Trump

The Soviets take part in all the international conferences on security, the reduction of forces and disarmament, and preach peaceful coexistence, without ever making the slightest genuine move toward diminishing the menace that its military power, through its very existence, casts over the rest of the world.

This power is the basic trump that has raised the USSR to the rank of Super-Great, enabled it to pull itself up militarily above the level of the United States, and thus to pursue its expansion in the tradition of czarist Russia and from the viewpoint of communizing the world.

While others have believed in detente, the Soviets have made no secret of their desire for revolutionary struggle and the propagation of regimes modeled on their own. Having neither a public opinion nor a mass media of their own to contend with, they are now seeking out all the Western weaknesses they can exploit, and have conditioned us to the pursuit of their offensive as long as they do not encounter a resistance equal to their thrust.

Meanwhile, the United States, convinced to the point of complacency of its economic power, elected a president who, by his own admission, believed enough in dialog with the Soviets to halt construction of the neutron bomb and the B-1 bomber, delay decision on the MX missile, and transfer technologies to the Soviets that were highly essential to the modernization of their weapons.

#### A Problematic Control

It is always better to talk than to turn one's back, but the fact is that the results of the dialogs of the past 15 years have not been all that great.

Mutual agreement was reached to limit the anti-missile missile sites and, finally, to halt the development of these systems only because the United States had assessed their prohibitive cost and the Soviets had assessed the tremendous technical difficulties involved in their realization.

Although the SALT 1 agreements signed 20 May 1972 stabilized the quantitative ceiling on offensive weapons, their immediate consequence was to set off a new race between the two signatories: this time, a qualitative one.

The SALT 2 treaty was the object of a noteworthy study that appeared in issue number 3 of *POLITIQUE ETRANGERE*, published by the French Institute of International Relations. This study makes it intelligibly clear that these agreements, with effect until 31 December 1985 except for a protocol on missiles that expires on 31 December 1981, have no real value unless the good faith of all concerned in respecting the commitments undertaken is total, there being no effective means of monitoring compliance. Everyone knows that despite the advancements made in spy satellites, the imperviousness of national boundaries and the coming into being of mobile missiles render the monitoring of Soviet Russia problematic at best.

This treaty establishes very high ceilings on strategic missiles, exceeding by far the numbers that would be needed to paralyze either of the parties to the treaty.

It also leaves the way free and clear to the deployment of Soviet weapons systems in Europe. In this respect, it must not be forgotten that the modernization of the NATO forces with cruise missiles and Pershing 2's (to be operational some years hence) is being induced by the coming on the scene of the Soviet mobile precision, multiple-warhead Soviet SS-20, which is already being deployed against Western Europe.

The Forces Reduction Meetings in Vienna and the Disarmament Meetings in Geneva have thus far produced nothing concrete. At Helsinki, the Westerners were deluded into thinking they had won universal respect for Human Rights, while in fact the Soviets sought above all to obtain definitive recognition and acceptance of the Yalta partitions.

If treaties are to be respected and meetings are to be effective, the parties thereto must pursue compatible aims. The evidence is now clear, for anyone who might still have doubts, that this was not the case.

Until now, the USSR, with its superabundant arsenal, has limited itself to supporting its partners by providing them with equipment and technicians, and, to the extent necessary, with foreign interventionist combat troops. This denoted a certain restraint on its part. But suddenly, in Afghanistan, Soviet troops have invaded the country without the latter having been the object of an identifiable attack or military threat.

Even if excuses could be found for this invasion and allowances made for the USSR to consider Afghanistan as a necessary ally whose territory represented a regional glacis for the USSR, it is important to note the change in the latter's behavior and the aggressive character of this action that is being carried out, for the first time, by a direct commitment of the Red Army.

Proud

Is it the USSR's intent now to take advantage of a certain impunity it derives from its military power in the face of the American attitude and the Islamic revolution?

I shall not take it upon myself here to analyze intentions, for, in my time, I have had some cordial and interesting contacts with the USSR military chiefs.\* They were proud of their armed forces, of what they represented for the nation, and they did not hide the fact that they had been schooled and drilled in the style of the offensive, to win, for which they can in no way be blamed. However, they, and especially Marshal Gretchko, seemed to me to be very much aware of the difficulties of limiting a conflict in time and in space, where modern weaponry is involved.

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\* Editor's note: General Maurin was chief of staff of the French Armed Forces from 1971 to 1975.

The armed forces hold a privileged position in the USSR leadership, and their chiefs obtain for them priority in the fulfillment of their needs. The USSR spent the equivalent of \$165 billion on military equipment and carried out 28 new nuclear tests in 1979.

There is in all of this a deliberate choice: The party and the army are one and the same, as if force were still the best means of imposing a certain type of society at home as well as abroad.

The Soviets run their empire, perhaps to keep it from splitting apart, in accordance with norms that differ entirely from those we know. This is no doubt their right. But what is serious is that they continue wanting to impose them on others. To dialog with them on a sound basis, one must first of all understand their language, not to adopt it, but not to be put-upon. This is why it astonishes me to see such astonishment over their current actions.

Militarily, I am convinced that beyond the usual brandishing of tanks, planes, warships, strategic missiles and tactical missiles, and notwithstanding the undeniable position enjoyed by the Soviet armed forces in their own country, it would be lunacy on the part of the USSR to attempt a large-scale offensive directly against the West.

Even granting their current theoretical first-strike capability against purely military objective and their current preparedness to conduct a massive offensive by conventional means, I believe they have not the least doubt as to the immediate response these actions would bring into being over their own territory.

Nevertheless, it is important to keep the unbalance that has now been triggered from weighing any more heavily in their favor, so that one of their leaders may not some day be tempted to have a go just to see what happens! On the other hand, this will not keep them from exploiting their power in a region where the risks to themselves appear minor, with all the disastrous long-term consequences this action could involve for everyone.

#### An Adequate Degree of Independence

France is one of the countries that has done the most to bring about a genuine detente. Convinced that the politics of blocs could only lead to an unbridled armaments race and eventually to a suicidal confrontation, she has equipped herself with the means for her own defense.

She has thus acquired a degree of independence sufficient to preserve her freedom of will and of action to adopt positions of her own choice. She cannot however afford to stand by without reacting to a nibbling away that can one day challenge and put to the test again the fundamental options of the free world.

Her intent to continue her policy of independence is clear from the continued development of her nuclear forces and of adequate means to deter any attempt at a direct aggression against her. What chief of state would sacrifice the lives of millions of his countrymen for a victory without meaning, since it would be a victory over ruins?

I believe in the deterrent power of the French nuclear forces, despite the coming into being of new weapons that are more precise and "cleaner," since the launching of a single one of those weapons against our territory would unquestionably bring immediate reprisals.

#### Without Ambiguities

To maintain her deterrent position in the current forces relationship, France must have a strategy without ambiguities and permitting of no vacillation whatever.

As regards conventional forces, our country now has a high-grade armaments industry. Not intended for aggression against anyone whomever, it is perfectly clear that despite our possible contribution against a conventional attack on the European theater the West can only respond with nuclear weapons, and that the conflict would then degenerate rapidly, ending up outside the tactical sphere.

Our conventional forces enable us to provide aid to those who may request it. This aid derives its particular character from the fact of France's independence, imposing on its beneficiaries no requirement whatever that they submit to any partisan ideology or to constrictive economic conditions.

The president of the republic has submitted concrete disarmament proposals to the UN, there being no possibility of genuine peace among the world's peoples at this point in time without a reduction and effective control of armaments, especially those of the super powers.

It is symptomatic of the current situation that these proposals have not yet progressed beyond institutional levels.

#### International Dialog

With regard to the recent derangement of international relations, France and Germany have now roundly condemned the military invasion of Afghanistan and laid the responsibility at the door of the USSR.

The ball is now in the latter's court.

To restore peaceful coexistence within a framework of mutual respect, an international dialog must be resumed beginning immediately and based on new propositions.



The world situation demands chiefs of state with a statesmanlike sense of responsibility, certainly cool-headed, but also clear-headed as regards the importance of the stakes: Is there to be a genuine detente based on mutuality of trust, or an ineluctable progression toward a major conflict?

#### Detente, Third World Decolonization

Paris LE MONDE in French 21 Feb 80 p 10

[Article by University of Paris (Nanterre) Professor Jacques Huntzinger: "Two Crisis 'Arcs'"]

[Text] Have we now entered the era of "chain wars"? The number of hot spots and dangerous situations appears to be growing daily: Ethiopia, Cambodia, Timor, Iran, Afghanistan, Guatemala, South Yemen, Tunisia, and perhaps tomorrow Thailand, Turkey, Zaire, and so on. Hardly has a civil or local war broken out somewhere than a new conflict at the other end of the globe is steeping humanity in blood. Open wars and covert wars, wars fought with old rifles and wars fought with highly sophisticated technologies, tribal wars and revolutionary wars, and so on. But is the Great War that is, the War of the Greats, a likely possibility? Yes, if the Greats no longer know how or care to control themselves. Yes, if the Greats no longer exercise self-restraint and abandon all sense of compromise and reasonableness, if, in a word, they forsake detente.

There are currently two crisis "arcs," different in nature but heading toward an entanglement with one another: the crisis of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, and the third-world crisis.

#### The Golden Age

It is now some years since the spirit of detente was badly damaged. The War of Yom Kippur was the turning point: The Soviets and the Americans were at one and the same time talking to each other (Mr Kissinger went to Moscow) and playing dirty tricks on each other.

Let us recall the days between 22 and 25 October 1973, during which the Soviet Union threatened gruffly to land troops on Egyptian soil to stop the Israeli offensive that was being pursued despite the ceasefire, and the ordering up of a NATO alert. This October 1973 "mini-Cuba," coming only a few weeks after the solemn signing of the June 1973 agreement between Mr Nixon and Mr Brezhnev on the prevention of nuclear conflicts and on concerted action between the two Greats in case of crisis, demonstrated how easily the dominant factors in East-West relations--the antagonism, the distrust and the spirit of competition--could resurface despite embraces between Mr Kissinger and Mr Brezhnev.

Detente had been a real thing, not an illusion. The achievements of the golden age of detente during the 1970's cannot be erased: the settlements of the German problem and on Berlin, the strategic talks, the development of exchanges and relations of all kinds between Eastern and Western countries, and above all the emergence of a common identity among the peoples of Europe as one continent artificially cut in two. Detente was first of all a language, a code between rival powers. A language of signals and gestures: the telephone "hot line," the meetings between Mr Brezhnev and Mr Nixon, Mr Brandt kneeling before the Auschwitz memorial, de Gaulle going to Moscow and to Warsaw. In international relations, form is frequently more important than the content of things.

When ulterior motives are at odds, it is highly important to get on with talks, since the dividing line between peace and war is a very slender one. Detente was a thin, fragile veil through which talks could be carried on and agreements reached despite deep underlying rivalries and opposing strategies.

But this thin veil was unable to withstand the stress of events, the structural rigidities of the system, the economic crisis, Soviet ambitions, and the conservatism of the leaderships. The Soviet Union played with fire, imagining that in the American view detente could indeed mean parity of forces and recognition of Moscow's status as a great power.

One by one, as the USSR displayed more and more of its power, frictions arose; There was Angola, Ethiopia, the SS-18's the SS-20's, and finally, Afghanistan, the straw that broke the camel's back and ushered in the era of the "cool war."

Is the USSR an imperial power and heir to the ambitions of the czars and the torch of bolshevism? Is the United States an imperial republic that remains certain of its rightness and of the universal character of its ideals, and unable, deep down within itself, to accept no longer being the world's leading power? "We must, no matter what the price, remain the world's most powerful nation." This sentence clarifies Mr Jimmy Carter's entire State of the Union message to the Congress of the United States on 21 January.

Following the example of the Truman Doctrine, linked to the 1947 civil war in Greece, and the Eisenhower Doctrine, linked to the 1958 crisis in the Middle East, the Carter Doctrine makes simultaneous use of a threat addressed to the USSR, a stepping up of military expenditures, and an appeal to the allies for solidarity of intent to "contain" Soviet power, particularly in the Persian Gulf.

Concurrently, the USSR issued a Brezhnev Doctrine covering the new progressive third-world countries linked to it through special cooperation and aid agreements, to safeguard socialism's new gains against "the reactionary

machinations of world imperialism." The USSR will defend socialism in Kaboul, as in Addis-Ababa, as in Prague. These reactions have their logic and must not cause surprise.

But at the same time that the East-West system has been heating up, the world has been changing. The transformation of the international society has been such that today there are close to 150 nations, nearly two thirds of which are less than 30 years old as such. As a result of this explosion of young sovereignties and because of the diverse natures of their leaderships, the international system has never been as fragile as it appears to be today.

We are starting to feel the buffeting action of post-decolonization, the second crisis "arc." It is linked to the internal fragility of the new states, to the difficulties they are encountering in trying to live within the traditional frame of reference of the nation-state, but it is also linked to the coming into being of rivalries, appetites and vying for influence within each region of the Third World. This is evident especially in Asia. The state of affairs of the world today is comparable to the one that existed in Europe at the time of the Hundred Years War. We are living a hundred years war on the scale of continents in Timor, in South-east Asia, in Dhofar, in Africa, in the Antilles.

These two current crisis arcs, one of which derives its potential from the degradation of relations between the two great powers, and the other from the forces of change in the international order, are inconfusedly distinct from one another, but they are becoming entangled.

#### Nuclear Senselessness

The risk of internationalization of local wars, the hotbeds of tension, is increasing with the seeming decision of the Two Greats to scarify each other more than ever so as not to lose face versus each other. The wars of the little ones could become the wars of the Greats. The world's sparks could become blazing firebeds. The spirit of detente having given way to the old demons of open competition, rivalries have become so deep-rooted, the accumulation of weapons so unsettling, and the distrusts and temptations on both sides so formidable, that despite all intentions of avoiding a war, little more is needed to make one likely. A Sarajevo could occur, because regardless of what one may think, once the dogs are unleashed, the Two Greats will be unable to control themselves or the crisis.

There remains, however, another possible tollgate capable of restraining the powers: the balance of forces. With detente degraded, reciprocal fear of mutual destruction has become the supreme rampart for the maintenance of peace. Now that we can no longer enjoy peace through detente, can we at least have peace through fear? Can a balance of forces between the United States and the Soviet Union be maintained? A situation of strategic

balance exists today that evidently rests upon partial vulnerability of the strategic systems of both. What has shaken the Americans is that they have suddenly discovered that their central strategic systems are vulnerable to a Soviet first strike. Now, the Americans have lived for 30 years convinced they are an impregnable fortress. In other words, they negotiated the SALT agreements from the viewpoint of parity, when in reality they could not accept parity. Indeed, in the final analysis, who with a Western mind could accept that the United States no longer be the world's foremost military power? Deeply underlying Western public opinion is the feeling that the United States must remain the world's most powerful nation. The idea that it is no longer more than an equal power is profoundly unsettling to public opinion, the media, and political leaders.

Assuming this strategic equivalence, I believe the most disturbing question as to the future is not whether one or the other will be the more powerful. There is in fact an action-reaction mechanism involved: Following a brief period of relative advantage favoring the USSR, the United States will recover a certain superiority toward the end of the 1980's. What seems to me more serious is that both powers are engaged in a race toward nuclear senselessness: the development of limited options; the development of antisubmarine detection equipment; the "killer satellite" projects; nuclear combat applications of the laser; and so on. This is a race toward preventive destruction of reprisal capabilities.

A point in time could be reached when either of them, feeling no longer secure in respect to its second-strike capabilities and fearing that its nuclear systems will be destroyed in a first strike by the other, will be tempted to be the first to press the button to prevent the destruction of its own nuclear forces. This scenario makes for political fiction, because this is 1980. But I believe it will not be political fiction in the next few decades. It is a race toward nuclear senselessness because the strategy of "assured mutual destruction" rested on a postulate formulated by SALT 1: the invulnerability of reprisal systems is to be preserved to ensure mutual nuclear equanimity ("If you attack me first, I can destroy you"). Only this reciprocal certainty can create a balance of fear. But this balance is in danger of becoming a very serious future unbalance.

The current crisis is going to halt arms-control negotiations for a time. The consignment of SALT 2 to the freezer and the Soviet statement that there will be no SALT 3 because NATO has decided to modernize its nuclear forces are going to block the SALT process for a long time to come. The American drive toward confrontation with the Soviet Union will accelerate, and the current Soviet team with its internal checks and balances will not be the one to resume nuclear arms control.

In sum, the danger we now face is a return to the original state of affairs deriving from the upsetting of international standards in all domains.



The affair of the Tehran hostages is a more serious one than that of Afghanistan. For the first time in the history of diplomatic relations there has been a permanent violation of diplomatic immunity, something that did not take place even during the Chinese cultural revolution. The massacre of the children by Bokassa, the Cambodian genocide, the total upsetting of the monetary system all point in the same direction: The international society had erected for itself a structured set of rules to free it of the Second World War. All of these rules are now in the process of being trampled into dust.

### Third World Instability

Paris LE MONDE in French 22 Feb 80 p 13

[Article by French Institute for International Relations Lecturer Pierre Lellouche: "Die for Kabul?"]

[Text] Is it likely that the international crisis triggered by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan will lead in time to a general confrontation in which Europe would be involved? Should the fears of war being expressed by the Western world's leading political and religious authorities be taken seriously?

As is unfortunately too often the case in similar circumstances, there is no shortage of political leaders and experts in our country to grind out "clarifications," each one more simplistic than the other, all having the common aim of reassuring public opinion by avoiding at all costs calling a spade a spade. While the French communists align themselves entirely on the "clarifications" issued by Mr Brezhnev, other representatives of the non-PCF [French Communist Party] left see nothing in the current tense climate but the result of an "alarmist campaign" carefully orchestrated by the West. This campaign, in their view, is designed to prepare a revival of the armaments race to hide from the peoples of the world the bankruptcy of the capitalist economies.

Still others, clinging desperately to the notion that war is impossible in the atomic age, explain away to us the current climate as a mere phenomenon being amplified in style by the media and highlighted by the success, for example, of certain political fiction literature on the theme of the "third world war."

### At the Edge of the Abyss

Less superficial but just as comforting is the idea that the current crisis has, after all, had many precedents since 1945 and that Europe has always come out of them whole.



It is true, in fact, that the so-called "peripheral" conflicts--meaning those of the Third World--have not ceased for 35 years. It is also true that the superpowers have never ceased confronting each other in those regions, without any effect on Europe. Twice, of course (Cuba in 1962 and the Yom Kippur War in 1973), the world has trembled before the danger of a nuclear exchange. But did not the superpowers stop, in each case, at the edge of the abyss? And have they not, following each feverish eruption (Hungary in 1956, Cuba in 1962, Czechoslovakia in 1968, the American bombardment of Haiphong in 1971, to say nothing of the Soviet interventions in Africa and the Middle East since 1974-1975), continued their dialog, precisely in order to prevent the escalation of a local crisis to a global level? Did they not sign an agreement in 1973 on the prevention of nuclear war, designed precisely to "manage" the type of crisis confronting us today?

Thus, despite the seriousness of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and despite President Carter's promise to defend the Persian Gulf by force, we --we Europeans--according to this viewpoint, have every chance of preserving our peace if only the few princes who rule us keep their "objectivity."

#### Miscalculation

This idea of "objectivity" which the president of the republic has stressed is at one and the same time uniquely appropriate and insufficient.

It is appropriate because it is terrifying to realize just how fragile is the atomic dialog that was thought to be solidly established between the superpowers. For in the Afghanistan affair, at least three successive miscalculations are evident.

First miscalculation: The Americans did not react to the Soviet-style coup d'etat of April 1978, nor to the execution of their ambassador in Kabul several months later. They also refused to believe, despite all the indications gathered after the summer of 1979, that the Soviets intended to launch a military operation. Second miscalculation, this time a Soviet one: This absence of an American reaction convinced Moscow that its intervention would draw no serious response from Washington. Third miscalculation: The United States, after having let the Soviets do what they wanted in Africa and the Middle East over the last 5 years, does a 180 degree about-face on Afghanistan and threatens to resort to force to defend the Persian Gulf. Now, in the absence of conventional military superiority in the region, this commitment can only mean a nuclear escalation. Thus, in just 1 month, Washington switches from passive indifference to the utmost extreme of combativeness.

This sequence of uncontrolled actions and reactions is in itself disturbing and recalls the process which, starting with the occupation of the Rhineland, was able to lure the European countries from miscalculation to miscalculation and from pullback to pullback until the day of their reluctant resignation to dying for Danzig.

## A More Searching Analysis

But assuming the "objectivity" advocated by Mr Giscard d'Estaing can help overcome the current crisis, will it suffice to preserve the peace enduringly? This notion of coolness seems to imply that once the Afghanistan crisis is settled the situation will return to "normal detente."

The question arises, however: Are we not now actually confronted by a new international situation, a new forces relationship requiring a more searching analysis on our part and a more voluntarist policy? For while it is true that the current crisis is positioned as the prolongation of a long series of peripheral conflicts in which the superpowers have been involved, it is nevertheless distinct from them in at least two fundamental respects:

1) The general context of the current point in time is that of an almost total disintegration of the international system that has been built up since 1945. The major international organizations, of course, subsist, but the system has collapsed by complete structures: This is the case especially with international monetary and economic relations.

Moreover, the rules of conduct that were believed to have been agreed by all are being violated with impunity, a precedent (the hostages in the American Embassy in Tehran) that is rapidly becoming the rule (violation of the Spanish Embassy in Guatemala and the French Embassy in Tripoli). In such a context, the major economic and demographic unbalances that are at the source of conflicts have hardly a chance of being settled other than through a violence that has become commonplace, almost "normal." Inurement follows to the idea that war, even nuclear war, is again conceivable, not only because technological progress has reopened to question the concept of "assured mutual destruction," but also because the growing number of nations possessing the supreme weapon complicates tremendously the already fragile balance of terror between the two superpowers.

2) The second new fact as compared to the crises of the 1950's and 1960's is that, this time, it is the USSR that has taken the offensive, and that this move was deliberate.

### Soviet Superiority

From the standpoint of military equipment, it is incontrovertible that the USSR has since the mid-1970's acquired a strategic force at least the equivalent of that of the United States. For convincing evidence, one need only read the inventories of forces annexed to the SALT 2 agreement.\* The

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\*The text of the treaty and its annexes was published in POLITIQUE ETRANGERE, No 3 (1979).

geographic situation, moreover, and the continued growth of its conventional weaponry give the USSR an incontestable advantage as much in the European theater as in the Persian Gulf region.

On the other hand, the United States of today, although "awakened" by the Afghanistan crisis, fears the vulnerability of its own nuclear forces. It no longer controls the atomic escalation game in Europe, where the Soviets have added to their superiority in conventional armaments a new theater nuclear weapons potential.

In the Persian Gulf and in Central Asia, the military situation is even more disquieting, in that in the absence of Iranian protectorship and of a solid base in the region, Washington is compelled to resort to a nuclear all-or-nothing threat. There is however a more serious consideration than the mere military weapons imbalance. The most disturbing aspect is that, this time, the USSR is convinced, as Mr Brezhnev and Mr Marchais are moreover very clearly putting it, that "the forces relationship throughout the world is favorable to the forces of peace," that is, to the USSR.

This analysis indeed corresponds to reality, at least over the near and medium term: Assuming it is at all possible for the United States to recover nuclear superiority, it will not be until near the end of the 1980's; furthermore, it will be several years before it can establish a credible military presence in the Gulf (assuming the Gulf countries agree to cooperate); and economically, the crisis that afflicts the West is structural, hence enduring.

This confluence of favorable factors has led the Soviets to cast aside their seemingly customary caution and to adopt a more and more militant and ostentatious policy, beginning with 40,000 Cubans in Angola 6 years ago, following through with interventions in Ethiopia and Yemen, to the 100,000 Red Army soldiers in Kabul. For, be it noted in passing, if the Soviet objective in Afghanistan was to put Mr Karmal in power, the simple coup d'etat needed did not require their moving in eight divisions, covered by Western television cameras.

#### A Real Danger

In these circumstances, the risk of a direct confrontation between the superpowers--that is, the danger of a war--is real. It is real now. It is real now because the military forces relationship in the region is unbalanced, hence dangerous; because the local political situation is extremely unstable; and because the two superpowers have each decided to take control. This danger of a confrontation will continue to be very serious until a new security system is established in the region, meaning, to be perfectly clear, until a new division of influence between the two superpowers becomes operative in the region and guaranteed by their nuclear umbrellas.

What are the implications in this situation for France? France had, paradoxically, as far back as 1974, hence 6 years before the United States, understood the dangers that were looming for the West in the destabilization of vital third-world areas.\*\* In Africa, France felt compelled to act, and to act alone, at a time when Mr Andrew Young appeared to be rejoicing in the Cuban interventions there. In view of this, the hesitations of French diplomacy in the circumstances surrounding the Afghanistan affair are all the more surprising. For France can neither view the Soviet intervention as a "regional" matter nor posit itself as referee between the Two Greats, first of all because we do not have the means, but above all because our own interests are also being threatened. In politics as elsewhere, the dual role of judge and party to a dispute has never been a satisfactory one.

Without, therefore, in any way renouncing its historic and justified devotedness to detente, nor its specific role in relation to the superpowers, France must nevertheless take cognizance of the fact that a certain phase of the dialog with the USSR has now ended. It would be both dangerous and a miscalculation to refuse to act for the protection of our interests in the Persian Gulf under pretext of saving detente in Europe. The two things are and must remain inseparable.

#### U. S., Soviet Strategic Parity

Paris LE MONDE in French 23 Feb 80 p 10

[Article by School of Higher Social Sciences Assistant Lecturer Alain Joxe: "A Gloomy Optimism"]

[Text] Expressing his views, following those [above] of Gen Francois Maurin, Mr Jacques Huntzinger and Mr Pierre Lellouche (LE MONDE 20, 21 and 22 February), Mr Alain Joxe believes we are perhaps not on the verge of a world conflict, but that the current crises are benefiting the armaments industrialists.

I am convinced that the next generation will not forgive ours for having left the world in the monstrous state in which daily life is lived under the menace of an atomic massacre that could cause millions of deaths. It will want to change that situation and will succeed in doing so. Meanwhile, we see thriving a strange race of "military" strategists, who do not even have the former warriors' concept of life and who manage the apocalypse as if it were a portfolio of stocks.

These first-generation experts in deception are happy with themselves, because they think they have been, in accordance with the Gospel, the shepherds of peace. But what about the new generation that must relieve them

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\*\* See, for example, the speech of 8 November 1974 by the president of the republic (LE MONDE 10-11 November 1974).



and must manage the balance of terror toward limited duels, force against force? Drunk with progress, they "chamois" an aggressive death industry that has conquered "real time," having crushed political-decision time down to fractions of seconds, and stagger down the empty streets of their dream like the bad cowboys in a B-film, finger on the trigger. They will be swept away some day by the wrath of the people.

It is they, the servants of this perverse branch of our contemporary industrial system, who are today creating a war psychosis designed to reactivate the economy and to bring in, through fear, a new social discipline equivalent to the fascisms of the past.

### Extraordinary Alarmism

There is, however, nothing extraordinary at this point in time as regards either the number or the nature of the conflicts in progress.

What is extraordinary is the level of alarmism. It is entirely artificial and warrants attention only because there is an economic crisis, anxiety pervades daily life, and efforts are being made everywhere to channel popular apprehensions in the direction of an even worse fear.

This is why I believe we can still be optimistic. A gloomy optimism, of course. War is no longer a manageable tool for economic restoration. In its predatory aspects it has been effectively replaced by automated financial manipulations, satellite-spying on harvests, monopolization of leading industries in the technological race, torture for the sake of labor productivity.

In its function as a destroyer of capital to offset the downward trend of profit levels, war, according to classic Marxist theory, is being replaced by the armaments industry, which renders unproductive then destroys, through obsolescence, more capital than any war in the past.

This destructive function has been organized by the Two Greats since the 1960's during their SALT tournament, which has done nothing more than moderate the speedup of the armaments race. Their connivance seems to be in crisis since the adjournment of SALT 2, but there is already talk of applying the agreements without signing them. The future of the armaments race has not been compromised and, as things now stand, it has served as a substitute for the Great War. I do not propose to belabor the issue of the Afghanistan affair, for which the Soviets will soon be smiling on the other side of their faces, but which is not very alarming if one cares to note that the Soviets' total abstention from Iran seals a new carving up of zones of influence in the region, aimed at control of the new Islamic neutralism by the Two Greats.



Lastly, Persian Gulf oil is the nub of a sharp energy conflict between the United States and Europe. The USSR will studiously avoid getting its nose into it for the moment and will apply itself to perpetuating the status of the Afghanistan affair as an internal one to its Central Asian empire. The more the Soviets become involved in Asia, the less the pressures they can think of exerting on Europe. The Afghanistan-Europe hodgepodge is strategically meaningless.

There remains the question then of nuclear balances, and it is on this question that I should like to dwell.

Atlantic alarmism is being hitched to two misleading concepts, clearly and purely military: 1) the weapons imbalance could of itself cause a war; 2) the West has become inferior to the USSR from the standpoint of the strategic balance.

The first concept is simply a false notion. Weapons are never the cause of war, and nuclear weapons much less than others. As has been evident since 1945, they have a chilling effect on their possessors. The second concept is false information, propagated in the United States for electoral purposes, as was the erstwhile myth of the "missile gap" (or technological gap), and picked up for their own purposes by the European governments.

A global imbalance favoring the USSR does not exist. This concept has moreover no meaning whatever in an anti-city or anti-resources sense. The Two Greats having the means of killing the entire enemy population many times over, there is a definite balance. The Americans have since 1973 been trying to restore an imbalance, basing their calculations on a comparison of counterforce capabilities. They are ahead in this domain today owing to their continuing superiority in miniaturization, multiple warheads and target guidance.

Contrary to Mr Kissinger's statement made in Brussels last Fall and reiterated since on Europe 1, the American arsenal is not directed mainly on Soviet cities but primarily, for a long time now, on military targets, under the supervision of the "U.S. Single Operation Plan" (SIOP), a body created in 1962. It handled 6,000 targets in 1966, 25,000 in 1974, and many more since then.<sup>1</sup>

The American counterforces superiority,<sup>2</sup> according to a report submitted by Representative Legett in June-July 1975,<sup>3</sup> was to be maintained at a ratio of 3 to 1 from 1975 to 1980, despite the deployment, already in progress at the time, of the new Soviet SS-18 and SS-19 intercontinental, multiple warhead missiles.<sup>4</sup> This superiority was subsequently upgraded to a ratio of 8 to 1 by 1985, which, as the Soviets closed the gap thanks to the greater thrust of their rockets and slightly overtook the U.S. lead, would drop in 1985 to 1 to 1.12. "An insignificant advantage," the Legett Report says, "in that this forecast is too far ahead in terms of time."

Contrary to the current outcry everywhere, the 1980-1985 period into which we are entering is one of relative drop in USSR counterforces capability. In view of this, the Soviets opted to close the gap by deploying the SS-20 "Euro-strategic" missiles which, like all tactical missiles, are mobile, perhaps capable of accurately pinpointing forces-targets (available information on the SS-20 is very vague), and above all, in accordance with a custom which they hold dear, make hostages of the Europeans, but also of the Chinese.

This double-edged countermanceuvre does not, for all that, restore global balance. Moreover, it does not even upset the local balance, assuming the local balance concept has any meaning whatever.<sup>5</sup> In NATO's counter-countermanceuvre (promise to deploy Pershing 2 and cruise missiles), the European bourgeoisies and the Germans in particular are playing a key role. The Americans could perfectly well compensate the effect of the SS-20's by placing a few Poseidon missiles aboard some additional submarines in the "European theater,"<sup>6</sup> as they had started to do in 1977.

But the Europeans are reacting for political reasons. They are demanding territorialization of the stakes and of the means of global balance, because only a territorial deployment of American missiles will allow them to claim allied rather than satellite status. This posture is essential to maintenance of their hegemony over the popular strata at a time when unity between exploited and exploiters is everywhere being sought through fear. The objective is to prevent the American leadership from capitalizing this unifying fear, but to assure the European political class at least a partial return on it.

The SPD [expansion unknown], which undoubtedly wanted to negotiate from strength, under its bonnet, the continuation of its Ostpolitik, perhaps miscalculated the Soviet reaction and, under pressure from its left wing, which refuses to accept the official alarmist lies, is preparing for a compromise.

In conclusion, it is true that the Soviets have achieved a strategic parity of sorts and can now hold in check the periodic American efforts, real or electoral, to break out from under this parity, but this does not mean an armed conflict between them is imminent.

On the other hand, if it is assumed that the stakes in the current crisis are indeed a revival of the armaments industry, and especially that of modern conventional weapons, which means a larger volume of production, then the danger of limited wars in selected deserts, modeled on Yom Kippur, is a very real and present one. They destroy equipment and above all downgrade it, providing justification for the bringing out of newer products.

No sooner had the Soviets entered Kabul than the president and general manager of Bell (helicopters) issued a significant eulogy on the Soviets' heavy helicopters, ushering in, we can be certain, the speedup in the modernization of conventional weapons that has top priority in the overall NATO modernization plan.

At this stage of things, what should be France's policy? First of all, it should be one of autonomous diplomacy. The French government is especially ill-positioned to implement such a policy, no matter how it may try to within the tight constraints that Germany, who commands us, intends to respect. It has not even been capable of capitalizing its having sheltered the Imam Khomeyni at Neauphle-le-Chateau in the form of a new oil policy. Only the left, a new class alliance, a new relationship with the Third World could vitalize our diplomacy, which has remained a Gaullist fancy.

Its plunge into the counterforce strategy led by the United States is clearly going to put an end to any illusions regarding the autonomy of the French strategic nuclear force. France will be asked to modernize its system with respect to accuracy, and its warheads will be swallowed up by a vast "Euro-strategic" accounting, as a negligible contribution to a few improbable scenarios. The left, which will be called upon belatedly to maintain an impossible situation, must either advocate this modernization or, sooner or later, fully reconsider a popular defense strategy outside the nuclear arms race to which we are now being bound. The sooner, the better.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. U. S. Congress: "Long Range Theater Nuclear Missile Program, Fiscal Year 1980, Arms Control Impact Statements," Joint Committee print, 96th Congress, 1st session, March 1979, p 133.
2. Counterforce capability is expressed in terms of an index "K," obtained by multiplying the number of warheads by two-thirds the explosive power (some of which is upward thrust with no counterforce effect) and dividing the result by the square of the accuracy of each head expressed in terms of CEP (circle of equal probability).
3. Report by Representative Robert Legett of California, submitted 25 June 1975 to the House Foreign Relations Committee. Refer: "The Vladivostok Accord: Implications to U. S. Security Arms Control and World Peace," Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, 94th Congress, 1st session, June 24-25, July 8, 1975 pp 9-10.

These 1975 forecasts were based entirely on the most unfavorable assumption and specifically on the premise that by 1980 the Soviets have deployed 1,320 SS-19's (whereas the actual number today is only 300 in place and 200 SS-18's).

4. The SS-18 was known to be MIRVed with 6 warheads, based on its flight test in 1973; its deployment at the beginning of 1975 totaled 10 missiles. The SS-19 was also known, since 1973, to be MIRVed with 6 kiloton warheads; its deployment in June 1975 amounted to 50 missiles, according to MILITARY BALANCE, 1975-76, pp 71 and 73, note (j).
5. See memorandum by Gen George S. Brown, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, submitted to the Senate on 7 February 1978: "Overall, the United States still has a net nuclear forces advantage in theaters of operations, but it must continue deploying modern systems in response to Soviet modernization."
6. According to the London Institute for Strategic Studies, the Euro-strategic balance of TNF [Theater Nuclear Forces] in terms of nuclear warheads in place is 1.07 to 1 in favor of the Warsaw Pact, and 1 to 1 in terms of a "usability" factor developed by that institute. The most alarming figure used by the German white book on defense does not take into account, as does the London Institute, the number of SS-20's assigned to the China sector, nor the numerous systems aboard aircraft, nor, above all, the 400 Poseidon nuclear warheads assigned by the United States to NATO (according to Gen D. C. Jones, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: "U. S. Military Posture for FY 1980," and also "Long Range Theater Nuclear [---]." [Sentence as published ends with line transposed from adjoining column].

#### Nuclear Weapon Taboo

Paris LE MONDE in French 24-25 Feb 80 p 8

[Article by author and disarmament advocate Dominique Halevy\*: "Alice in the Land of the Cold Monsters"]

[Text] Danger of war? It stands to reason in a land bristling with weapons and warriors directly in power or who, being superpowerful, bring the weight of all their means to bear upon those directly in power; in a society of men in which the display of weapons of war is a vainglory, and the resort to them a method. It stands to reason as a corollary to an economic war that is worldwide, on a planet where the well-being of some is at the price of the ill-being of others. It stands to reason when political discourse everywhere, or almost everywhere, is the art of bad faith,

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\* Author of the book "Contre la Bombe" [Against the Bomb].

and when the dissemination of information is less concerned with accuracy than with propagandistic aims. It stands to reason in a land governed by men, where the women wear muzzles.<sup>1</sup>

And so, since it is in the logic of things, there are wars. What is not in the logic of things, however, but rather in its absurd inversion, is a nuclear world war. Or even, by contagion, a conventional-armed world confrontation with its inherent danger of a nuclear sideslip.

### Confrontation

We are of course not proof against absurdity, and everything is positioned to render it operative. But earthly confrontations are confrontations between those who have and those who would like to have; they are economic confrontations and absolutely not confrontations between two moral persuasions. I believe there is only one thing that could plunge mankind into a nuclear conflict: moral fanaticism.

And, thank Heaven! we have not yet reached that point. The capitalist world, which styles itself the "free world," is immoral by nature. And the world that clothes itself in socialist vestment is immoral in its manner of being until now.

We are both, at this point, too devoid of virtue to have any virtue to defend. Moral fanaticisms are therefore not in confrontation at this point, but rather desires for a more equitable apportionment and desires for possession. The desire of those who rule the earth is not to destroy each other but to possess each other. I can see no economic interest whatever in a general war that would utilize nuclear weapons with the mutual aim of either taking over the other's cemeteries or not taking them over.

This is why one has every reason to challenge the debate that consists of analyzing, among experts, who, between East and West (while waiting to get around to the other cardinal points), has the greater nuclear destructive capability on a first-strike basis and which one of them on a second-strike

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1) And here, the male chorus comes in: "The good old argument! Just look how everything changes when we give them their share of power: Indira Gandhi, fiery Golda Meir, Margaret Thatcher. Are they less bellicose than we?" These women are tolerated because and only as long as they are willing to play the game of the male society. And they are handed those exorbitant, those mind-boggling powers that men take for themselves. But we are talking of something else: of giving women the governing /voice [all caps]/, not the /power [all caps]/. The governing power must be recovered by the nations; it is the property of their peoples, who have for too long let themselves be deprived of it. But the governing voice must be recovered by the people.



basis (there is actually an excess of capabilities on both sides), and to reject the complex scenarios involving partial, measured, local tactical, strategic, minor, major and other forms of nuclear exchanges.

These highly theoretical and sophisticated discussions that have been structured, touched up and rectified constantly by our brilliant human brains over the past 35 years could very well be nothing other than a consummate imposture. With all these means at its disposal, even an imposture acquires the aspect of a reality; and well it might: This is the price of deterrence. One must fully pretend to believe that all of this could happen. And what if these threats (accompanied by these welcome and extravagant efforts at agreement, wherein what is sought is an understanding enabling each to define the arsenal to which the other /has a right [*in italics*]/) have been but pure Lewis Carroll? The queen is forever threatening to chop off your head, and everyone knows it is proper to be terrified, but everyone also knows that the order can never be executed. Nuclear terror is very upsetting, but it is totally impracticable.

#### A 'Muscular' Face

Personally, I find these deadly phantasms, totally imaginary though they may be, more suited to the wonderland of Alice than to currency in the harrowing reality of the cold monsters who reign over our poor planet.

The nuclear weapons taboo will continue holding its ground, even though our theoreticians may think that in 35 years they have succeeded in rendering it banal, minimal and sterile. The people are determined not to become accustomed to them! They still have before them in their mind's eye the terrible images of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and in their daily life the perils of the industrialized atom, that will not allow their agonizing vigilance to be disarmed.

True, but what will the cold monsters do?

Where, in what country, what man, what body of men, would be morally capable of setting off a nuclear bombardment, by nature now reciprocal? No people on earth have mandated their leaders to bring about such a holocaust. And the leaders very well know this. Can anyone imagine, for example, a pleasure seeking chief of state like the president of our republic pressing a nuclear button? It would be totally contrary to his hedonistic cynicism (and that is what it now is!). But he is not alone in this regard; everyone will hesitate, then recoil, because in the final analysis the cold monsters are human beings, and because confrontation is economic confrontation.

According to some, it is all a matter of objectivity on the part of a few well-informed leaders. Who can say that the group that leads the USSR lacked objectivity when it decided to "consolidate" Afghanistan? The

Soviets, at this juncture, are in the process of testing just how far they can carry this game of local military actions without its being too far. The Western camp's intentionally maximized reactions are intended to signal that the too-far point is about to be reached and that it will be reached by one more step. The Olympics boycott, besides being a moral sanction, can just as well be interpreted as a refusal to send to Moscow some tens of thousands of hostages whose peaceful presence there would hamper this grand (vain) game of nuclear threats, should the Afghanistan adventure take a more dangerous turn in the weeks or months to come.

Coexistence is today showing its true face, stripped of its "detente" make-up. It is a "muscular" face. Destabilization under the impact of all its inherent forces, which are far from being solely military, is a necessity and must remain permanent, because the thought of our planet remaining stable in its present state is enough to make one cry!

#### Inordinate Powers

It must change. If change is dangerous, it is because there are everywhere too many weapons, armies, generals, and uncontrolled or ill-controlled powers. But do peoples, deep down in their hearts, want war? The most disadvantaged among them simply want a fairer share of the fruits of this earth. The least disadvantaged among them must learn to accept this.

And all must seek to diminish the too often inordinate powers they entrust to those whose ambition it is to serve the state, removing from these powers the possibility of their being abused. And they must obtain truthful information.

A vast undertaking, without which, however, everything risks remaining and forever being nothing but misery and massacre.

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## MECHANISMS OF COMMUNIST POWER, INFLUENCE, INTERVENTION

Paris LE FIGARO in French 27 Feb 80 pp 1, 4

[Article by Annie Kriegel: "The Mechanisms of Power in the Communist Universe--The Party and the Army"]

[Text] Since the international tension took a new turn with the direct intervention not only of the peripheral armed forces of the socialist camp--the Vietnamese, the Cubans--but also by the Soviet Red Army, an idea has been coming back into the foreground: it is suggested that with Brezhnev worn out by age, the Soviet Army now has more autonomous influence on the decisions of the leading socialist power, which would explain the abandonment of the prudence that some like to credit it with.

There is an old notion and an old fear, in the socialist movement, of a slide toward militarization of the revolutionary civil power--toward a kind of Bonapartism. But the actual outcome, in the communist universe, has contradicted this: opposed to such a "degeneration" are the real mechanisms of power in a socialist regime of Leninist type.

Still, the necessary distinctions must be made and certain exceptions granted.

Distinctions: the Third World states that call themselves "socialist" and that in the present phase are, in effect, allies of the Soviet Union, such as Syria, Libya and Algeria, do not, for all that, fall into the category of socialist regimes of Leninist type--precisely because they are first of all structurally states, in the Western sense of the term, even when, as in Algeria and Syria, the state apparatus grants a degree of legitimacy to a single-party apparatus. And because they are first of all states, the major state institution, the army--the army of liberation or the army that seized power--which, moreover, gave birth to these states and continues to furnish men and arbitration in cases of emergency--has very strong influence.

Exception: the Yugoslavian case. Within the community of socialist states of Leninist model, Yugoslavia stands out. Perhaps because of the fact that in the group of nationalities which together made up the preexisting Yugoslav state, none was of such size as to get the better of the others, Tito

could not, or did not want, to have even his League of Communists avoid the nationalist-type federalism. The result of this situation is that after him, the only unitary force capable of incarnating the pan-Yugoslav interests is the army.

There is nothing like this elsewhere in the socialist world, where the unitary locus of power is indisputably the party. Let us look at the decision process that preceded the North Vietnamese offensive on Saigon, as analyzed, in the wooden language common to the communist world, by General Van Tien Dung.

January 1973: the Paris Agreements are signed after a negotiation in which Kissinger's interlocutor was Le Duc Tho, member of the politburo of the Vietnamese Workers Party.<sup>1</sup>

October 1973: the 21st plenum of the Central Committee decides to open a "new phase" in which, under cover of "violation of the agreements" by the Americans, "political struggle, military offensive and diplomatic action" would be carried on simultaneously.

March 1974: the Central Military Committee of the party submits for approval by the politburo the means and methods appropriate "for each theater of operation." It remains to the general staff of the army to work out the "operational directives."

October 1974: final green light from the politburo for installation--completed in January 1975--of the apparatus designed for "a great offensive during 1975."

Power, therefore, always lies clearly with the party, wherever a CP of Leninist type is in power. This is why, though Michel Rocard is not convincing when he judges that the Soviet Union is only concerned about its glacis so as to be able to solve its economic problems from a position of shelter,<sup>2</sup> Francois Mitterand is no more convincing: "It is not within anyone's capacity to be policemen of the world except for the USSR and the United States.... It is reasonable that France should wisely keep its distance from a game in which it is not a player."<sup>3</sup>

The state of the world is not defined either as a struggle between two superpowers or as a struggle between two blocs in which the tutelary power purposes to make use of its allies and dependents. False symmetry. To con-

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1. On the occasion of its fourth congress, in December 1976, the Vietnamese Workers Party resumed its founding name, Communist Party of Vietnam. General Van Tien Dung quite recently became minister of defense of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.

2. CARTES SUR TABLE, 25 February.

3. FRANCE SOIR, 21 February.

sider the structure of the West and that of the socialist camp equivalent is to forget that the nature of the latter is not of the state type and that it does not, in the strict sense, obey state interests. Except for one (enormous) detail: in the 1950's, the socialist camp was not sufficiently consolidated to be able to support within itself, that soon, the coexistence of two state-parties of the size of the Soviet and Chinese parties.

With the exception of this failing, the socialist camp does indeed constitute a well-tuned machine on a worldwide scale, a machine that makes it capable, without the necessity of recourse to the hypothesis of internal "differences," of combining and articulating operations of detente (in the same week, Poland proposes a European conference on disarmament and Vietnam, a Southeast Asia conference) and activation or exploitation of centers of tension ranging from commando operations to armed aggression (Central America, Tunisia, Lebanon, Iran, Afghanistan, Cambodia).

Is there one place where thought is devoted to this tuned machine? There is no mystery about it: among the 20 sections working for the Central Committee of the CPSU, the "international section" had at the beginning, and under the name of "foreign section," taken over from the Comintern, which was dissolved in 1943. Run by Boris N. Ponomarev, himself a former member of the Comintern directorate and secretary of the CPSU since 1961, the international section, which includes key men of the type of V. V. Zagladin, specialist in West European problems and R.A. Ulianovskiy, director of the Institute of the Peoples of Asia and an expert in liberation movements, exercises a triple function. First of all, it is a study organism which, based on a network of academic establishments (for example, the Institute for Research on the United States of America), constitutes the Soviet Politburo's unit for reflection on matters of international policy.

Secondly, it is an organism for supervision of the part of the Soviet governmental system that specializes in foreign policy--above all, the foreign affairs ministry; and in this regard it controls the media for external expression of a theoretical order (WORLD MARXIST REVIEW) or of a political nature (NEW TIMES). Finally, it is an organism for coordination with the non-Soviet elements of the socialist camp, such as the corresponding international sections of brother parties, whether in power or not, and the liberation movements, which do not yet have full diplomatic status (the PLO, for example), through bodies such as the Africa-Asia Solidarity Committee.

All this does not imply that a "permanent plot" is to be seen in it, even though the system does not exclude recourse to local plots. Nor does all this eliminate every risk either: according to Mao's formula, not error or fault or crime. Not even dissension or failure. But all this is to be taken into consideration.



## ANALYSIS OF SOVIET INTERVENTIONIST POLICY, WESTERN REACTIONS

Paris LE FIGARO in French 19 Feb 80 p 2

[Article by Annie Kriegel: "The Invasion of Afghanistan: Moscow's Profits and Losses--the Fallout from a Military Intervention--the Reactions of Islam --the Rallying of the French CP--Symbolic and Gratuitous Sanctions--What Will Is There in Western Europe?--from Prague '68 to Kabul '79']

[Text] What is there in common between Prague 1968 and Kabul 1979? In both cases, the intervention of the Red Army and the justification given for it: the duty of the "first country of conquering socialism" to lend a strong hand (in the literal sense of the term) to a friendly and allied socialist regime which, threatened, expressly requested it. This is what is called "socialist solidarity."

And what is the difference?

--For the French Communists, it has to do with the nature of the danger incurred. If they did not approve the Soviet armed intervention in Prague, it is because, according to them, the Czechoslovak socialist regime was at the time shaken only internally by an attempt at renovation, the inspiration of which remained socialist and whose jolts were on the one hand legitimate and on the other hand controllable. But the Afghan socialist regime is doubly threatened from the outside, since it is confronting a purely "feudal" rebellion, stirred up and supported by imperialism. It matters little here to fit this analysis to the observable facts: what matters is the analysis.

--For those who govern us, the difference lies in the degree of recognition granted by the international community to Czechoslovak or Afghan legitimacy, on which depends the character--"acceptable" or not--of the manifestations of socialist solidarity. The Czechoslovak status, of course, dates formally only from 1975; to base the status of the socialist states of Central and Eastern Europe definitively on an authenticated international text was the objective which the Soviets had fixed in 1962 for what was finally, in the following decade, going to arrive under the name of the Helsinki Conference.

But Prague had been, from the end of the 1940's, recognized de facto as an entity of socialist bent. This was not at all the case with Kabul in 1979,

though the Soviets affect to be surprised by this view, maintaining that everything has seemed clear and definite since the 1978 coup d'etat.

But they know how to nurse, as the occasion requires, the Western reluctance to consider a regime decidedly socialist, especially if the adjective is equivalent to "pro-Soviet." Didn't France believe it recognized in Vietnam, until after the capture of Saigon, one of those "Third World-type" nationalisms that was obviously tainted with socialism, but too specific a socialism not to be neutral as between China and the USSR?<sup>1</sup>

What do the Soviets want? For the time being, and without speculating about any eventual later direction of an offensive for which Afghanistan can only be the springboard, it is for them a matter of measuring the chances, after a military conquest, of normalizing it: not inside the borders of Afghanistan, where there is no doubt about the question, which is a purely technical one, but rather outside them. Normalize: that is, to pass off as an accident--an "incident along the way"--something that results from the essence of socialist expansionism of Soviet obedience. Are their chances good? Not bad.

The observers have so far stressed the price, an indisputably heavy one, which the Soviets, whether or not they estimated it correctly beforehand, have effectively paid for their audacity. But the final net price may be a great deal lower if the Soviet Union manages in the medium term to ascribe the operation to the profits and losses of a fortuitous event.

What, then, are the significant measurements of their chances in this matter? There are two series of them:

1. the power and coherence of the support which the various components of the socialist camp contribute;
2. the power and coherence of the forces that cooperate in reacting against the Kabul coup.

#### Evolution of Western Socialism

1. Under the heading of the first series, three data are of a kind to encourage the Soviets:

--even though there is general uneasiness, and disapproval on the part of Yugoslavia and Romania, Eastern Europe, including Poland,<sup>2</sup> backs the actions stoutly, as do Castro and his Latin American and African colleagues.

--in the Moslem world, even if the deliberate confusion among all sorts of Islam--from traditionalist Islam to "political" or "Islam-Marxist" Islam--does not suffice to muddy everything except, thanks to Khomeyni and for a while longer, in Iran, and even if the Islamabad conference can maintain the illusion of a possible anti-Soviet Islamic unity, the points of support that the Soviets prepared for themselves a long time ago have held. Their own

Moslem republics are furnishing an abundance of the troops of which the army of intervention is making ironic use. Syria, South Yemen, the PLO, Libya, Algeria, not to mention Mrs Ghandi's India, are carrying on different kinds of activity ranging from proselytism in favor of "positive neutralism" to activism evidenced by the Libyan team in Tunisia, or in a craftier vein, the Syrian initiatives in Lebanon. The sudden movements--to Damascus, for example--by the Soviet foreign affairs ministry, the meetings following one another in Moscow at an accelerated rate, and the consultations of the representatives of the "progressive" parties, movements and states of the Near East with Brezhnev and officials of the foreign-policy section of the CPSU Central Committee suggest that there is nothing entirely improvised and uncoordinated in this.<sup>3</sup>

--finally, in Western Europe, the French CP has again, at just the right moment, consented to act as the point of reference for determining the positions of the different actors. It was doubtlessly in 1975, after the happy conclusion of the Vietnamese affair (and taking into account the crisis of conscience and confidence of which Watergate was the bewildering expression in America), that the Soviets concluded that the balance of world forces had turned in their favor. But they had to wait 2 years to convince the French Communists of this, in 1977. Hence the 2 years of sharp estrangement which did not follow from the fact that the French were following the strategy of union of the left, but rather from the fact that they were inopportunistly caught up with, as a bonus, some Eurocommunist "nonsense."

2. Under the heading of the second series, there are likewise three data to consider which, from the Soviet point of view, involve a good many positive aspects.

--Once the risks of a series of circumstances capable of leading to a world war--which Afghanistan by itself obviously could not justify--are ruled out, there is something about civil sanctions that is by nature symbolic and gratuitous vis-a-vis the materiality of the unjust force deployed. Or even something preposterous--for the Afghans, in any case. But whether they are political or economic, whether they involve condemnation by the United Nations, which the Soviet veto in the Security Council necessarily renders academic, whether they involve the curse of Islam, boycotting of the Olympic Games, embargo on grain deliveries, or postponement of the urgent negotiations under way, especially in the area of disarmament, the precise impact of such sanctions cannot be evaluated in itself.

But on this last point, how many encouraging indications there are for the Soviets! First of all, if it were only at the level to which they assign such importance--vocabulary: who, for example, among either the learned or the less learned, challenges that everlasting concept of "imperialism," used to designate any American policy, even if it is piteously defensive? At most, use of it is extended to such marked Soviet intervention [as published]--"interference" (always "gross") being by the United States only. Detente? The word is not always dishonored--quite to the contrary--and its acceptance in socialist-language internal use, no precise and concrete, has

not discouraged the Western governments from using it in its reassuring acceptance for external use.

Alinement, nonalinement? This is for whoever boasts of not being alined. For what one is "alined" on is, it seems, unimportant compared with the diabolic fact of being alined at all. From this point of view, Mrs Thatcher and Georges Marchais are birds of a feather.

--But beyond vocabulary lies the special area that particularly interests the Soviets, Western Europe, where what, again from the Soviet point of view, determines everything--namely, the existence or nonexistence of a political will--is well on the way to providing the right answer: that there is no political will.

Even if it is wrong, this interpretation is obviously supported by the uncertainties--need we say "irregularities of heartbeat"?--of French policy: capabilities, subtlety, coolness, independence, realism, moderation--so many ambiguous words to describe a policy that speaks a language "neither entirely the same nor entirely something different" in French-speaking Africa and in Southern Africa, in Cairo and in Tunis, in Bonn and in New Delhi--a policy which, strong in its nuclear capacity, excessively minimizes the importance of political deterrence, a policy that varies from almost ostentatious firmness to quasi-neutralism--that Third Way of calm times of which only the storm unleashed will say whether it was actually sanctuarized neutrality, harmful wait-and-see-isms, beneficial concentration of forces, or prolegomena to capitulation and collaboration.

--Even more than by French policy, hopes can be stirred up by the evolution of a Socialist International that was long the bete noire of Moscow.

Here, indeed, is where three convergent elements are beginning to bear their fruit: first of all, the general response to the accumulation of defeats that democratic socialism has suffered in Europe in recent years and to which the local Communist parties have lent a hand; secondly, the Third World type of neutralism of Austrian and Swedish social democracy; and finally, the "Leninism," not to say pro-Sovietism, of the left wings of the West German and English Socialist, Social-Democratic and Labour parties.

The Soviets have now chosen the place and occasion where they will be in a position to learn more about this interesting socialist evolution in Western Europe: the Madrid conference, which is to be held this fall as a sequel to Helsinki.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. We cannot recommend too highly, to anyone who really wants to know what it was all about, an instructive reading of General Van Tien Dung's book "Et Nous Primes Saigon" [And We Took Saigon] (Paris, Sycomore, 1979). In it, General Van Tien Dung, chief of staff of the Vietnamese army, gives a detailed account of the conditions in which the final offensive against Saigon was decided on and carried out in 1975.

2. See, in our 11 February editions, the "point of view of Mieczyslaw F. Rakowski."
3. The unfolding of this activity--at least the public part of it--can be followed in the detailed chronology supplied each week by the official journal of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, TEMPS NOUVEAUX [New Times] (French edition), or in the analyses in the official French-language weekly AFRIQUE-ASIE.

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## INEFFECTIVENESS OF WESTERN RESPONSE TO SOVIET AGGRESSION

Paris LE FIGARO in French 29 Feb 80, pp 1, 4

[Article by Patrick Wajzman: "The Newly Finlandized"]

[Text] Many Western leaders are, I fear, in the process of acquiring a "Finlandized" mentality. By this I mean that like the Finns, whose state of dependency vis-a-vis the USSR is well-known, they are concerned not to rub the Kremlin the wrong way too much, to absorb its provocations, to anticipate its anger, to systematically minimize the scope of its imperial adventures, and to make the most, with a rather naive enthusiasm, of even the least of its "peaceful" initiatives. In brief, our governors of the free world too often behave like weak-kneed leaders more concerned to indulge their adversary than to resipiscence, more anxious to gloss over his excesses than to make him atone for them, more concerned about his susceptibility than about his arrogance.

In a study published in December 1977 by the American review COMMENTARY, the historian Walter Laqueur admirably defines this defeatist psychology that leads certain peoples--or certain persons--to submit preventively to the influence of the strongest. And to illustrate his point, our author chooses the example of the famous "Gleichschaltung" [unification] tendency which, in 1933, led millions of Germans to join Hitler's party even though no particular constraint forced them to rally to it. But, Laqueur adds, they did so anyway, "just as one takes out an insurance policy."

At the risk of troubling the chronic serenity of some optimists, I must confess that this type of fascination for accommodation at any cost certainly does not constitute the best "insurance policy" against the Soviet challenges. On the contrary: accommodation is a harmful, anesthetizing policy that develops in us the irrepressible conviction that history is no longer on our side.

Thus, it is explained to us today that the decease of Marshal Tito will not necessarily lead to the Red Army's invading Yugoslavia, and that despite the USSR's interest in this geopolitically seductive zone, the behavior of the Moscow hierarchies will be marked by reserve and restraint. Sometimes it is even added, to reassure us, that the "Kabul coup" was sufficient, at least provisionally, to dissipate the probability of a "Belgrade coup."

Rightly or wrongly, I believe that such reasoning is correct. Indeed, I find it hard to imagine that immediately after offering the universe the spectacle of a ferocious subjection of Afghanistan, the masters of the Kremlin can assign themselves the immediate objective of military occupation of Tito's homeland.

With this said, how can one fail to realize that the simple fact of considering, without batting an eyelid, the hypothesis of an invasion of Yugoslavia is in itself the proof that we are resigned to it? How can one fail to understand that by speculating on the moment of this invasion, on its modalities or consequences, we are thereby recognizing that it is conceivable, if not written into the "normal" order of things? And how can one fail to realize that such an intellectual process means that we implicitly admit, without even being entirely aware of it, the ineluctability of Soviet expansionism?

All subtleties aside, being mentally "Finlandized"--that is what it amounts to!

And it is to this sad state of moral dilapidation, to this fatalistic acceptance of the superiority of the Soviets, that we are directly led by the sacrosanct policy of "accomodation," whose virtues and charms we too frequently vaunt.

Will the reader kindly understand me. I feel no kind of esthetic attraction to pitched battles, the sound of marching boots and the movements of tanks. But it nonetheless seems to me that by trying desperately to save detente and to cajole the Russians, we are taking from the Kremlin all valid reasons for limiting its ambitions.

When the ministers of the Nine meet in Rome on 19 February, is their main concern to show Western determination? Not at all. On the contrary, it consists in avoiding a head-on confrontation with Brezhnev and making a great effort not to identify him as too clearly culpable. This is also the reason why that masterpiece of precaution, the ministers' communique, avoids repeating any explicit condemnation of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. If I--God forbid!--were master of the Kremlin, such an omission would fill me with joy. And I would tell myself that people who are polite to the point of "forgetting" to condemn the illegal occupation of an independent country will probably end by forgetting the occupation itself. Like that of Hungary in 1956. Like that of Czechoslovakia in 1968.

When these same ministers, after several hours of semantic controversy, finally get around to concocting an inoffensive proposal to neutralize Afghanistan, do they sincerely try to impede Leonid Brezhnev? Not at all. For the good reason that such a suggestion is very difficult to put into practice. It is true that Austria was neutralized in 1955; but the Westerners were present there alongside the Red Army. But unless I am mistaken, this is not at all the case in Mr Karmal's beautiful country today.

When, a few days later, the Soviet No 1 declares he is ready to consider a withdrawal of his troops from Afghanistan on condition that that country's neighbors and the United States "guarantee noninterference" in it, does even one chief of state of the free world publicly ask Brezhnev why, in the same speech, Washington, Islamabad and Peking are accused by name of threatening the Kabul regime? Does a single one of them point out to the secretary general of the CPSU that it is not very logical to ask for a "guarantee of non-interference" from the very ones who are said to be guilty of interference, and that some demagogy could be involved in this position? Finally, does a single one of them inquire into the precise scope of the statement published by TASS at the beginning of February, which solemnly reaffirmed the right of the USSR to intervene at any time and anywhere in the world when it is a matter of "supporting the class struggle on the world scale"?

But beyond these intellectual deficiencies which the immediate world situation furnishes us, what should be revised is--I repeat--the overall way in which we perceive Soviet power.

First of all, we should defend our values with more conviction and stop expecting our salvation to come from the good will of the USSR alone.

Secondly, it would be a good idea for us to stop celebrating the inevitable difficulties encountered by the Red Army in its imperialist progression as so many decisive victories for the free world. No attitude, indeed, has a greater demobilizing effect. And I do not see very clearly how the fact that Brezhnev's soldiers are taking 6 months longer than expected to annihilate the Afghan mountain people constitutes a sign of vigor of the West.

Finally, it would be in our interest to stop being self-satisfied for flimsy reasons. For contrary to what some seem to think, the victory of the American hockey team over its Soviet opponents at Lake Placid is not at all sufficient to balance off the misdeeds of the Muscovite military rabble in Kabul.

I will doubtlessly be told that I am a pessimist, and that the Western camp has not yet, for all that, fallen under Soviet fiefdom. This is obvious. But going from compromise to compromise and from concession to concession, I fear that one fine day we will find ourselves on unknown shores: perhaps those of Finlandization; but for sure, no longer those of liberty.

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## ANALYSIS OF PCF, PCI DIFFERENCES ON AFGHANISTAN INTERVENTION

Paris LE FIGARO in French 24 Jan 80 p 2

[Article by Annie Kriegel: "Marchais' Strategy"]

[Text] What draws attention in the manner in which the Soviets have conquered Afghanistan militarily is the utter indifference to any precaution or false pretence deriving from a civil political strategy.

Now what makes this indifference to what will be said internationally even more striking is that it is seen also, and displayed with equal arrogance, in those who could now be called Brezhnev's men--just as, recently, there were the president's (Nixon's) men: they have burned their boats, on the appeal of their No 1, without the least suggestion of uneasiness.

Castro, who only a few months ago expended incredible energy for the success of his OPA [political and administrative organization] over the nonaligned movement, has a speech delivered in his name to the General Assembly of the United Nations in support of the Soviet initiative--a speech that is one of the most furious of its kind and that goes down big with the overwhelming majority of Third World states.

The PLO, which could have chosen to keep silent, since it does not have a vote, asked to take part in the debate as an observer. In order to say what? To denounce "the unilateral measures taken by the Americans against the Soviet Union." This nationalist movement does not only, in this way, annihilate the image of moderation that it had taken so many pains to create only a few weeks ago, it also casts doubt on its own nature by taking the national rights of the Afghan people--a Moslem people to boot--as worthless; and finally, it destroys its right to ask, in order to achieve its own national objectives, for the unconditional aid of the Arab states, who, with the exception of Syria and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, condemned the Soviet aggression, with Algeria abstaining and Libya not voting.

The third man to burn his boats was Georges Marchais, whose televised offering from Moscow will be epoch-making. While Castro threw overboard the formidable authority that he had by virtue of the fact that he was the effective chairman of the nonaligned movement, and while Arafat threw overboard

the legitimacy that he had by virtue of the fact that he was the leader of a national renaissance movement, Georges Marchais threw overboard that he had by virtue of the fact that he had placed his party under the reassuring sign of Eurocommunism.

Of course, just as Brezhnev cannot be counted on to throw detente on the scrap heap, and the PS [Socialist Party] is not inclined to be the first to bring out a tract on "Union of the Left," neither is Marchais, for all that, going to renounce the Eurocommunist theme. On the contrary, the more these valuable road markers are shaken by the storm, the more tightly they have to be held onto to keep them from being blown away. One can therefore be sure that in the weeks to come, Georges Marchais will--for example, at the coming National Council meeting--play the Eurocommunism tune with the same inspired conviction.

But the sole effect of this persistence will be to finish draining the life out of Eurocommunism. Moreover, this Eurocommunism has become so undifferentiated that J.-P. Chevenement is no more or less audacious than Marchais when he declares that the "Socialist blueprint" adopted at Alfortville "can be termed Eurocommunist."

Let us leave this word game. On the other hand, it is appropriate to reflect on the significance of the difference between the positions of the Italian and French CP's regarding the Afghan affair.

The restoration not of a simple "pro-Sovietism," which in the matter of support of Soviet foreign policy had never been denied by the French Communists, even in the most acute period of their differences with Moscow, but of an absolute concordance of views between the French and Soviet CP's throws light retrospectively on the profound reasons for the failure of the union of the left: the PCF began in 1977 to perceive that at least for a time, the relationship of world forces was taking a decisive turn in favor of the socialist camp. Thus the union of the left, as an indirect strategy for winning power in France, was no longer required: it had come to maturity too late. Nor was there any longer a need for the priority given, against the advice of the Soviets, to the particular interests of the PCF: priority had to be assigned again to the general interests of the international communist movement.

The conviction that the present communist movement is, in the present situation, capable of achieving a breakthrough that would not necessarily be the final breakthrough but would ensure significant gains comes through clearly in the "triumphalist" speech of the French Communist leader. As for the mansuetude that the Soviets show in pretending to overlook the insolence that the PCF gave them in the not very distant past, it is explained by the fact that the PCF functions in the only country in Western Europe that has an independent deterrent force. That this is the reason for the Soviet considerateness toward the PCF is evidenced, by contrast, by the meticulousness with which the Soviet press, including even PRAVDA, systematically reports even on even the slightest French book of strategy fiction in which the



author brings into his scenario, at H hour, a Communist agitation and obstruction campaign on a pacifist theme whose purpose is to prevent the French authorities from being in a position to wield nuclear deterrence.<sup>1</sup>

Nor is it difficult to guess the type of reproach that the French Communists are articulating with regard to their Italian comrades: they are criticizing their timidity, their underestimation of the positive virtualities and promises of the present world situation.

In doing so, they do not state a position on the Italian Communists' attachment to the historical compromise strategy, while they themselves have practically postponed for good the strategy of union of the left. Actually, an eventual entry of the Italian Communists into the government would no longer cause the sensation it would have caused 2 years ago. For in the meantime, everyone has lost any hope that the Italian Communists could change anything at all, for better or worse, in the "Italian-style situation" that they themselves, for that matter, have imprudently helped to create.

On their side, it is not certain that the Soviet Communists, without giving up their far-reaching criticism of the "timorous" analyses of the Italian Communists, want to go any farther toward putting the PCI on the index, in contrast to the place of honor granted to the PCF. For without going so far as the hypothesis of a preestablished assignment of roles, one may think that the Soviets are observing with interest and a certain favor the fact that the PCI, by drawing closer to the European socialist movement, and FRG social democracy in particular, is having an influence on both the one and the other and is helping to keep them in a position of prudence, if not of neutralizing expectation, which is already preventing Europe from "speaking with a single voice," as we have just seen at Strasbourg.

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1. Cf, for example, the commentary in PRAVDA of 5 December 1979 on the book by Lt Col Michel Manel, "Trompettes et Sirenes de la Dissuasion" [Trumpets and Sirens of Deterrence], Media, 1979.

## DETAILED OVERVIEW OF FRENCH FORCES IN FRG

Bonn WEHRTECHNIK in German Apr 80 pp 56, 58-59, 61, 65-66, 67, 69

[Article by Wolfgang Flume: "French Soldiers in Germany"]

[Text] When France pulled out of military integration in NATO in 1966, the French forces, stationed in Southwest Germany, remained in Germany as allies. In addition to some units in Berlin, these French forces include mainly the II French Corps, with HQ in Baden-Baden and about 51,000 military personnel, 19,000 wheeled vehicles, 1,650 armored vehicles, as well as 100 helicopters. The following article provides information on the organization and equipment of this II Corps which has considerable fighting power. Visits to the 2nd Cuirassier Regiment, which is equipped with battle tanks and which is stationed in Reutlingen, as well as the Combat Unit School in Breisach, made it possible to obtain detailed data on training matters.

The French forces have been in Southwest Germany since 1945 and are now mainly stationed in the former French occupation zone. Starting in 1955, they consisted of the Alliance forces within NATO; since 1966, when France pulled out of the military alliance of NATO, they have been in Germany on the basis of a bilateral German-French treaty; and so, the West German black-red-gold flag now also waves next to the Tricolor over the facilities of the French forces on West German territory.

The FFA (French Forces in Germany) are under the command of Lt Gen (General de Corps d'Armee) Pierre Brassart, with HQ in Baden-Baden. He is at the same time CG, II French Corps; he however also has the troops in Berlin and several military training facilities under him.

The units in Berlin under Major General d'Astorg, the French City Commander, include 2,700 soldiers, broken down as follows: one tank regiment with AMX-13 tanks, one infantry regiment, one Engineer company, one signal company, Gendarmerie, and one HQ unit. The French City Commander in practice has three superiors: in political matters, that would

be the ambassador in the FRG; next we have the General Staff in Paris; and, for training and supply, there is General Brasart. On the whole, there are about 5,000 French living in Berlin.

The miscellaneous French installations in Germany include several technical air force detachments, such as a close-in air support school in Baden-Baden, several radio stations, the Gendarmerie (a kind of military police although with more authority and functions than the West German military police), as well as several territorial elements for logistics, fuel, rations, etc.

II Corps--which, with a few exceptions, for example, atomic artillery, is stationed entirely in Southern Germany--consists of three armored divisions: the 1st Arm'd Div in Trier, the 3rd Arm'd Div in Freiburg, and the 5th in Landau, plus rather voluminous Corps units and one logistics brigade. Prior to the reorganization of the French army, there were two armored infantry divisions stationed in Germany with about 61,000 men in 35 garrisons. Today, II Corps consists of 30 garrisons with about 51,000 military personnel, including 38,000 draftees. The following major equipment units might be mentioned at this point: 19,000 wheeled vehicles, 1,650 armored vehicles, including 530 battle tanks, and 100 helicopters.

#### The French Armored Division

The backbone of II Corps is formed by three armored divisions, each of which has about 7,000 men. On top of that we have 520 armored vehicles and 1,280 road vehicles. Here is the breakdown in detail: 148 AMX-30 battle tanks, 132 AMX-10 APC's, 115 VAB [troup carrier] wheeled armored transport vehicles, 24 155-mm armored howitzers, 38 MILAN, 18 20-mm AA guns, 12 120-mm mortars and 12 VAB equipped with HOT--by the time all of the new equipment has been introduced.

An armored division is specifically organized in the following formations:

HQ:

One HQ support regiment consisting of the following:

One HQ company,

One signal company,

One repair battalion,

One transport company,

One medical company,

One traffic control company;

One reconnaissance company with, among other things, 52 vehicles, equipped with six MILAN, five Reasura battlefield radar and three Olifant radars, nine 98-mm LARC bazookas, and nine 7.62-mm MG as well as a total of 129 soldiers;

One AT company, presently still equipped with SS-11 guided AT rockets on tracked AMX-13 vehicles, which however will be converted to VAB wheeled armored vehicles equipped with HOT;

Two armored infantry regiments with one HQ support company, each, with six mortar<sup>s</sup>;

Two tank companies (each with three platoons consisting of three AMX-30 battle tanks, one armored infantry platoon with three AMX-10);

Two armored infantry companies (each with four platoons equipped with three AMX-10 APC's, each, one platoon with four AMX-10 equipped with eight MILAN).

Each armored infantry regiment consists of about 1,000 men, including 250 infantrymen, 20 AMX-30, 44 AMX-10, 20 VAB, eight MILAN, and six 120-mm mortar. In Germany, the regiments are still equipped with the AMX-13, instead of the AMX-30.

Two tank regiments, each with the following:

One HQ support company,

Four tank companies (each with 13 AMX-30 in four platoons);

One armored infantry company (13 AMX-10 in four platoons).

This means that a tank regiment has a total of 54 AMX-30 battle tanks, 25 armored vehicles (AMX-10, VAB), and 190 wheeled vehicles.

One artillery regiment,

One HQ support company,

Four batteries with a total of 24 155-mm guns on AMX-13 chassis, which however are soon to be replaced with the 155 GCT armored howitzer on AMX-30 chassis.

#### Engineer Regiment:

One HQ support company,

Two tank companies with four platoons, each,

One mechanized company with four platoons, one support company.

The equipment in the Engineer regiment includes Engineer equipment, such as Engineer tanks, for PAA tank bridges, light bridges, transport vehicles, and earth-moving equipment, etc.

#### Corps Support Units

The Corps support units of II French Corps include 18 regiments. Here they are:

One infantry regiment with about 1,500 men, broken down as follows:

One HQ support company,

Four infantry companies with three platoons each, equipped with VAB, one MILAN section, and one VAB section equipped with mortars,

One support company with two platoons of VAB equipped with mortars and one reconnaissance platoon,

Two TD companies, with three platoons of VAB, each, equipped with MILAN.

The infantry regiment is equipped with VAB throughout. Mortars, MILAN and bazookas are available as weapons.

Two armored reconnaissance regiments.

The Panhard EBR (armored reconnaissance vehicle) in the armored reconnaissance regiments is to be replaced with the AMX-10RC 6x6 wheeled tank equipped with an 105-mm weapon and laser range finder.

Three signal regiments;

Two Engineer regiments, including one in France, equipped among other things with Gillois amphibious bridges (like the West German M-2);

One traffic control regiment;

Two transport regiments;



One helicopter regiment with Puma and Gazelle SA-341. The Alouette III AT helicopters, equipped with SS-11, are being replaced with Gazelle SA-342 equipped with HOT; these AT helicopters are organized in one flight.

One battalion of light helicopters (overall, II Corps has about 100 helicopters available).

Eight artillery regiments, including:

Three regiments of surface-to-surface artillery, equipped with 155-mm guns on AMX-13 chassis, which will be the first to be converted to the 155 GCT.

Two AA artillery regiments which are presently still equipped with 40-mm Bofors, as well as 30-mm AA MG on AMX-13 chassis. Roland will now replace the Bofors cannon.

One regiment with Hawk (stationed in France),

Two nuclear artillery regiments equipped with Pluton,

One repair battalion.

One logistics brigade with

Two transport regiments, maintenance facilities, repair facilities, etc.

Overall, about six regiments of II Corps are stationed in France.

80,000 French in Germany

To the 51,000 military personnel in the French forces we must however also add about 35,000 civilians, including 25,000 dependents, 10,000 civilian employees of the French forces (including about 5,000 Germans), so that there are about 80,000 French in the fighting forces who live in Germany. They have available 12,000 apartments, 68 schools, and five high schools, 5 hospitals, and additional community facilities. Here we might also mention the French economat shops, something like the PX stores carrying articles from France. There however the medium of exchange is francs. Nevertheless, year after year, the German economy gets a flow of more than DM 400 million from the French forces--and there is no foreign exchange adjustment for that.

In Germany, the soldiers get 18 percent higher pay but 8 percent of that are immediately deducted for housing; 20 percent of the pay are disbursed in DM. With those 8 percent of the total pay one can live rather cheaply; accordingly, the single-family or multi-family homes in the FRG do not always look very attractive; like the military barracks, they would appear

to be in need of renovation. But there is a reluctance to seek apartments on the German open market already because of the cost; that means that the French families always live together and this alone makes contact with the German neighbors difficult.

#### Contacts With the Allies

Because the French forces are not part of the NATO military alliance--in other words, because they are likewise not integrated into international staffs, etc.--they have special liaison officers or delegations with the forces stationed in Germany. Thus there are liaison officers with German II Corps in Ulm, with the Southern Territorial Command in Heidelberg, and with the IV, V, and VI defense area commands. Liaison detachments however are also assigned to the British Army of the Rhine, to USAREUR in Heidelberg, and to the Soviet Forces in Potsdam, all of which again are also represented in Baden-Baden--the Soviets being represented here even by a major general. The Germans have also assigned some rather high-ranking officers to the FFA and are represented by the DBFFA, in other words, the German Representative Attached to the French Forces in Germany. At this time, the DBFFA is Maj Gen Alexander Frevert-Niedermeim. This position was established only after 1966 and is designed to underscore the special relations between the French forces and the host country.

#### DBFFA Mission

The DBFFA is the "authorized representative of the Federal Government." He represents German territorial sovereignty in dealing with the French forces in Germany, he implements the rights to which German authorities are entitled, on the basis of the NATO Status of Forces Agreement as well as the additional agreements to the Status of Forces Agreement, and he handles transactions between the French high command in Germany and all German authorities.

#### Two Visits

The author had an opportunity to visit two French units--the 2nd Regiment of Cuirassier in Reutlingen and the 4th training center command in Breisach. The tank regiment emphasized equipment but the visit to the combat forces school brought out the tough training which the French soldiers are getting.

#### 2nd Cuirassier Regiment

Like many French regiments, the 2nd Cuirassier Regiment has a very long tradition; this is why they retained the old names, such as cuirassier, cavalry, etc. regiments; all regimental COs from the very first one on, are listed; there are memorial plaques for battles (in this case, from Marengo all the way to Ulm), etc. The 2nd Cuirassier Regiment visited in

this case was founded in 1634 by Cardinal Richelieu as the "Cardinal Duc" Cavalry Regiment. It has been in Germany since 1951 and it has been stationed in Reutlingen since 1961; the regiment consists of 819 military personnel, including 45 officers, 144 NCOs, and 630 EM. In personnel terms, like almost all French regiments, it can therefore be compared to a reinforced German battalion. The equipment consists of 237 vehicles, 54 AMX-30 battle tanks, 19 AMX-10 APCs or command vehicles, and several AMX-13 APCs. The latter however are to be replaced later by the VAB, for example, in their role as command vehicles, armored medical vehicles, or armored repair vehicles, of which each company has one. The regiment furthermore has three AMX-30D tank recovery vehicles with a 15-t crane and a 30-t winch.

The regiment's barracks also accommodate one armored reconnaissance company from the 5th Armored Division with 180 military personnel and two platoons of scouts, one platoon equipped with Rasura Kadar (later on RATAC) and one platoon equipped with MILAN. To that we must add 150 draftees in a training company belonging to the regiment. After 2 months of training in that company (or also in France), the draftee is assigned to an operational company for the remaining 10 months of his 12-month term of service. Because all newly trained personnel are always organized in one company, the regiment's companies reveal a differing training level. During those 10 months, the men trained in their vehicles and that includes target practice and submerged driving. Marksmanship training is given in the barracks, for example, using a 5.5-mm MG built into the tube (insert barrel), used in firing at a range of 50 m, or at the post firing range, aiming at real targets in the landscape, however with the weapon lowered, as well as twice or three times in maneuver areas (Muensingen or in France). There is a total of three static and two dynamic firing phases with a total of 30 rounds fired. Laser firing simulators have not yet been introduced; but an instrument is being tested in France where the projectile's trajectory is fed into the sights of the gun pointer's telescope. Driving school simulators are also available in France for driver training.

One regiment in each armored division is completely submersible, that is to say, the crews of the tank companies have gone through submersion training in the AMX-30 with a 4.5-m high diving shaft. All soldiers are provided with safety equipment and have climbed six times out of an AMX-30 standing under water. The diving shaft is used only for air supply; the tank commander himself sits in the battle tank and is guided during his underwater drive from land by radio. The armored infantry companies of the "submersible regiment" can likewise cross water bodies; their AMX-10 is provided by hydrojet drive and thus has an amphibious capability.

The AMX-30 battle tank is equipped with an 105-mm gun which above all fires hollow-charge ammunition. The older vehicles are in addition equipped with a coaxial 12.7-mm MG, whereas the newer ones have a 20-mm automatic cannon. The AMX-30B2 vehicles, which will shortly be issued to the units, will be equipped with passive night-vision instruments and laser range finders, as

well as a new gear; the current one is not quite satisfactory. Out in the field, the tanks drive buttoned-up whereas for road travel the driver has an attachable windshield. The night-vision equipment for firing is still active, in other words, it consists of an active IR projector with passive IR telescopic sight for the tank commander. But there is also a passive driving instrument.

As in the West German Armed Forces, maintenance is carried out on the lowest echelon within the regiment; the workshops in Reutlingen used to be stables for a former German cavalry barracks and, accordingly, the architectural layout is not exactly the best. But all of the regiment's equipment is being maintained there, in other words, tanks, vehicles, light weapons, electronics, etc. There are no problems with maintenance personnel; the soldiers, who operate the equipment, are responsible for maintenance. For example, the engine is removed for inspection after 150 engine hours; since the power plant is designed, not as one block but rather in parts, this takes several hours. According to the regimental CO, Lt Col Andre Aourousseau, 80% of the battle tanks are ready for action; if they had to go into action on the very next day, then about 95% of all battle tanks could start rolling. For higher-echelon maintenance and repair, the regiment has a repair company in Tübingen which however also services other armored and artillery regiments.

Overall, each armored division has six repair platoons.

Relations with the civilian population are considered good; there are many reciprocal invitations. The location of the barracks is perhaps a problem; because of the buildup pattern in recent years, the military post is now located in the middle of a residential and commercial zone.

The maneuver terrain, by the way, is very muddy and therefore cannot always be used; it is about 3 km away so that the battle tanks must be driven through built-up areas.

Relations with the West German Armed Forces are also very good. For example, when the regiment goes to France for firing practice, several officers and NCOs of the partner battalion also go along; during division exercises--including those in France--entire German companies likewise participate. At the time of my visit at the end of January, a joint river-crossing exercise was being prepared; the West German Armed Forces were supposed to make river-crossing equipment available for that. Here, much depends quite generally on the determination of those participating on both sides; there is less issuing of orders and more things are being done on the basis of individual initiative. And here is one important point: both partners must above all have officers who speak the language of the other.



## Combat Troops

The visit to the 4th Training Center Command in Neubreisach was a very special experience; that term might best be translated as "assault unit school" because it trains not only Ranger types but also entire companies. Overall, there are nine such schools in the French army, including two in Germany. The trainees attending the 3-week training courses in 1980-- according to the school commandant, Lt Col Jean Bougerol--come from the FFA to the extent of 44% and the remainder come from France; 50% are infantry men, 19% come from armor, and 17% are from the artillery while 8% are Engineer. This year, 1,180 West German Armed Forces, U. S. Army, as well as British and Canadian military personnel have also been registered; each time, the trainees are combined in a platoon which consists of as many as 40 men; that platoon is attached to a French company which is in training here at the same time. Attendance at this school is mandatory for infantrymen, for the armored infantry men of a tank regiment, as well as for the Combat Engineers. Just about 5,000 soldiers attend the school each year; in 1979, 3,618 out of 4,805 passed the course and earned the coveted badge which is worn over the breast pocket. The 4th CEC [Training Center Command] has a cadre of 150 men plus 80 vehicles. A new company arrives for training each week (four platoons with 150 men).

The first week emphasizes above all individual training; during the second week the accent is on cooperation within the platoon and the company; the third week is taken up with a long hike into the Black Forest; on that occasion, the soldiers are airlifted by helicopter to a place unknown to them. Some of the training facilities of the 4th CEC are located in France, for example, in the fortress walls of Neubreisach, for winter training or for mountain climbing in the Vosges Mountains. The training objective is to toughen the soldier individually and in the group, to promote solidarity, to make the purpose behind these efforts clear, and to give the men self-confidence so that they may be able to overcome difficulties in spite of being afraid. Training includes the confidence course, house-to-house fighting in a specially built "village," demolition training including line-laying and placing mine traps, close-range AT action, crossing water bodies with improvised vehicles, hand-to-hand combat, and survival training.

While the draftees are unfamiliar with the exercises in advance, and while the confidence course, individually, and within the squad, also requires a certain level of intelligence (for example: how do I get up an 8-m tower without any aids?), the cadre personnel of the company in training are in advance detached for briefing at the school; the better the cadre personnel are prepared and the better they can train the EM, who, prior to attending the CEC, must already have been in the army for 3 months, the more successful will they all be at the school.



The author received a very good impression of the tough but not sadistic training during a visit to the training area in Rheinaue near Breisach and in the fortress walls of Neubreisach; the men had to climb the walls, they had to go through the confidence course, and they had to hike 8 km in less than one hour, carrying a field pack. Great courage was to some extent required for certain "tricks," such as leaping from one tree to the next at a height of 10 m, crawling on hands and knees over two cables stretched over a pond at a height of several meters, sliding down to the ground along a diagonal cable, suspended only from a little dolly, walking across shaky suspended logs; on some soldiers, one could see the sweat of fear on their foreheads. All soldiers were properly secured during all exercises; but it is not exactly fun to be suspended 15 m over a lake from a rope around your stomach, after you have missed your next step. Probably the most impressive training exercise was kneeling in front of an approaching tank, touching the tank's track in front, before throwing oneself sideways to the ground. This exercise was performed three times and each time the tank would approach faster. The men also had to lie down in a very flat concrete well and allow the tank to roll over them, at first in the prone position and then sitting and finally standing in front of the approaching tank and hitting the ground fast.

#### The French Soldier in Germany

French soldiers like being in Germany; that applies to draftees as well as NCOs and officers. Among the draftees, of course, duty stations near the border with France are popular; then they can go home every weekend they are off duty (they are on duty every 4th weekend), not just once a month, although in that case they can travel by train on a free ticket from Friday afternoon until Tuesday noon. Including Saturdays and Sundays, French military personnel get 45 days leave which most of them spend in France. There are no problems with the draftees, not in political respects either, because the French soldier quite generally behaves unpolitical toward the outside. Pay is not exactly high with F250; 20 percent are paid out in DM. Thus the men spend most of their off-duty time at the post, possibly in front of the TV set. About one-quarter of the soldiers however cannot receive French TV; according to General Brassart, the situation will probably improve only in a few years when TV can be transmitted to the barracks via satellite. Efforts are being made to let the young soldiers see a lot of Germany. Because each year about 38,000 draftees are assigned to duty in Germany, more than 1.5 million Frenchmen have so far become familiar with Germany by virtue of their military service alone. Because of the short term of service of only 12 months, there is not much of an effort to learn German; the situation is somewhat better among the regular personnel who are very reluctant to be transferred back to France. Many have German wives and children; in case of transfers within Germany, consideration is given as much as possible to the age of the children and suitable educational facilities at the new duty station.

Contacts between Frenchmen and Germans among other things are made more difficult by the fact that every regiment spends an average of 100 days away from the garrison due to exercises in the maneuver areas lasting 2-3 weeks, each, range practice, or maneuvers.

### They Are Our Allies

French II Corps to be sure is smaller than the German corps; each division is also smaller; nevertheless, the corps has a considerable combat value. More and more new material is being received; the emphasis on the nuclear component, as during the sixties, is no longer as pronounced today so that great efforts are also being made in the conventional arms sector. The training level of the French troops, in the eyes of the French officers, is entirely equivalent to that in the West German Armed Forces; personally, the author would even consider training--on the basis of what he saw at the 4th CEC--to be tougher and more realistic than among the West German Armed Forces.

Great emphasis is also being placed on interoperability. Thus, the new weapons system generation, developed together with Germany, in the form of Roland, HOT and MILAN, can be considered a big success on the road toward standardization in Europe. Tremendous hope has also been placed in the German-French battle tank of the nineties, which would replace the AMX-30; the French forces are not going to have a battle tank comparable to the Leopard 2; they only want to improve the existing AMX-30.

Much emphasis is placed on contacts with allied forces and especially the West German Armed Forces. These contacts are used to become familiar with the operating procedure, training, and lessons learned by the others and to communicate our own experiences. Looking at it this way, more than 40 partnerships with West German Armed Forces units have a value which goes far beyond the ceremonies which are always connected with this. Each year, there are about 30 exchanges on the squad level, 50 on the platoon level, and ten on the company level. Frenchmen attend German schools, such as, for example, the "Character Guidance" school. Combined exercises on a higher echelon (regiment or battalion or perhaps even division) are not being carried out--at least not yet; here there may well be certain political obstacles which might be explained by France's dropping out of the military alliance. On the other hand, France is West Germany's ally--and could not allies conduct purely binational joint exercises on the division level? Something which is possible within the NATO framework with the British or the Americans should also be possible between the West German Armed Forces and the French.

Although France under General de Gaulle dropped out of NATO military integration in 1966, France is and remains West Germany's ally. In the meantime, all French presidents down to the defence ministers kept hinting that "France does not belong to the integrated military organization, that it could take care of the organization and leadership of

its own defence by itself; on the other hand, it is a member of an alliance and France always discharged its obligations within an alliance"--according to President Giscard d'Estaing in May 1976; the year before, the French defence minister told the National Assembly: "As member of the Alliance, France is represented in its diplomatic bodies; it maintains a military mission with the Allied Supreme Command in Europe; of course, we do have the information exchanges which are necessary for a possible commitment of the Alliance and they consequently do cover the areas involved in the Pact."

Conversation partners again and again stress the fact that France has always discharged its obligations. France after all is committed to Germany in two ways: first of all through the NATO pact which, in case of war, "only" calls for support based on French considerations; and, secondly, something which is often forgotten in Germany, when one speaks of the "stubbornness" of the French, through the Western European Union. The treaty on the WEU (Brussels treaties) definitely provides that the partners must help a member under attack with military means.

Since we consider French forces on German soil to be a partner, the West German government should also try to modernize the barracks which belong to the FRG but which are used by our partner in such a manner that the French soldier will not always enviously look at the modern barracks and training installations of the West German Armed Forces and feel that they are just second-class allies.

This is a point where the FRG perhaps should be somewhat more magnanimous and at least put the French on an equal level with the Americans whose barracks in recent years were also improved with German money. Our French allies perhaps might be even more entitled to this--after all, so far they have never demanded foreign exchange adjustment payments for their forces in Germany.

#### The French Army

Prior to the reorganization, which was begun in 1976 and which has just been completed, the French army consisted of the following:

Five armored infantry divisions with 15 brigades,

One parachute division,

Two mountain divisions,

One ready-brigade for overseas duty,

Numerous battalions for territorial defence.

The formations were very big so that it was the goal of this reorganization to arrive at smaller units that would be easier to command. At the same time there was a personnel cutback although the fighting power was to be preserved or was even to be increased through the stepped-up introduction of new equipment; the brigade command level was eliminated and this led to the demobilization of 15 headquarters. At the same time, several battalions were deactivated to reinforce others and the divisions were made smaller; the formations in the Territorial Army were adapted to those of the Field Army (division organization) so that the French army now has the following units:

Eight armored divisions with 7,000 personnel, each, plus 520 armored vehicles, and 1,280 other vehicles;

Four infantry divisions with 6,900 men, each, 490 wheeled tanks, and 1,110 miscellaneous vehicles;

One mountain division with 8,800 personnel and 1,700 vehicles;

One parachute division with 12,600 personnel and 2,300 vehicles;

One Marine division with 7,600 personnel and 1,600 vehicles.

This means that the French army has a peacetime strength of 320,000 including 23,000 officers and 68,000 NCOs; 64% of the soldiers are draftees who are called up six times a year (1 February, 1 April, and so on). The principal equipment includes 1,080 AMX-30 battle tanks, 3,100 other armored vehicles, 40 Pluton atomic artillery rocket launchers, 930 MILAN AT rocket launchers, and 300 helicopters.

The 15 divisions are joined by another 14 mobilisation divisions, ten of which are derived from active-duty units while four are made up from schools. Overall, the nominal personnel strength of the French army is 545,000 (264,000 active-duty personnel and 281,000 mobilization reserves).

The peacetime divisions are assigned as follows:

Fifth Army (Strasbourg [Strasbourg]) with I and II corps, although III Corps can also be placed under it. This army prepares the maneuvers in conjunction with the Air Force. It coordinates the fire of atomic artillery and the employment of AA units.

I Corps (Metz) with four armored divisions;

II Corps (Baden-Baden) with three armored divisions;

III Corps (Versailles) with one armored division and two infantry divisions.

### The French Infantry Division

Each of the four infantry divisions consists of about 6,900 personnel, 490 wheeled tanks, and 1,100 vehicles. It is organized as follows:

Three infantry regiments with VAB,

One tank regiment with 36 AMX-10RC,

One artillery regiment,

One Engineer company,

One HQ and support company.

The infantry division is equipped, among others, with 370 VAB 4x4 armored transport vehicles, 12 VAB rocket TDs provided with the HOT AT rocket, 72 MILAN, 36 AMX-10RC wheeled tanks, 24 drawn 155 BF50 field howitzers, 18 120-mm mortars, and 58 20-mm light AA guns.

### Armored Divisions

The strength and organization of the armored divisions are described in the article on the French forces in Germany.

### Marine Divisions

The 9th Marine Division, with 7,600 mostly career personnel, is air-transportable and can participate in amphibious operations. In addition to 1,600 vehicles, its equipment includes 20 AML wheeled tanks, 18 105-mm guns, 66 mortars, 10 MILAN, 44 helicopters, 51 20-mm cannon, 535 bazookas.

### Mountain Division

The 27th Alpine Division consists of 8,800 men and has 1,700 vehicles, including the following: 62 AML wheeled tanks, 36 MILAN, 24 105-mm howitzers, 54 mortars, 10 helicopters, and 38 snow vehicles.

### Parachute Division

The 11th Parachute Division consists of 12,600 personnel and 2,300 vehicles; it is intended for fast reaction in Europe and overseas. It includes Foreign Legionnaires and Marines. The equipment among other things includes 54 AML wheeled tanks<sup>1</sup>, 11 105-mm cannon, nine 40-mm guns<sup>1</sup>, 46 80-mm cannon<sup>1</sup>, 48 mortars<sup>1</sup>, and 48 MILAN.

### FOOTNOTE

1. Air-transportable among others with the help of the Super Frelon helicopters.



## GENERAL BRASART INTERVIEWED ON FORCE'S DUTIES

Bonn WEHRTECHNIK in German Apr 80 pp 58-59

[Interview with Lt Gen Pierre Brasart by Wolfgang Flume: "Glad To Be Here"]

[Text] The French forces in Germany have been there since 1945; they have been stationed in West Germany on the basis of a bilateral German-French agreement since 1966; they are no longer militarily integrated into NATO. Their missions do not differ from those of other French forces. There is much exercising going on with the West German Armed Forces so that the commander-in-chief of the French Forces in Germany at the same time is CG, French II Corps in Baden-Baden. He is Lt Gen Pierre Brasart who was able to point out in the course of a conversation with WT [WEHRTECHNIK], that relations with the West German Armed Forces and with the civilian population are very good. The French Forces in Germany are now being equipped with modern materiel, such as the Roland armored AA rocket mount or the Gazelle AT helicopters equipped with HOT; with a view to further interoperability, great hopes are being placed in a German-French battle tank which is to be developed jointly. Lieutenant General Brasart actually does not have any problems, except perhaps one: the facilities which belong to the FRG and which are used by the French should urgently be renovated (with German money) or they should be adapted to the latest requirements.

WT: How would you describe the missions of the French Forces in Germany?

Lieutenant General Brasart: First of all I would like to note that there are no special missions for the French forces in the FRG. In military terms, we are the II French Corps and we therefore have the same tasks as, for example, I Corps in Metz or III Corps which was recently organized in Paris. Since France pulled out of military integration in NATO in 1966, people are somewhat frequently asking us why we are still in Germany. At the time, the German government asked us to stay here and now we are here

on the basis of a bilateral German-French agreement. Of course, we no longer have any direct missions within the NATO framework, for example, regarding border defence, and we do not have any combat sectors of our own either--like the German and other forces adjoining us--but I would like to stress that we do belong to the Alliance and that Article V of the NATO Treaty says that the partner must help the country under attack with means of their choice and that extends all the way to the use of arms.

WT: Did France get German financial adjustment payments for the forces stationed here after 1955, like the British or the Americans, until a few years ago?

Lieutenant General Brasart: No, never before. In this connection however I would like to mention a problem which is very serious as far as we are concerned: on the basis of the bilateral 1966 agreement, all of the installations of the FRG which we use--and that includes 65 barracks, 28 ammunition depots, eight fuel dumps and 12,000 apartments with a living area of 2.2 million square meters-- must constantly be maintained at a partly rather heavy expenditure because, for example, all of the barracks were built prior to 1945; one of them, in Karlsruhe, was even built back in 1874. I do of course get money from Paris for minor repairs. So we would like to have the facilities improved, especially since our soldiers can see what good and modern barracks their comrades in the West German Armed Forces are billeted in. But these perhaps are political questions on which our politicians must come to an agreement.

WT: The FRG is a fully integrated NATO member; your forces are no longer militarily integrated into that alliance. Does this create problems with a view to joint employment, especially in case of a national emergency?

Lieutenant General Brasart: As French forces stationed in Germany, we have good connections with the West German Armed Forces, either through sponsorships or through liaison officers or through staffs assigned to all important commands. Moreover, interoperability is being constantly improved through jointly developed systems, such as MILAN, HOT, Roland, and probably soon also a jointly developed battle tank; all of that would greatly facilitate joint action. Even though we are no longer integrated, we are still neighbors.

WT: Are joint exercises with the West German Armed Forces always only binational or also multinational?

Lieutenant General Brasart: Exercises with the West German Armed Forces are always bilateral; they usually take place on a lower unit level; for example, the last maneuvers of the 1st French Armored Division were also attended by a German tank battalion and a German artillery battalion. Each year, companies and batteries are being exchanged; in addition to that, we have about 40 sponsorships, for example, between the French 3rd Armored Division and the German 10th Armored Division. And our French officers study

at the Leadership Academy in Hamburg, while German officers attend French war colleges.

WT: Your airforce no longer has any bases on German soil. In case of war, where would you get the presently vital air support from? Is this being practiced already in peacetime?

Lieutenant General Brasart: Our tactical air units, which are stationed in the Vosges Mountains and in Alsace, generally give us the necessary air support. This is also being practiced in peacetime. I would like to mention the fact that our operational procedures are adjusted to those of NATO although naturally there are some problems also resulting from the different languages--but this is quite generally a European problem.

WT: Are you satisfied with the material equipment of your forces? Is it better than among the other French units?

Lieutenant General Brasart: The French army was reorganized in recent years and received better armament on the basis of a law applicable for the period of 1976 until 1982; it calls for an increase in the share of defence expenditures, during that time, out of the total budget, from 17% to 20%. In 1980, for example, the defence budget went up 14.9% as compared to 1979. Even if you include an inflation rate of about 10%, this means that we are above the NATO requirement of 3%.

The II Corps is not getting any preference in terms of equipment. We are now getting the new equipment so that I will get the first Roland I armored AA mounts this year; later on I will get the Roland II all-weather version; after that we are going to get the VAB armored transport vehicles and we are now also getting the first Gazelle AT helicopters equipped with HOT which are to be stationed in Freiburg. During the next several years, we are also going to get the 155 CGT armored howitzer. I believe that I am not revealing any secrets to you: new equipment is used initially mostly in France, near the manufacturer; if there are problems, then help is not far away. For us however new equipment also means that we need a new supporting structure; it is very difficult to wedge modern tanks into what used to be the stables of a cavalry post.

WT: What necessitated the reorganization within French II Corps? Has it now been completed?

Lieutenant General Brasart: In the past, we had five big armored divisions in France, plus one parachute division, one mountain division, as well as several independent battalions for territorial defence. To provide a more flexible combat command setup, we turned them into smaller divisions--eight armored and four infantry divisions--which have adequate supporting units. These divisions are made up of regiments; we no longer have any brigades which do not have any supporting units. The absence of this command echelon at the same time also signifies a considerable saving; as a result of this,

the reduction of French ground forces by 20,000 men, as required by the 1976 law, down to a level of 310,000 men could be accomplished only in part. Here, after II Corps, reorganization has been completed since the summer of 1978; last year, it had also been completed in France with all units.

WT: Did the reduction of the French army also lead to the withdrawal of French soldiers from Germany?

Lieutenant General Brasart: Yes, about 10,00 soldiers were taken out and that meant that several barracks became available.

WT: Do you have any problems with the draftees some of whom after all come from France's more remote regions?

Lieutenant General Brasart: No. We do not have any problems with them directly; they are all good chaps who do what we must demand of them. I could only wish for higher pay; after all, DM 100 is not much when, for example, a fellow wants to take a German girl out to a restaurant or a discotheque. Most draftees come from Eastern France and they, as well as all others, can go home once a month for 3 days, free of charge.

WT: How many percent of your soldiers are in Germany with their dependents? What facilities are available to them here, for example, schools, hospitals, etc.?

Lieutenant General Brasart: We have 51,000 soldiers here in Germany, including 12,000 career personnel and 39,000 draftees. In other words, one out of every six French army personnel is stationed in Germany. About 80% of the career personnel have their families here; and according to statistics, which are perhaps one or two years old, 6% of the married career soldiers have German wives. For them, we have 12,000 apartments, 68 primary schools, five high schools, plus the Exonmat (PX) shops. We furthermore have five military hospitals and a social service.

WT: Are you satisfied with these facilities?

Lieutenant General Brasart: Well, of course you have the subsistence problem. We sometimes also encounter difficulties due to the fact that the barracks we are occupying were located outside the city during the thirties but are now surrounded by residential developments. Thus, a certain degree of noise pollution is unavoidable.

WT: How do you see relations between your troops and the German population-- apart from the points just mentioned?

Lieutenant General Brasart: Relations are very good; we have good relations with the population and the particular garrison town where the same regiment has been stationed in some cases already for the past 35 years. Yes, we belong to the cities! The local lord-mayor at one time even called me the "French mayor of Baden-Baden." We have many German-French clubs; the club here in Baden-Baden, by the way, has about 700 German and French members. The language problem perhaps still causes some separation. We urge our soldiers to learn languages; but we are happy that many Germans here in South Germany speak French. It is perhaps also regrettable that our apartments are mostly too closely together so that we are therefore somewhat separated from the Germans. Apartments on the open market however are just about unaffordable as far as we are concerned so that we here and there perhaps live in a certain atmosphere of isolation.

WT: Are your draftees happy to be serving here in Germany?

Lieutenant General Brasart: The thing that counts is not duty in Germany; the only thing that counts is how far the soldier is away from his kin. Otherwise, he is glad to be here. We also let him see a lot of Germany, for example, through excursion trips to Berlin or Munich. The West German Armed Forces help us in this respect. This winter for example they made a total of 12,000 skiing days available to us in its skiing areas.

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## QUEBEC PAPERS COMMENT ON PLQ CONGRESS

## Congress of a New PLQ

Montreal LE DEVOIR in French 3 Mar 80 p 6

[Article by Michel Roy: "The Congress of a New PLQ"]

[Text] The Liberal Party that we saw at work at its Montreal congress last weekend seems to be a completely transformed group. It is more representative of the different areas of society and obviously more open to young people, women, ethnic groups, rural people, small businessmen, and low-income workers. The PLQ [Quebec Liberal Party] is no longer dominated, as it was until recently, by professional people, big businessmen, and the upper middle class. Intellectuals, teachers, researchers, and academics can now answer the invitation to join the Liberals, whom they influenced decisively 20 years ago.

But this new Liberal Party also presents less of a nationalist image, precisely because it is more diverse in its makeup and its members are from very different groups. People say the PLQ has succeeded in getting rid of its inferiority complex toward the Quebec Party [PQ] because of the personality and activity of its leader, who staunchly defends the beige book of the Constitutional Commission as adopted by the Congress at the same time as he has succeeded in imposing for the last two years a demanding conception of moral and intellectual integrity in politics. The 2,000-odd delegates and observers were familiarized with this document on Saturday and Sunday; it has weaknesses, is debatable, and will be debated in various aspects. But the Party now has a completely coherent, perfectly defensible program, one that will serve as a federalist promotional weapon during and after the referendum, on the condition that the PLQ agrees to disseminate it in a more digestible and accessible format.

The three-day congress took place with a kind of harmony and serenity that are often suspicious to the press. There were no remarkable incidents or spectacular walkouts. An uneventful weekend. It would be tempting to conclude that the leaders' skillful organizing had saddled recalcitrants with a ready-made program. However, many delegates were present in the 14 workshops, they spoke up frequently, and no one sought to cut them short. Thus,

Mr Denys Hardy, former minister of Cultural Affairs and Communications in the Robert Bourassa government, made lively speeches in the two commissions and the general assembly to modify the communications chapter in the beige book. He was listened to attentively and supported by a majority, at least in one of the workshops, and his proposal was adopted. If Jean-Paul L'Allier had been willing to follow the same rules of democratic debate, he might have been successful in having other cultural motions adopted. The right of speech and discussion would have been respected for all three days. Numerous elderly and young people from all regions did not hesitate to put forth suggestions and propose changes in committee work. It is certain that a "party line" had been well defined and that the authors of the document, who were resource people in several workshops tended to use the podium generously to defend their own way of thinking. Nonetheless, their opponents were able to express themselves often and without hindrance.

It was obvious that a constitutional document developed over a long 18 months and already submitted to Liberal Party members in their respective regions would not be torn down and built up again in three days. Such an undertaking would have been inconceivable, although many changes, mostly minor ones, were made in the text.

A tendency was noted in the workshop discussions to inject into the beige book elements likely to make it more "Quebec" or more "autonomist." These attempts could not succeed without endangering the general balance of a chapter, except in the case of communications, where the Commission seemed to have allowed for the amendments presented by Mr Hardy.

In his Sunday afternoon speech, Mr Ryan emphasized, no doubt for the benefit of critics of the beige book's orientation, that the book grants Quebec many more powers than it now has under the present regime and that the book as a whole noticeably favors the provinces' contributions to the federal system. He also said the "dualist committee" and the "dualist bench" are guarantees of cultural protection for Quebec.

Whatever the interpretations and analyses, the critiques and objections, the PLQ document proposes a reconstruction of the Canadian system in a decidedly federalist perspective. The most frequent and fundamental objection is to the method, approach, and practice.

Thus, Prof Dion wished the Liberal Party could have brought back the spirit of its battles in the 1960's and put forth a definitely nationalist plan without breaking federal ties. The authors of the beige book took the hard way rather than the traditional route that Quebec has followed for 30 years.

Upon rereading the professor's critical articles, we wonder if he has taken into account all the political evolution that Quebec society has undergone since the end of the 50's. The Quebec Party was born in 1967-68 out of the most nationalist group in the Liberal and National Union parties since the beginning of the quiet revolution. Today, the sovereigntist grand design and its associationist link are embodied completely in the PQ. The Liberals have not given up their principles of nationalism stated in 1965, but they have opted for renewed federalism. Why would they try clumsily to imitate

the PQ by proposing a form of nationalism that can already be found in Mr Levesque's party? Since the issue of the particular law was a dead one, all the PLQ had to do was construct a completely new proposal and transform federalism itself rather than insist on proposing special laws for Quebec that can logically lead only to independence.

That is why polarization will be strong and unmerciful in the campaign that is now beginning. The issue is which of the two philosophies is more apt to favor the full development of Quebec society.

#### Beige Book Remains Intact

Montreal LA PRESSE in French 3 Mar 80 p A 4

[Article by Marcel Adam: "The Beige Book Remains Intact, or Nearly So"]

[Text] The renewed federalism plan drawn up by the Political Commission of the Quebec Liberal Party came out practically untouched in its essentials after the Liberal delegates had studied it thoroughly in their Montreal congress over the weekend.

Party Head Claude Ryan told the delegates when the congress opened that they had full authority to accept, reject, or change the document.

It may be recalled that when the Beige Book was published Mr Ryan said the document's essentials were in the chapter titled "The Objectives of Constitutional Reform," that they were non-negotiable, fundamental principles, and that he would allow changes in the ways in which they were to be implemented.

In this context, Mr Raynold Langlois, chairman of the Commission that produced the Beige Book, said at the opening session that "these principles lead undoubtedly to accepting the document's recommendations in general, because they are intended to be the practical application of the 13 fundamental principles set forth in the report."

Although Mr Ryan told the delegates that he was relying on their judgment without the slightest intention of seeking to influence it, Mr Langlois was careful to remind them that they had a coherent construction whose component parts are not easily interchangeable.

It would have been surprising if the party leadership had expected a lot from a congress made up of party members who were undoubtedly serious but who were mostly unfamiliar with constitutional problems; they could hardly recast in depth a document prepared over a long period of time by a team of experts. Moreover, since Mr Ryan basically underwrites this document and has taken every occasion to promote it and has thereby closely identified himself with it, the delegates would have felt as though they were disavowing their leader if they had changed it substantially.

As the government leaders of such important provinces as Ontario and Alberta have welcomed this project, which some were pleased to remind the bolder delegates of, a lot of shifting about was not encouraged.

Were the delegates really free to make substantial changes in the Beige Book? I think so. But would they have wanted to, as uninitiates, in such a short space of time?

Under these conditions, serious party members naturally put their confidence in their leaders and generally let themselves be easily talked out of following certain paths they think are right, as could be seen last weekend. There is no reason to take umbrage at that or to cast doubt on the democratic legitimacy of the results of such sessions.

The party members put confidence in their leaders' suggestions concerning matters unfamiliar to them just as citizens do with their government leaders. The main thing for them is that they have the real democratic power to censure or remove those who have misled them by failing to make into policy their deepest needs and aspirations.

Except in the areas of communications and unemployment insurance, most notably, the amendments improve or focus the document without changing its balance or orientation. But it must be said that a large part of the document remains unaltered for the moment because there was no time to put the amending resolutions to a vote. That is the case, for example, with the chapter on communications. But Mr Ryan has said he is in agreement with the changes on this last point and will make them his party's position.

As for the other amendments left hanging, it may be supposed that they will be integrated into the party's constitutional program to the extent that they do not detract from the basic objectives of the Beige Book. As these objectives have been endorsed by the congress, this should not present any problem to the Liberals's democratic conscience.

It may be said of this congress that it took place in a serious, workmanlike atmosphere, marked with authentic respect for the democratic process, even if this procedure is not as strict as that prevailing in PQ congresses.

Thus it may be held that the Beige Book does not yet express the will of the Quebec people, but it does reflect that of the Liberal Party, at least in its key orientations.

#### Ryan's Liberals

Quebec LE SOLEIL in French 3 Mar 80 p A 6

[Article by Claude Beauchamp: "The Liberals and Claude Ryan"]

[Text] The army that left the Queen Elizabeth last night at the close of the Quebec Liberal Party's orientation congress was a perfectly unified one,

sure of its means and objectives, feistier than ever and completely mobilized to move against a unique, immediate target--the referendum.

The 5,000-odd delegates and Liberal Party members met to study the Party Constitutional Commission's beige book, which proposes a "new Canadian Federation." They had obviously come to seek more than a plan for renewing the Canadian Constitution: arms and arguments to combat the "yes" of the Quebec Party. Their expectations were not frustrated.

For two days, everything was done to convince the party members present that the Quebec Party did not have the monopoly on national pride and emotion, that defending the idea of a dualist Canada was a mission as exciting as promoting an associated Quebec, and that attachment to Quebec's history, continuity, and tradition could be accommodated by federalism as well as by sovereignty-association.

In a word, Claude Ryan has, as leader, delivered the goods so far. The Liberals sought him out two years ago because they wanted a leader capable of standing up to the Quebec Party on its own ground, that of the constitutional future of Quebec. In 18 months, Mr Ryan had the Quebec Liberal Party adopt a constitutional proposal that was coherent, articulate, and sufficiently orthodox not to raise the ire of more centralizing federalists, and yet innovative enough to satisfy the Liberals hoping to rewrite generally the text of the Canadian constitution.

The party members found in the words of their party leadership increased pride in their role of defenders of a "no" vote. They feel less on the defensive. They are going over to the attack.

Mr Ryan has been well served by talents as an orator unsuspected at the moment of his entry into politics, and he completely dominated the weekend session. He said exactly what his audience--half of which consisted of new faces--wanted to hear on the referendum.

The osmosis between this man, who was not even a Liberal Party member two years ago, and the present members now seems to be so complete, as does their convergence of ideas, that one begins to wonder what will happen to the relationship between the party and its leader once the catalyst of the referendum contest lessens in Quebec's political life.

Some indications, easily detected at the congress, may indeed lead one to believe that Mr Ryan's real leadership of the party is more fragile than it may appear at first glance. For example, in some workshops, some members expressed their dissatisfaction with the overly directive role given the "resource persons" during the discussions. In addition, the assembly turned a cold shoulder to Mr Ryan when he said that the work done since he took over proved that "intelligence had returned to the party."



Mr Ryan also arouses a certain uneasiness among his people by his venomous and hateful way of attacking those who do not think as he does. His political opponents are "liars," "hypocrites," and "blackguards." Those who oppose him are "frustrated" or "naive." Politics is not a parlor game, and the Liberals tend to err more by arrogance than modesty, but the bitterness of Mr Ryan's ad hominem attacks rather embarrasses party members who are certainly partisans but unused to savagery more characteristic of intellectuals than politicians.

Mr Ryan's behavior and the dichotomy in his speech, which has him talking on a high plane concerning ideas and at a very low level concerning people, bother those who cannot forget that after a Liberal victory over the Quebec Party the struggle will continue between Liberals who are federalists and those who are "provincialists," as Pierre Trudeau somewhat disdainfully calls them. Today, the referendum strategy forces Claude Ryan to stress the pan-Canadian dimension of his option. Tomorrow, assuming he takes power in Quebec, the Quebec aspect of his constitutional position will come to the fore.

Also, the whole question of acceptance by the rest of Canada and its constitutional position are Mr Ryan's Achille's heel. The Liberal leader again showed a lot of candor in his speech yesterday when he opined that his modest person ("Canada listens to Claude Ryan," he said) would suffice to have English Canada rally en masse to Quebec principles, but his assertion was unconvincing for lack of real and concrete proof.

However, his repeated success in the last two years shows that Mr Ryan has learned quickly how to be a politician. He still has to learn that baseness always comes back to haunt whoever is guilty of it, and that he must not count his chickens before they are hatched.

## AFGHANISTAN, PRE-STOCKAGE ISSUE RAISE INTEREST IN SECURITY DEBATE

## Military Speaks Out

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE AFTEN in Danish 29 Feb 80 p 5

[Article by Rolf Bagger]

[Text] Collections of signatures, new popular movements and a new security policy magazine with a line critical of the military are among the events and phenomena which clearly show that the defense and security of Denmark and Europe, to an increasing degree, attract much public attention in this country. Also from a security policy point of view, the outlook for the eighties is hectic.

There is an upsurge in the security policy debate in this country. The situation in Afghanistan, the new Danish defense program, the U.S. reinforcements for Europe, and the action 'Women for Peace' have intensified the interest in security policy problems, and, yesterday, a new security policy magazine appeared.

FORSVAR--MILITÆRKRITISK TIDSSKRIFT is the result of the initiative of a small group of people who want to point out that they are independent of parties, organizations and other established political forces. However, they do not seek to conceal that they belong to the left in the security policy debate, and that the launching of the magazine has been supported financially with 10,000 kroner from the Reconciliation League and with 5,000 kroner from the Plum Fond. The editorial staff of the magazine shares offices and telephones with the Reconciliation League.

"But we should not like at all being regarded as a left-wing magazine," says the editor responsible under the press law, Søren Møller Christensen, a student of history. "We do not want to stand for the old Radical-Liberal 'What-is-the-use' attitude. We want to create an open magazine, and if we get caught preaching, we shall pull back."

The editorial staff of FORSVAR consists, in addition to Søren Møller Christensen, of his wife, Kirsten Bruun, a student of Russian, and of

two journalists, Svend Aagaard Nielsen and Anders Nyholm (who is known from the Copenhagen Radio Corporation case).

The editorial panel is composed of well-known names from other peace and left-wing organizations, such as Erik Stinus, author, Otto Sand, machinist, and Bent Østergaard, teacher. In addition, Bent Sørensen, lecturer at the Niels Bohr Institute, and Maja Naur, cultural sociologist. The panel, moreover, includes researchers from peace and conflict research centers and institutes in Oslo, Lund, and Stockholm.

#### Debate Insufficient

The background to the start of the magazine is the general dissatisfaction of the editorial staff with the level and quality of the Danish military and security policy debate. MILITÆRT TIDSSKRIFT, published by the Society of Military Science, is extremely poor, it is said, and the magazine lacks scientific views. The other magazines, apart from those of the left wing, are described as being far too uncritical of the policy pursued. This applies, for example, to FREMTIDEN, published by the Foreign Affairs Society.

Furthermore, the established conflict research, to the extent that it is being undertaken in this country, is considered insufficient. On Professor Erling Bjøl, Søren Møller Christensen says that one can at least see what he wants, what he stands for and what he thinks. On Bertel Heurlin, university lecturer, and others, Søren Møller Christensen says, however, that they place their research at such a high level that it becomes incomprehensible. The mistake they commit, says Søren Møller Christensen, is that they try to make natural science out of international politics. Bertel Heurlin is the author of books such as 'Disarmament Policy. An Analytical Survey of Disarmament as a Phenomenon and Object of Negotiations in International Politics.'

To make up for the shortcomings in the Danish debate, FORSVAR wants, to a high degree, to draw on foreign (especially Swedish and Norwegian) conflict and peace research, which the recently published issue also reflects. But the magazine, moreover, wants contributions from people within the Armed Forces. Søren Møller Christensen points out that the education of officers is so demanding that there must be many gifted people within the Armed Forces, and that, among these, there must be many people who feel that it must be possible to do the whole thing in quite a different way than is the case now.

The editorial of the first issue states that the editorial staff deplores the fact that the chief of the Defense Staff, General Kristensen, for whom they would have liked to write an article on the coming defense program, has declined to do so.

On this, General Kristensen says that it would be desirable to have a new magazine since those already existing only reach very narrow circles and confirm the opinions which the groups concerned already have--both the

NATO-oriented groups and those on the other side. But on the basis of a sample of the cover of the magazine and a conversation with Søren Møller Christensen, G. K. Christensen got the impression that FORSVAR would be one of the usual magazines to the left, but he did not want to exclude the possibility that he might later on want to contribute articles to FORSVAR.

#### Existence

The existence of the new magazine will be secured financially only if, beyond the initial capital, it manages to obtain 2,500-3,000 subscribers. A sample of its cover, mailed to various people, provided 500 subscribers, and, beyond that, the Reconciliation League and the society Never Again War have both informed the editors of the magazine that they want to subscribe on behalf of all of their members, for the time being for 12 months--that amounts to 250 and 500 members, respectively.

At the same time, the international situation gives rise to conflicts and debates. After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Coordinating Committee for Peace and Security has experienced unrest within its ranks. Uffe Torm, editor, who comes from the Organization for International Cooperation, and who was a member of the presidium, has resigned from the committee and requested that his name be deleted from its letter paper. The reason given for his resignation is that the committee did not want to adopt a resolution which clearly condemned the invasion of Afghanistan. The Joint Council of Danish Youth has resigned its membership for the same reason. About 12 months ago, the Social Democratic member of the Folketing, Lasse Budtz, left the presidium of the committee, calling the committee a communist front organization, clearly turned toward one of the superpowers.

Nevertheless, the committee still has got prominent Social Democrats within its presidium. In late 1979, the committee arranged a hearing on security policy in Copenhagen, a hearing which resulted in cooperation with and financial support from the daily INFORMATION.

#### New Actions

Most recently, the action Women for Peace has created a violent debate, admittedly, both on the security policy issue and sex roles. So far, the action, which consists in the collection of signatures among women only (the aim is 5 million signatures in this country and abroad by the month of May) has been backed by women from the center of the Social Democratic Party and to the left, but it has also encountered opposition on the part of a few Social Democratic women, not only for reasons of sexism but also from security policy viewpoints.

Finally, a new grassroots movement is being formed. No to the Atom Bomb. Among the promoters is the author Erik Knudsen. They hope for a support similar to the one previously given to the Campaign Against Nuclear Weapons.

## MP's See 'Allies Pressure'

Copenhagen INFORMATION in Danish 1-2 Mar 80 pp 1, 8

[Article by Jørgen Dragsdahl]

[Text] In the opinion of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, political pressure from the East Bloc, based on military strength, is the biggest threat to the security of Denmark in the coming decades.

But, nevertheless, a report containing an extensive analysis and evaluation of the threats to Denmark fails entirely to discuss these threats in greater detail.

And the report does not even mention the possibility of political pressure from our allies, based on economic strength and military dependence.

These are a couple of the points to which members of the Folketing draw attention in their criticism of a 35-page report which, in January, was distributed among a select group of politicians who are dealing with the coming defense program. The report is called 'Security Policy Analysis and an Evaluation of Threats' and has been prepared by a committee under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, headed by Torben Frost, department chief, who is in charge of the NATO office of the ministry. At the present time, the report is not available to the public, nor has it been elevated to represent the position of the government. But, in the absence of better material, it actually is the analytical basis for the security policy of the eighties.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs states that the work was started in February of 1979, and that the relatively brief final product does not reflect the amount of effort put into it. However, the ministry declines to indicate the sources of any of the parts of the report, and it does not want either to explain the kind of 'intermediate calculations' which led to various unfounded conclusions in the report. Nor does the Ministry of Foreign Affairs want to take a position on the criticism raised.

### Biggest Threat

A Social Democratic member of the Folketing tells INFORMATION that the report is incoherent and marked by contradictory opinions, showing that it is a rush job, prepared by a group of people. Several people state that they do not find any concrete political perspectives.

"The biggest threat to Denmark's political freedom of action is entirely missing. Our economic dependence upon foreign countries scares the prime minister stiff at the moment, because the position taken in dealing with the defense budget may cause pressure from abroad," one of INFORMATION's sources states.



The report contains an evaluation of the significance of oil to Danish security, and it also contains an analysis of the North-South problems. But, in addition to lacking an evaluation of the threat from the partners of cooperation, the report also lacks completely an analysis of the clash of interests between the United States and Western Europe.

#### Naive

One source calls the report naive and points out that the politicians exactly need new perspectives and a list of contradictory considerations instead of a hotchpotch, representing the only valid truth.

The Folketing, last Thursday, read a proposal from the Radical Liberal Party to set up an independent fact-finding committee to analyze the security policy situation (see page 5 [following article]). INFORMATION, therefore, asked Jens Bilgrav-Nielsen of the Radical Liberal Party to comment on the report. However, he declined to do so, since the report is confidential. He said, however, that "at the present time, no acceptable material is available which can form the basis for a debate in the Folketing on Denmark's security policy situation. There is no material which is sufficiently new, clear and profound."

#### Somber Perspectives

At the present time, the report constitutes the basis for the deliberations on the new defense program. The perspectives of the discussion on the military East-West relations are somber.

It is felt that there is no "immediate risk" of a "deliberate" attack from the Warsaw Pact on the NATO area. On the possibility of an isolated attack on Denmark, the report says that "aggression appears hardly likely."

But in their discussion of "attempts at political pressure against West-European governments, including the Danish basic right to an extensive military force," the authors write: "This aspect of the threatening picture is, if possible, even more difficult to evaluate than the purely military aspects of it, but the surmise of this very possibility of pressure may, in the coming decades, be most likely to prove well-founded."

However, the report does not discuss purpose, methods, nor consequences of such an imagined pressure.

#### NATO Inferior?

Somewhere in the report it says: "In short, the conventional relative strengths in Europe have developed in a direction which is unfavorable to NATO. It is assumed that the Warsaw Pact today has the military capacity to obtain considerable territorial gains all over Europe through a quickly launched conventional attack."

Some figures of relative strengths are given on the number of aircraft (2 against 1 to the East) and the number of tanks (3 against 1 to the East), but there is no mention of NATO's qualitative armament in the seventies, for example, within the field of anti-tank weapons.

In a discussion of the balance of strategic nuclear weapons, the opinion is that there is an "approximate nuclear balance." It is found "reasonable to assume" that this balance "will remain basically the same in the foreseeable future."

The report does not deal at all with the significance of the new American strategic doctrines and the new weapons systems in developing the capacity to launch paralyzing surprise attacks. Nor does the report give an evaluation of the stability of the so-called balance in the future.

#### Unforeseeable Future

The fundamental conclusion is that the eighties are more difficult to predict than the seventies were at their start, but that no major changes in the international conditions for the Danish security policy are "in sight."

The report, a little further on, goes on to say somewhat inconsistently that "the ability of Western democracies to handle the problems effectively" has come under debate. "This debate, in a sense, is healthy as it may contribute to elucidating the limitations and possibilities of democracy, but it also indicates the possibility of radical changes if the fundamental problems remain unsolved."

What these changes may be, the report does not say.

#### Security Policy Committee Urged

Copenhagen INFORMATION in Danish 1-2 Mar 80 p 5

[Article by Jørgen Dragsdahl]

[Text] The government is working on plans to replace the existing disarmament committee by a permanent security policy committee.

This information was given by Minister of Foreign Affairs Kjeld Olesen during the first reading of a proposal from the Radical Liberal Party to set up an independent committee of experts to evaluate the problems which the eighties will pose to the Danish security policy.

The government is in sympathy with the proposal from the Radical Liberal Party but finds it limited and incomplete. It sees a need to improve the basis for the Danish security policy and prefers a committee with day-to-day discussions and distribution of information material. The new committee will also get a fairly small permanent secretariat.

Lasse Budtz, too, was in sympathy with the principles of the proposal from the Radical Liberal Party. He proposed that the committee, for example, issue annual reports which are issued in popular editions as well. The committee will have representatives from the research field and the Folketing.

The Conservative People's Party and the Liberal Party called the initiative taken by the Radical Liberal Party "playing for time" and a "smoke screen." But, otherwise, the problems of ensuring the independence of the committee marked the debate. For that reason, Sten Folke of the Leftist Socialist Party was completely against the proposal. Gert Petersen of the Socialist People's Party feared that it would become too integrated in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Bilgrav-Nielsen, too, said, on behalf of the proposers, that if the committee becomes connected with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it is feared that it will become biased.

"The world changes. We must view the problems differently," he said. The Radical Liberal Party wants people from outside the establishment to participate in the work. Bilgrav-Nielsen, moreover, feared that if representatives from the Folketing participate, they will have an opinion-forming function.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs admitted to him that it may be a good idea to discuss whether it is appropriate to include representatives from the Folketing.

### Three Percent Seen Inadequate

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 6 Mar 80 p 8

[Article by Christian Brøndum]

[Text] Even if the Folketing adopts an annual increase in the defense expenditure of 3 percent for the next 10 years, the Armed Forces will, in 10 years, still be lacking 34.8 billion kroner to reach the quality level which the Armed Forces themselves consider adequate.

This appears from an economic report recently prepared by the Defense Command.


The report shows that if all the requests of the Armed Forces for new materiel and replacement of existing materiel are to be met, the budget must, each year, be increased by 10.5 percent, corresponding to an average increase during the entire 10-year period of 70 percent. An increase of 3 percent, which is considered the most conceivable increase in the present political negotiations for a new defense program, will, over the entire period, only give an average increase of 16 percent.

Defense Minister Poul Søgaard's political move in the defense negotiations with the Liberal Party, the Conservative People's Party, the Radical Liberal Party, the Democratic Center and the Christian People's Party was an unaltered extension of the present budget of 6.446 billion kroner. If the minister's move is adopted, the difference to the financial requirements, according to the evaluations of the Armed Forces themselves, will become even larger.

The basis for the calculations of the Defense Command is the so-called 'Phase 2 Report' which was prepared by the Defense Command prior to the political defense program negotiations. It appears from this report that, with the annual increase in the budget of 10.5 percent, the Armed Forces will not only be able to continue the replacement of both combat vehicles and aircraft by new models. There will also be means to purchase replacements for the destroyer escorts and corvettes which, presumably, will have to be replaced during that 10-year period. In addition, there will be means to buy entirely new weapons, such as combat helicopters.

However, the Armed Forces themselves do not believe that an annual increase in the budget of 10.5 percent is politically feasible. At a defense conference held last Saturday at Christiansborg, the chief of the Defense Staff, General K. Jørgensen, described the result of such an increase as "chrome-plated armed forces in a Rolls Royce edition."

But according to the economic report of the Defense Command, it is clear that, in 1989, the difference (in fixed prices) of a 3 percent increase and a 10.5 percent increase will amount to nearly 8 billion kroner. In 1989, an annual increase of 3 percent will bring the expenditure of the Armed Forces to 8.3 billion kroner, while the 10.5 percent increase will increase the budget to somewhat under 16 billion kroner.



The graph shows the increase in the defense expenditure based on a 3 percent and a 10.5 percent annual increase, respectively. On the average, over a 10-year period, a 3 percent increase will correspond to a 16 percent increase of the present budget, while an annual increase of 10.5 percent corresponds to an average increase of 70 percent over 10 years.

Key:

- |                             |                       |
|-----------------------------|-----------------------|
| 1. Million kroner           | 5. Plus 3 percent     |
| 2. Price level January 1978 | 6. 16 percent average |
| 3. Plus 10.5 percent        | 7. Zero level         |
| 4. 70 percent average       | 8. 6.466 annually     |

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## CONSORTIUM TO BEGIN TEST DRILLING IN SOUTH JUTLAND

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 5 Mar 80 p 2

[Article: "DUC Will Drill for Oil in South Jutland"]

[Text] Dansk Undergrunds Consortium [the Danish Substratum Consortium], DUC, will start in the beginning of May the first drilling on land for oil and natural gas.

The company has just gotten environmental approval from the exploratory project in South Jutland, and the first test drilling will take place near Løgumkloster. Here it is necessary to go down 2800 meters into the substrate, while in the next project near Tønder it is possible to be content with drilling down to a depth of 1800 meters.

For the time being more land drilling is being contemplated in South Jutland. This will probably be around Varnæs near Åbenrå, but the final decision has not been made yet. The combined project is expected to cost about 40 million kroner.

The preliminary work for the future drilling began in 1978-79, reports DUC Information Chief Lars Dyrskjød.

Both Gulf and Esso have previously searched for oil in South Jutland without results, but both the measuring equipment and the methods used for the interpretation of seismic investigations have been vastly improved in recent years. And the results DUC has gotten in its investigation have produced such clear and reliable information on the substratum that it has been decided to proceed with the actual test drilling.

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BUSINESS INSTITUTE SEES 39 BILLION GROSS FOR NORTH SEA CONSORTIUM

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 13 Mar 80 p 13

[Article: "A.P. Møller Denies Being Able to Earn 39 Billion on Oil and Gas"]

[Text] A.P. Møller and the foreign partners in Dansk Undergrunds Consortium [the Danish Substratum Consortium] (DUC) will up to 1990 gain a combined profit from the recovery of gas and oil from the North Sea of 39 billion kroner before taxes and write-offs on investments made hitherto and planned.

This is the conclusion of the private analysis institute Børsinformation in an investigation of DUC's North Sea activities.

Børsinformation itself indicates this estimate to be very conservative, in that the estimate assumes that oil prices will not rise more than inflation. The basis is a crude oil price of \$34 per barrel.

The estimate of the extent of oil and gas production is based on a mean proportional of the estimate which DUC itself has made and the estimate of production capacities prepared by the Energy Ministry's American experts.

At A.P. Møller the analysis is rejected as "misleading." "There are hundreds of mistakes in it," says the company's information chief, J.E. Karlskov Jensen.

Børsinformation itself points out that DUC did not want to cooperate with the institute on the analysis, just as the consortium has been unwilling to point out specific errors.

To this A.P. Møller's information chief replies that it would take the company's economists several weeks to prepare a report which points out in detail the mistakes in Børsinformation's analysis. "The analysis is completely unqualified as a basis for decision," he stresses.

From the analysis it appears that the gas project in the first phase will give the consortium an "internal return on investment of 23.5 percent." In addition the Gorm Oil Field which is under development will produce an annual return on investment for the company of 68 percent. Possible recovery from the Skjold Field will produce a return on investment of 66.7 percent, but DUC has not yet made a decision on activity here.

The analysis denies the allegations from political quarters that the pace of exploration in the Danish section of the North Sea has been too slow. The level of activity is denoted as satisfactory, when geographical conditions are taken into account.

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CSO: 3106

CONSORTIUM WILL PROVIDE 23 PERCENT OF OIL NEEDS BY 1985

Copenhagen INFORMATION in Danish 18 Mar 80 p 1

[Article: "Danish Oil Will Cover 23 Percent of Our Consumption in 1985"]

[Text] DUC Will Put the Third Oil Field--Skjold--Into Production as of 1985

By 1985 Danish oil production will cover about 23 percent of oil consumption here at home.

A.P. Møller's information department reports to INFORMATION that Dansk Undergrunds Consortium [the Danish Substratum Consortium] (DUC) expects to put its third oil field--Skjold--into production as of 1985.

The Dan Field has been in production since 1972 and the Gorm Field will according to the plan produce oil by January 1981.

Together the three fields will be able to produce a good 3.2 million tons of oil per year, and according to the agreements which Denmark has entered into with the International Energy Agency (IEA) Danish oil consumption in 1985 will be about 13.8 million tons.

The Skjold Field was discovered in 1976. It is a relatively small oil field from which 3 to 8 million tons can be recovered. On the other hand, the oil is relatively easy to recover.

As early as 1977 there existed a petition from DUC for permission for production, but the production plan was so constituted that the Ministry of Commerce did not want DUC to burn off the field's gas, and secondly high annual production was desired in proportion to the combined amounts of oil.

The American consulting firm estimated in 1977 that the field contained about 2.2 billion cubic meters of gas, corresponding to 2.2 million tons of oil.

### Return on Investment of 84.3 Percent

In a report DeGolyer & MacNaughton wrote that the Skjold project was an "unusually attractive project." The consulting firm thought at that time that expenses would be about 400 million kroner, while the proceeds from oil and gas would reach about 3.6 billion kroner.

DeGolyer & MacNaughton expected the Skjold Field to yield a return on investment of about 75 percent.

Nevertheless, at that time DUC withdrew its petition for permission for production, because the consortium asserted that it was impossible to pump the gas back (re-inject it) into the field.

In Børsinformation's A.P. Møller analysis, which was published last week, it says that the Skjold Field at the present oil prices will yield an internal return on investment of 84.3 percent.

A.P. Møller's information department reports that a new drilling platform--Dyvi Beta--has just been leased for exploratory purposes.

The drilling platform around October 1 will perform confirmatory drilling in the Skjold Field, and if the results of this drilling meet expectations the field will be put into production as of 1985.

Dyvi Beta will then be moved to the Adda structure, where the presence of oil was established by test drilling in 1977.

Dyvi Beta has a crew of 78 men and costs about 350,000 kroner in operating expenses per day.

### Three Hundred and Seventy Thousand Tons of Oil from the Dan Field

A.P. Møller expects that the only Danish oil field in production--the Dan Field--will produce 370,000 tons of oil this year. This represents a 11 percent decline as compared with production in 1979, which equaled about 425,000 tons.

The reason is the stricter requirements which the Ministry of Energy has set for the burning of natural gas in connection with oil production.

According to A.P. Møller the burnoff in 1980 will be substantially lower than the 150 million cubic meters reported in INFORMATION. A.P. Møller's information department reports that in the first two months of the year 1980, 400 cubic meters per day were burned off on average. This represents about 80 million cubic meters per year.

Eighty million cubic meters of natural gas have an energy content corresponding to 80,000 tons of oil. Each Dane uses an average of about three tons of oil per year for heating. The burned-off oil could therefore provide a good 27,000 Danes with heat.



OIL EXPLORATION GROUP ACTS TO AID DANISH FIRMS

Copenhagen INFORMATION in Danish 10 Mar 80 p 10

[Article: "Project Group for Natural Gas"]

[Text] A project group of about 80 men in Dansk Boreselskab [the Danish Drilling Company] will direct the construction of a natural gas project for Dansk Undergrunds Consortium [the Danish Substratum Consortium] (DUC).

In the next five years DUC will invest 4.1 billion kroner for the purpose of the recovery of Danish natural gas from the substratum in the North Sea. According to DUC the project group needs assistance from engineering firms on the order of magnitude of at least 650,000 technical man-hours.

At a meeting Wednesday at the Danish Engineers' Association was discussed the report which an independent group of consulting engineers has prepared in order to ensure as much Danish participation as possible in the gas project.

"A flexible project organization, careful planning, strict observance of plans and budgets, along with strict discipline are among the demands which the drilling company will make on Danish engineering firms," said Civil Engineer Al. Hemming Jørgensen of Dansk Boreselskab.

The aim of the engineers' report and of the meeting at the Danish Engineers Association is to draw Danish firms into the work as quickly as possible, so that they in the following phases of the project more easily can secure manufacturing contracts and orders.

Dansk Boreselskab's organization in Copenhagen is in charge of control of the gas project and will be in charge of purchasing, management of materials and the supply service.

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CSO: 3106

## BRIEFS

**FAS, OIL CONSUMPTION DOWN**--The combined sale of oil products dropped 13 percent from December 1978 to December 1979, indicates a statement from the Danish Bureau of Statistics. The sale of heating oil and petroleum dropped a total of 18 percent, while the sale of gasoline declined 11 percent. The production of gasworks gas dropped 12 percent, while the consumption of electricity dropped only two percent. [Text] [Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 12 Mar 80 p 8] 8985

**RADICAL LIBERALS QUIT PANEL**--The participation of the Radical Liberals in the negotiations for a new defense program must, after the meeting with Defense Minister Poul Sogaard last Monday afternoon, be regarded as ended. The Social Democratic defense spokesman, Preben Steen Nielsen, tells BERLINGSKE TIDENDE that the Social Democratic Folketing fraction, at a meeting last Friday, decided that the Radical Liberals have excluded themselves from any further participation in the negotiations. Accordingly, the three big parties in the defense negotiations, the Social Democratic Party, the Liberal Party, and the Conservative People's Party, have agreed to demand that the Radical Liberals be removed. The background is that by voting for the agendas of the Leftist Socialist Party and the Socialist People's Party for defense cuts in the Folketing last week, the Radical Liberals have committed themselves so strongly that they cannot participate in the continued defense negotiations, says Preben Steen Nielsen. But even if the Radical Liberals leave the panel today, the difference between the five remaining parties, the Social Democratic Party, the Liberal Party, the Conservative People's Party, the Democratic Center Party, and the Christian People's Party is still very big. [Text] [Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 11 Mar 80 p 5] 7262

CSO 7106

## OFFICIALS DISCUSS ARMS PROJECTS, COOPERATION, BUDGET

Bonn WEHRTECHNIK in German Apr 80 pp 15-23

[Interview with State Secretary Dr Karl Schnell, Ministerial Director Engineer Hans Eberhard, Division Chief for Armament, and Ministerial Director Dr-Engineer Johannes Trienes, Division Chief for Weapons Engineering: "Good Progress in Armament"]

[Text] This year's WT [WEHRTECHNIK] interview with State Secretary Dr Karl Schnell, Ministerial Director Engineer Hans Eberhard, Division Chief for Armament, and Ministerial Director Dr-Engineer Johannes Trienes, Division Chief for Weapons Engineering clearly feels that considerable progress can be registered in recent times in many sectors in the armament field, particularly in terms of cooperation. This applies to bilateral projects in Europe--the model 90 battle tank or the model 2 AT helicopter--just as much as it applies to the trans-Atlantic dialogue between Europe and the United States. This is where the concept of the weapons family gradually comes into its own. Arms cooperation of course to be sure also means simultaneously technology transfer--if in the past and until now we have benefited from our partners in certain sectors and if we want to continue to do that in other sectors in the future, then we must also be ready to let our partners share in our knowhow in other fields where we are the leaders. We are happy to note that research and development expenditures, which for 1980 have been cut back by about DM120 million to a figure of DM1.7 billion, will go up again during the next several years.

WT: More and more programs are being undertaken jointly, regardless of whether they involve developments or procurements--inside Europe or also across the ocean, in other words, between Germany and the United States. Are you satisfied with trans-Atlantic cooperation?

Dr Schnell: The trans-Atlantic dialogue in recent years has been broadened considerably also because of President Carter's statements. This dialogue

is not just a bilateral dialogue between America and Germany; instead, it is a trans-Atlantic dialogue between Europe and the United States. We look for bilateral solutions only in special cases, when European solutions are not possible. These joint European efforts are stepped up by the IEPC which, during its last meeting in November, particularly stressed cooperation between Europe and America. I would here like to mention only the so-called "package program" which after all is to lead to a division of labor between Europe and the United States.

#### The Package Program

WT: This package--or weapons family--probably includes third-generation AT rocket systems and air-to-air missiles. What other weapons might also be included here?

Dr Schnell: We consider it impractical immediately to get involved in further programs beyond this point; we must first of all figure out how things are coming along. We are completely concentrating on the two programs mentioned by you; but in addition we have initial investigations on further programs, for example, for air-to-ground weapons or ship-to-ship missiles.

WT: How far along are you with the two first-named programs? Let us take the AT weapons first.

Dr Frienes: Here we started with talks in Europe. France and Germany--being the nations that had developed the second-generation AT rocket systems, such as MILAN and HOT--and Great Britain had started considering what a next generation might look like. When the Americans then proposed the package program, the Europeans were already prepared as a result of these preliminary talks; this is probably also the reason why this package is the most advanced in terms of coordination between Europe and the United States. After careful deliberations, which partly also were influenced by the technical capabilities of the two partners, that is, Europe and the United States, the following agreement was worked out: the Europeans will develop a "direct"-action, vehicle-based AT weapon of the third generation with the technical objective of "fire and forget." The "vehicle" concept includes the helicopter. An official organization is already being set up in Europe for this program and industry has already created a trilateral firm along the lines of the German-French Euromissile. The Americans for their part want to develop a portable, in other words, lighter-weight AT weapon because it is more limited because of its lighter weight and thus also in terms of its effectiveness on target so that it is supposed to hit the tank "indirectly" which means at less protected points. Hence the expression "indirect" weapon. Just exactly what the engineering solution is supposed to look like is not yet definite--in other words, for example, triggering the warhead while flying over the target.

WT: Are there already any agreements on that between the United States and the Europeans?

Eberhard: So far, these are just declarations of intention. During our next meeting within just a few days, we are going to have a model review. It is also important to note that this means division of labor in the sense that, in each case, other weapons will be procured, if necessary, by everybody--in other words, the Americans will procure our heavy, direct AT weapon and we will procure their light, indirect weapon, if necessary. The elimination of parallel developments is a prerequisite for making the entire program meaningful; but knowhow transfer is fully contained in that.

WT: Are you also just as far along already in the sector of air-to-air weapons?

Dr Trienes: In that family, the partners, that is, the Americans and the Europeans, have figured out that the European side should work on the shorter-range missile and that the Americans should take the medium range--using the abbreviations ASRAAM and AMRAAM. Negotiations on a corresponding model project are far advanced. France has not yet definitely decided as to whether it will cooperate actively. In spite of its basic readiness to cooperate, France probably would first of all like to get some clear ideas as to the next aircraft.

WT: You also mentioned initial investigations in the sector of air-to-ground weapons. What kinds of weapons would be covered by that?

Dr Trienes: All air-to-ground weapons, for example, from the MAVERICK all the way to any stand-off missiles which might possibly be developed in the future. This sector encompasses already developed weapons and future systems. It is therefore difficult to delimit a compact package--although this certainly does not prevent cooperation regarding the existing weapons.

WT: The Harassment Drone, in other words, the small antiradar drone, is supposed to become a purely bilateral German-American program. What is the status of this project?

Eberhard: This program is now continuing after some delay. It is probably the first step toward the effort to jam the battlefield command equipment of the other side.

#### Further Purchase in the United States

WT: The projects mentioned so far are more or less developments for the future. Looking at West Germany, are we not also still buying arms in the United States? What systems could you mention here?



Dr Schnell: Of course, armament relationships also include purchasing. I would like to mention just a few examples for last year, such as a certain number of Sidewinder AIM-9L, in order to close the time gap until shipments from European license production, certain parts for the modernization of guided-missile destroyers, spare parts packages for the M-48 or additional TOW ammunition. An important item here, in bilateral relations, is also the training of West German pilots in the United States or technical-logistic support for our training aircraft over there.

WT: How high were those expenditures last year?

Dr Schnell: An individual annual figure could easily create the wrong impression because of the very complicated accounting method, but looking at it on the average, including all purchases of spare parts, components, etc., we have a figure of roughly \$500-750 million per year.

WT: You mentioned the Sidewinder Missiles which are to be built in Europe on a license basis under German project management. Are you not also trying to get other weapons manufactured here under license?

Eberhard: Yes, that applies for example to MAVERICK, STINGER or special ammunition for the model 70 field howitzer. Looking at the MAVERICK, we can tell that Italy might possibly take over as project manager whereas in the case of the STINGER, we have an offer to Norway; regarding special ammunition, the Netherlands will presumably be the pilot nation.

WT: Does special ammunition mean longer-range projectiles?

Eberhard: No; this is the so-called increased-payload subammunition which was developed in the United States and which we selected for the field howitzer and the armored howitzer.

Roland Secured in the United States

WT: To mention just one example running in the other direction: Roland was now after all cleared all obstacles in the United States?

Dr Schnell: Roland is now a sure thing for American troops in Europe. Of course, so far only the equipment for a first lot has been approved but this is more a question of budget mechanics.

WT: Are the American Roland missiles to be used here in Europe on the battlefield or only for facility protection, as we heard in the United States?

Dr Schnell: Roland is to be used on the battlefield; the Americans are planning to purchase Rapier only for target protection in England in order to protect the facilities of the U. S. Air Force there.

WT: And what about the Copperhead? Here after all we already have industrial conferences between American and European companies on possible joint production.

Eberhard: It has so far not yet been determined whether Copperhead or a similar laser-illumination-guided artillery ammunition makes any sense in Europe. Because the weapon and the laser target illuminator are used separately, we need friend-foe identification which is very difficult to put together and we need an instant and jam-free data transition procedure-- a problem which has not yet been solved. Thus we consider Copperhead or our experimental projectile, the Bussard, more in the nature of engineering studies in order to figure out whether these methods will work in Europe in the first place. The Americans likewise had to admit during field exercises that it is more difficult in Europe than under American environmental conditions to arrive at satisfactory results.

Dr. Frienes: The future will probably lie less with this kind of weapon, using a separate illuminator, and much more so with autonomous weapons. Technologically, the way to that goal leads via systems such as the Copperhead or Bussard.

#### Good Cooperation in Europe

WT: Arms cooperation with the United States seems to be developing very nicely--but what about the situation in Europe as such? Are we making progress here likewise?

Dr. Sennell: We are naturally trying to push cooperation with our partners in Europe likewise, above all with France, Great Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, and Norway. France comes in second place after the United States as supplier for the West German Armed Forces, especially also through the successful bilateral programs which now will be joined by others. Cooperation with Great Britain was just as good. We are trying to achieve closer cooperation with France and Great Britain above all in the helicopter sector, including medium and heavy transport helicopters and we want to include the Italians here.

WT: Apart from the Tornado and the howitzer, is not Italy somewhat off by itself there?

Eberhard: Well, yes and no--while the government was trying very hard to cooperate more, industry still seems to be somewhat reluctant. But they do want to participate in the battle tank for the nineties; in the case of MILAN, the Italians did want to come in, probably also because of the quite understandable intention of getting closer to entry into the third generation of AT weapons.

WT: Last year the Netherlands purchased 445 Leopard 2 [tanks] and will participate in production. Could this lead to closer and possibly also more development-oriented cooperation with a view to the battle tank for the nineties?

Dr Schnell: Certainly; the Dutch and other nations of course are free to cooperate on this battle tank, not so much on the overall program, but rather in the component sector. The condition for this however is that they must also participate financially and report a requirement of their own. This applies today as it did last year.

Norway as a partner

WT: Norway is an interesting partner--if we think in terms of oil--and it is also willing to cooperate. They are cooperating in the Sidewinder program and you already mentioned the Stinger. Are there any other projects to be mentioned?

Bierhard: Here we might especially mention the submarine. The Norwegians asked us to design their new submarine class 210; we are now trying to develop the combat value increase of our submarine class 206 in terms of fire control and weapons employment systems together with the Norwegians so that this can also be used for their submarines. We have already gotten a certain project-manager status approved at the Kongsberg Company because this outfit has considerable experience with systems. An association was formed with the collaboration of German industry in order to develop the same systems for both classes of boats. Beyond that, a number of other projects was launched, beginning with the exchange of research and development discoveries and extending all the way to certain material questions.

#### Tactical Combat Aircraft Not Yet Ready for Decision

WT: Now let us take up some big projects which have to be decided in the near future or where certain cooperation agreements have already emerged. How far along are we with the tactical combat aircraft for the nineties?

Dr Schnell: To be quite frank, the TKF [tactical combat aircraft] is not yet ready for any decision. The West German Air Force derived a requirement for a TKF from the threat and that TKF is to be optimized in terms of air defense with simultaneous suitability for employment against ground targets. We have included several alternatives in the planning connected with our investigations; so far however we do not yet have any coordination between the possible partners who are Great Britain, France, and West Germany because the priorities and tasks are still different.

WT: In other words, the various military establishments have not yet agreed on common requirements and time schedules?

Eberhard: The situation in these countries varies; while West Germany must intercept over its own soil, right along the border, the British, for example, must engage entirely different aircraft so that the Tornado is certainly suitable for them in this role.

WT: Is a single aircraft at all possible, considering the differing missions--in West Germany, primarily, air defense, and, in the other countries, with more emphasis on air-to-ground sorties?

Dr Trienes: Right now it looks as if we could achieve a common aircraft with a unified basic design which however would have different equipment for the individual missions as a result of which there is a greater probability that it could be optimized rather nicely for both missions. The possible engineering solutions also seem to be attainable here. Regarding the timetable, we have also come closer together because the British are now ready to go along with the "slowest" partner. The decision itself--in other words, whether or not a tactical combat aircraft is to be developed--will not be possible before next year; until then, we must examine all ways for a common basis. Naturally, we must do this always on the condition that the military requirements of all three partners will be met.

WT: In the case of the tactical combat aircraft, there is increasing talk of France and Great Britain as partners. Could not the United States also be a partner with whom the tactical combat aircraft could be developed together?

Eberhard: Development cooperation with the United States at this time cannot be anticipated. The United States made it perfectly clear that it has no intention, prior to the middle of the eighties, to start developing a new combat aircraft. But the United States is presently interested in cooperating with Europe in the research area. The European tactical combat aircraft design work thus is currently not being influenced by the Americans. But that does not mean that we in Europe will not try to get American components; after all, one of our basic ideas was that not everything must be developed newly, from scratch.

#### TKF Cannot Be Financed From Model 14 Individual Plan

WT: Could a tactical combat aircraft development still be financed through the defence budget at all?

Dr Schnell: Figures of around DM 10 billion have been mentioned as development costs and we would have to contribute our share to that. Looking at the development project at this time, we are not in a position to come up with the development costs for a TKF from the Model 14 individual plan. Here, the various governments would have to figure out to what extent other budget funds are made available. After all, a development of a tactical combat aircraft would have repercussions on the preservation and further

growth of our aviation industry.

#### Mr. National Approach to Battle Tank Issue

Mr. Is it true that we are somewhat further along right now regarding the battle tank for the nineties which, so to speak, is supposed to be "your" battle tank, Mr. Eberhard?

Eberhard: That of course is not the case but I do admit that I personally am very much interested in not approaching the battle tank issue from a purely national angle. I believe that such an important project is so decisive for the Alliance that any possible national reservations must be put aside. Where we are involved, we cannot demand knowhow transfer and where we believe that we have a head start, we cannot say: no, not here, where we want to sell. With all due respect for German industry, I would like to warn against believing that we alone have a monopoly on armor production.

Mr. What does the agreement have to say anyway, specifically, regarding joint development efforts?

Mr. Schnell: You ought to say "joint definition" because, after all, here is what is involved: both countries intend together to spell out a battle tank during phase II. At the end of the definition phase, we are supposed to decide whether a new development would be worthwhile. If the definition phase should not clearly prove that significant progress compared to the Leopard 2 can be achieved, then no joint battle tank will be developed--and that is clearly what is provided for in the agreement.

Mr. In other words, no other countries--for example, the Netherlands or Belgium--are to be involved during the definition phase?

Mr. Schnell: The concept is to be prepared by Germany and France; the definition phase however will already include the first component considerations and the countries could already cooperate in the component sector, as we said before.

Mr. How is the program supposed to be managed?

Eberhard: Like all international programs, we are going to have a management committee also for the battle tank for the nineties which is supposed to meet in Paris and which will be supported by a small, permanent office in which we will also be represented. The government and industry organizations, which have combined into a coordination group, will have its headquarters in Hamburg.

Mr. What will be the development costs for the battle tank?



Eberhard: You really could not tell what that is going to be today because we do not yet know what the battle tank is supposed to look like and what it is supposed to include. Are we going to include the ammunition development or are we not; are we going to develop a new chassis or can we use the one in the Leopard 2--all of these are questions which yet remain to be answered.

#### Model 2 AT Helicopter Only in Definition Phase

WT: The Model 2 AT helicopter is likewise a bilateral German-French program. Has it been possible to settle here on a final configuration?

Dr Trienes: We concluded a government agreement on an 18-month definition phase with France on 15 October. The foundation for this consisted of the military requirements and the joint concept studies by MBB [Messerschmitt-Boelkow-Blohm] as the general contractor for the definition phase and Aerospatiale. Germany is the project manager with the BWB [Federal Defense Equipment and Procurement Office] as the executive agency. The cost of the definition phase will be split equally by both countries but just exactly how that is going to shape up later on remains to be seen. The initial industrial contract is just about to be signed. Within 12 months we are supposed to find out whether the existing concept can be implemented through the extensive use of proven equipment within the existing, admittedly very tight financial framework. That applies especially to the expensive night-fighting and night-flying equipment. Here we are from the very beginning conducting a comparative analysis of equipment on the market, essentially, in other words, also from the United States, as well as systems to be newly developed. But we are investigating several solutions also for other structural components. Certain milestones are built into the program and as we get to each of them, we are going to have to decide whether we want to continue on together; the agreement itself does not contain any obligation beyond the definition phase. But I would like to emphasize this: a purely national development effort is impossible for financial reasons.

#### Satisfied With AWACS

WT: Now and then, the AWACS program makes the headlines in the daily press because the Americans probably are not coming through on their obligations completely. What is the status here?

Dr Schnell: The program is running according to plan. NAPMA, the appropriate NATO agency, is in full swing in Brunssum and the infrastructure measures in Geilenkirchen have already been started, for example, the runway is now being repaired. Competitive bidding invitations for the other infrastructure projects are now out and the bidding must be international for projects involving more than DM 2.6 million according to the EC Guidelines. Regarding the compensation, we can say that all compensation

programs have been launched. Out of the 200 millions in the motor vehicle package, DM 30 million have already been awarded; negotiations on the European telephone system for the U.S. Army in Europe may also yet be completed in April; some of the funds have already been included in the United States budget. Furthermore, the direct participation of German industry in AWACS, in the amount of \$450 million, has already been secured through orders that have been awarded; the fourth point in compensation, the first license payments for the adoption of the 120-millimeter tank gun, have also been made. Looking at it overall, we are very satisfied with the way the program is going.

Q: We are certainly glad to hear that. Looking at the German share, does this also apply to the MLRS, the medium-range artillery rocket system, which is essentially being developed in the United States? Do we have adequate participation by German industry here?

A: Our share in this system is clearly spelled out: we develop a warhead and its development is also being handled here in Germany. If the overall system is to be produced later on, then provision has been made that the manufacturing effort will be broken up on the basis of the value of the needs of the particular country.

Q: Is any consideration also being given to a German vehicle for the MLRS?

A: Yes--if it should be possible to put it on a wheeled vehicle, then we will decide on a German vehicle. But if, for some reason, it would have to be on a tracked chassis then the question must be looked into all over again.

Q: Procurement of Patriot

A: Another system developed in the United States, which we in West Germany will probably take over, is the Patriot AA missile system. To what extent it is possible to involve German and European industry in this production

A: Patriot is the only possible successor to Nike-Hercules. Joint agreement has been provided by those countries which include Patriot as successors to Nike. Just exactly how this procurement effort will turn out, something that is currently being studied at NAPATMO in Munich: license production or purchase in the United States. We cannot yet tell today to what extent German industry will be involved here. The next question--whether all countries which are now represented in NAPATMO will also afterwards produce Patriot--likewise is still unanswered. Whether and to what extent license production still makes any sense also will depend on that.

### Utilization Phase Costs Considered

WT: There is one question that comes up in connection with license production in Germany: license production may be more expensive here than in case of purchase; the acquired knowhow and the subsequently possible maintenance through German industry however will cause the utilization phase to become cheaper. Are you considering this viewpoint as you have to decide whether to purchase or to produce under license?

Eberhard: Of course, we are including the utilization phase in our considerations; this is somewhat more difficult for the customer because at first he can see only the procurement costs and he cannot immediately get a picture of expenditures during the utilization phase. Purchase abroad perhaps involves an advantage during the utilization phase. But we do know after all that the costs for the development and procurement phases together as a rule are smaller than the cost for the utilization phase. Let us just take the frigate as an example here: because of the lower expenditures during the utilization phase, we decided on diesel engines and we picked the American turbine as additional engine. The other question, which is asked again and again, is the extent to which the tax return flow must be considered. This of course does have considerable significance in terms of the national economy but the return flow would not help our West German budget. This is why we must not and cannot use this in our analysis--although it is quite understandable that we should be thinking about this.

### Preliminary Work on Hawk Successor

WT: Let us now get back to the AA rockets. While Patriot is supposed to replace Nike, the Hawk follow-on system is not yet as definite. Is a new European system being developed or is a twice-improved Hawk under discussion?

Dr Trienes: Some preliminary studies have been started in Europe, for example, in Germany, under the designation MIFLA or in Great Britain and France in the case of the EURO-SAM studies. Now, joint considerations are being undertaken in Europe as to how to replace the Hawk: by means of a new system, by means of Patriot or a Patriot derivative. A "hip-hip"--in other words, a Hawk improved once more--is likewise not being ruled out. But no decisions have been made; we in Europe are trying to get ready to talk to the Americans as partners.

WT: The Americans are apparently developing Pershing II with greater range as well as cruise missiles. Both systems are to be stationed in Europe later. Is there any indication that we are going to participate in these programs, in other words, are we going to convert our West German Pershing units to the new weapon?

Dr Schnell: Development participation in these, rather more strategic programs, is not anticipated here. Our two Pershing wings with the West

German Air Force are to be modernized by the middle of the eighties. But the way things are today, the range of our Pershing missiles is not to be increased. Likewise, we are not participating in the cruise missiles; today we cannot yet tell whether, sometime in the future, infrastructure measures might be necessary which would have to be paid out of the NATO infrastructure budget title.

#### Further Increase in Development Expenditures

W: So far we have been talking mostly about programs for the future, in other words, programs which are in the so-called preliminary phase or in the development phase. Are we going to have enough budget funds in the future for research and development? And do certain worries seem justified now as we look at the current decline in these budget titles in the Model 14 individual plan?

Dr Schnell: Research and development expenditures in the 1980 budget came to DM 190 million for defence research and DM 1.5 billion for military technological development and testing, plus about 15 millions for military research and development apart from defence equipment, giving us a total of about \$1.7 billion.

Compared to 1979, when we had a figure of DM 1.8 billion, this is a certain decline and the reasons for this are to be found in the general budget fund shortage but also in the decline of the development funds required for the Tornado and the second weapons system generation. On the other hand, we are facing new programs which call for an increase in the development fund allocations. We have to develop not only the tactical combat aircraft or the Model 90 battle tank; we must also come out with the new armored vehicles for the army, new submarines for the navy, and the vast field of ammunition. If we want to retain our qualitative lead, we must over the next several years again spend more for research and development and we therefore also planned on higher budget estimates. Our development funds are rather tight; nevertheless, we have been able to develop everything that was necessary. In this conversation we mentioned a large number of systems to be developed; I believe that it is an illusion that we could alone, on a national basis, develop all of those weapons which are being talked about today. This is where priorities have to be established. And this is precisely also a reason for cooperation.

Eberhard: We are after all today dropping entire areas, for example, we are only spending so much for laser research that we will be able to remain "in the know." But we nevertheless do expect technology transfer from America to Europe in this field; this is what we should keep in mind whenever we have somewhat of a lead ahead of the others, for example, in the armor sector.

WT: Are present-day expenditures for research, development, and procurement still enough, to begin with, in view of the threat? Is it not rather the fund shortage by which the defense sector should be guided?

Dr Schnell: NATO's defense efforts in the final analysis are determined by the Long Term Defense Program--and this is where we have our priorities. The Long Term Defense Program is not going to be altered or invalidated as a result of Afghanistan because it is aimed at the defense possibilities and an increase in defense effectiveness in the Central European area. Our defense expenditures will go up by 3 percent this year if we include military aid to Turkey because, according to NATO criteria, defense aid is included in defense spending.

#### PHOTO CAPTION

1. p 15. State Secretary Dr Karl Schnell is quite satisfied with progress in international armament projects. The following also participated in the interview with WT (from left to right): Ministerial Director Hans Eberhard, Division Chief for Armament, and Ministerial Director Dr Johannes Trienes, Division Chief, Weapons Engineering.

5058

CSO: 3103



HAUFF VISIT TO ISRAEL, NEAR EAST POLICY NOTED

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 24 Mar 80 pp 42-45

[Article: "Difficult Mission"]

[Text] Research Minister Hauff attempted to explain Bonn's position in the Near East conflict to Israel; but Prime Minister Begin would have none of European interference.

Israel's Prime Minister Menachem Begin got down to brass tacks immediately. When he received the German Research Minister Volker Hauff in his office last Tuesday they did not discuss science and technology, but the Near East and the Soviet threat.

For Begin the young man from Bonn was the first official FRG emissary who would convey to him an assessment of the altered East-West balance and authentic information concerning future European Near East policies.

Leaning back in his chair nonchalantly, the Israeli politician drew a grim picture of the Soviet advance--of the invasion of Afghanistan, of their troop presence in South Yemen and of their military aid to Libya, Ethiopia, Syria and the Polisario in the western Sahara. All around Israel's borders, Begin said, there is hardly a country not subject to Soviet influence. "Such is the situation in which we find ourselves."

Dissatisfied with the role Europe is playing, Begin deplored the fact that Italy is about to export nuclear technology to Iraq to help that country in the manufacture of plutonium. Expressing his readiness to negotiate with Syria and Jordan, Begin made it clear that he would brook no participation on the part of Europe.

Israel has long since realized, Begin told the Bonn minister, that the European countries' prime concern is to secure their oil supply from the Arab states. It would therefore be helpful "if the Europeans would keep

out as far as possible" and if they held back altogether on pronouncements such as Giscard d'Estaing's on the "Palestinians' self-determination." At which point Begin added casually: "I am told that Helmut Schmidt has made statements along the same general lines."

The youngest member of the Bonn cabinet could see what a difficult undertaking it would be for the socialist-liberal coalition to join with France and the other EC partners in trying to assume an independent role in the Near East conflict.

To be sure, Begin's assessment of the threat of Soviet expansion in the Near and Middle East is by and large shared by Bonn foreign policy experts. But the conclusions they draw are different: the Europeans feel that the West has gained ground at Soviet expense. The Israelis, for their part, view the Soviet advance as an immediate threat to their own security.

Diplomats in Bonn believe that the Arabs are using the Afghanistan conflict as a means of focusing attention on the Near East. In their conversations with European political figures they frankly state that solidarity with the West above all implies a readiness to dislodge the Israelis from the occupied territories on the West Bank.

A Bonn Foreign Office position paper concludes: "The Near East conflict has entered a new stage and its resolution has become even more urgent. Depending on the further developments of the situation, the improved Western position in the Near and Middle East as a consequence of Afghanistan may be maintained or the thrust of the newly won Islamic solidarity may turn against the United States and the West."

Pursuant to the instructions he had received from the Chancellor and the Foreign Minister, Hauff told the Israeli Prime Minister that Europe was not prepared to exercise the kind of restraint Begin had requested. The Europeans, said Hauff, were also concerned about their security. And, with reference to Arab oil, he added: "It is not just a question of doing business."

If, as is to be expected, the Egyptian-Israeli negotiations do not succeed by the 26 May deadline in spite of American efforts to achieve an understanding, the EC will launch a joint Near East initiative. "It would be wrong to think one can return to business as usual in the event no result is reached by 26 May," Hauff told Begin.

The main points of the EC initiative are these: The incontestable right of Israel to live within recognized and secure borders is of equal priority with the recognition of the right of the Palestinian people to attain self-determination.

The conditions: Neither side may raise an exclusive claim to the entire territory of the former trusteeship area of Palestine. Hauff left no doubt in Jerusalem that Bonn feels that only a gesture on the part of Israel can lead to progress. At a dinner with the very first Israeli politician he met, Energy Minister Yitzhak Modai, Hauff said: "The eyes of the world are upon your country."

But Prime Minister Begin was not impressed by Hauff's talk about the European initiative. The Camp David accords do not obligate him to reach positive results by 25 May. "If we do not reach any, we will simply continue our efforts."

In parting, Begin merely asked his German visitor to give Chancellor Schmidt and Foreign Minister Genscher a full and detailed report about everything that was said in Jerusalem.

As things stand, Begin has given up hope that he will soon be able to have a word with the Chancellor himself. In fact, neither Begin, nor his Foreign Minister as much as asked Hauff whether Schmidt would embark on his long-postponed visit to Israel any time soon.

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CSO: 3103

## DEBATE WITHIN TRADE UNIONS ON YOUTH WORK, COMMUNISM

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 24 Mar 80 p 12

[Article by Ernst Guenter Vetter: "No Agreement on Youth Work"]

[Text] For years now a heated debate has been in progress inside the DGB, which is about to reach a climax. Within the next few days the presidiums of the 17 members unions will meet to discuss the organization of youth work. The explosiveness of this issue first became public in 1977 when Karl Schwab, the DGB presidium member responsible for youth work, returned from his organization's youth congress in great alarm. The reason for his exasperation was that he had noted a great deal of intolerance which he took to be due to the alarming degree of influence wielded by communist functionaries. Soon thereafter Hinrich Oetjen, the director of the DGB Youth School, issued a memorandum in which he and his colleagues denounced communist infiltration of youth work more outspokenly than ever before. The document also criticized union youth work generally, an accusation no doubt aimed at the functionaries of the Metal Workers Union. It was.

Things came to a head as a consequence. The DGB youth secretary was suspended from office and the school which until then had been an instrumentality of all the unions was placed under direct DGB supervision. Not without justification some members spoke of escalation while others held that union solidarity might crack over the issue of youth education. Ever since, unusually strong language is being used within the unions and in public.

When unions start quarreling about the principles of education work, they touch upon the very heart of their organizational structure. And, when a controversy about this particular subject revolves around communist infiltration, there is every reason for the public to be on the alert. It is no secret any longer that leading functionaries are openly advocating popular front alliances as long as the communists do good work for the unions. The vast majority, to be sure, still opposes any kind of partnership with the communists.

Equally sharp differences exist between two groups with opposing views as to how education should be organized. On the one hand there are those who favor "committee work." They feel that youth work should only be conducted at the place of work in committees established for that purpose and based on agreed political principles and directives. The Metal Workers Union is the prime exponent of this method. Most of the other unions are against it. They are in favor of a wide spectrum of youth activity which should take in all the interests of young people both at work and during their leisure hours and not be confined to prescribed political instruction. This, they feel, is the only way to get a large number of young people interested in the labor unions. The Mine and Energy Workers Union has already achieved practical results along these lines.

### Something of an Injustice

Recently, Hermann Rappe, a member of the presidium of the Chemical Workers Union, made it unmistakably clear that he considered committee work "a rigid and dogmatic form of education, a mere superimposition of subject matter." This cannot be viewed as a contribution to youth work; there is something of an injustice in preaching the "ideology of right and wrong consciousness." This same union, which has coined the term "deputy policy" (youth work to be done by deputies only), has stated that youth work cannot be restricted to instruction in political economy.

Other unions, above all the Miners and Energy Workers, are in agreement. Bruno Koebele, a member of the presidium of the Construction Workers Union, says it is more important to obtain a labor contract than to "preach cadre regulations and other people's wise sayings without end." He states his position clearly: Any attempt to exert pressure on the DGB and to make it adopt the philosophy of just one of its members unions, namely the Metal Workers, is to be rejected. This statement is directed primarily against the presidium members of this union, Benz and Preiss, who have composed long letters and presented documentary evidence in support of their argument and are working for the dismissal of Karl Schwab, who will not do their bidding, and for the suspension of Hinrich Oetjen.

One may call it a pure coincidence that the very functionaries who make light of communist influence are the ones who favor youth work in committees. The leading proponents of this course are the aforementioned presidium members of the Metal Workers Union, Georg Benz and Hans Preiss in addition to Dr. Detlef Hensche of the Printers Union. Those opposed to their view say that the committee approach espoused by the Metal Workers not only is too rigid and dogmatic to appeal to young people; they also feel that these committees are most susceptible to communist domination, providing them with a base for inculcating their ideas in young people with little or no opposition. This group considers the struggle against communism within the ranks as synonymous with the rejection of the committee approach to youth work.



It is this marked political or even ideological accent which makes this controversy so explosive for the unions. This is where the basic differences of opinion lie. It is therefore worth noting that the communist newspaper NACHRICHTEN, forever concerned about the purity of dogma, chose to reprint Benz' and Preiss' document, thereby presumably demonstrating solidarity and friendship. On the other side of the fence there is a large grouping, composed of social democrats and socialists, who are united not only in their opposition to a specific approach to youth work, but also in their rigorous opposition to communism. For all that, the spectrum is broad enough. There are unionists like the youth secretary of the Miners and Energy Workers Union who comes out in favor of patterning the future development of the market economy after the "third way;" and there is Hinrich Oetjen, who wants to abolish the "capitalist system." The so-called "Offenbach Circle," a loose grouping of leftwing socialists none too popular with the union leadership because of its criticism of basis democracy, has lustily joined the attack against the Metal Workers. And while the youth conference of the Printers Union comes out against the committee approach, presidium member Hensche, a supporter of popular front ideas, sits by smiling maliciously.

#### Metal Workers Predominate

One other factor must be considered which operates below the surface: animosity against the all-powerful sister union which has the money and the votes. The Metal Workers, boasting 2.5 million members, are the predominant element in the DGB and they act accordingly, not always to the delight of their colleagues. The Benz/Preiss proposal won unanimous approval from its presidium, which does not always achieve a like measure of agreement. To be sure, many may have felt that such a large organization cannot conduct youth work in anything but a committee setting.

Nonetheless, the smaller unions are unlikely to agree to the adoption of the Metal Workers' proposal. It would be a severe blow to their separate identity if they were to bow to the dictates of the big union. At the same time, it would be a blow to union solidarity and to common opposition to the communists--a question which goes far beyond the youth report. The DGB faces a severe test. It ought to discuss this subject openly and intensively and should not try to reach quick and easy decisions in a matter of such vital importance to the labor movement.

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CSO: 3103

## WESTERN INCOMPREHENSION OF SOVIET MOTIVES, REASONING

Paris LE FIGARO in French 24 Jan 80 pp 1, 4

[Editorial by Max Clos: "The Lamb..."]

[Text] Afghanistan was not enough. Moscow is going at it again with Sakharov, whose deportation is thrown in the face of the West as a challenge. This act, both cynical and crude, has only one meaning; it amounts to shouting in our face: "You will do nothing; it is we who are playing the game, and we will not back off."

Once again, the free world is surprised; and this is what is most surprising of all.

For in the last analysis, the problem is not a new one; it has been studied by generations of specialists, and one need only open one's eyes. It boils down to two propositions.

The first is that the Western countries persist in viewing the USSR as a country like any other, in establishing their relations with it on the same bases as with the nations of their world. But the fact of the matter is something quite different. The Soviet Union is a foreign universe with its own rules and its particular ends. An ideological war has been declared since the beginning between the two blocs, and our world, termed "imperialist" or "capitalist," is considered by the other as an absolute evil that has to disappear, that one must help to make disappear. Mr Marchais has said some very convincing things in this regard on television. In the meantime, it would be enough, in order to inform oneself, to read the Soviet political literature seriously--on condition, of course, that one has the key that gives access to the double language.

The second proposition is that between the two universes, there exist and can exist only relationships of force. In the East, expressions such as "democracy," "detente" or "peaceful coexistence" are purely formal. The translation of "detente" and "peaceful coexistence" is: tactical pause between two combats that makes it possible to bring oneself up to date, sharpen one's forces and take a deep breath before resuming the attack.

The trouble is that in the West, these ritual formulas are taken for high policy, which leads to regrettable misunderstandings--but without the facts throwing the least doubt on the meaning of the words. Despite--and these are only examples--Budapest, Prague, Ethiopia, Afghanistan. Not to mention Sakharov and the thousands of people buried in the mist of the gulags and the psychiatric hospitals. And yet some strong voices have cried out the truth. But as voices in the desert. Solzhenitsin, for example, when he writes: "You will know that what I am saying is true when they come to look for you--yes, you."

American opinion has had a jolt. Mr Carter has had a jolt. And France? In Moscow, Mr Chaban-Delmas has had the gesture that he needed. Will it have any effect?

A thesis has developed among us, and it seems close to the views of those who govern us. It can be summed up this way: France should keep out of the quarrel, for by showing its support for the United States, it runs the risk of angering Moscow and antagonizing the Third World, exposing itself, among other inconveniences, to selling fewer sewing machines. It is added that in 6 months, the crisis will probably be overcome, without any major conflict. Mr Carter and Mr Brezhnev or his successor will have a summit meeting. And they will speak again of peace, peaceful coexistence and, of course, detente. Conclusion: let's posture a bit and tend our garden while waiting for this to "quiet down."

Apart from the fact that this shopkeeper's policy has nothing very exalting about it, it risks proving very dangerous. For this new period of "detente" also will be nothing but a pause allowing the East time to digest its winnings until the following aggression. To what point and for how long do we think we can back off this way?

By slipping toward the abyss each time without fighting, one ends by falling into it. An Indian proverb says: "The bleatings of the lamb stir up the tiger's rage."

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## NEW GOVERNMENT SENDS BUDGET TO ALTHING

Reykjavid MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 11 Mar 80 p 19

[Unattributed article: "The New Draft Budget: 8.4 Billion Krona for Export Payments"]

[Text] According to the draft budget presented yesterday to the Althing 24.4 billion krona will go for price supports for farm products and the government has decided to hold the line there. Export payments will run to 8.4 billion krona and there is a financial magnitude which must be taken in the context of the clauses of the draft budget on a 10 percent outlay of the treasury for price guarantees for agricultural products. It is stated in the preamble to the draft that it is indicated in the government covenant of the administration that outlays for education will be increased. It is intended that the increase will be in stages and the increase, according to the draft, is now 265 billion krona. The increase of outlays for the wage fund of Icelandic educators is 1.221 billion krona, in comparison with the draft budget of Tomas Arnason, and borrowing authority has been increased by .5 billion. Wages of educators from the fund are intended to cover 85 percent of the funding needs. Last spring, however, an agreement was made with educators that that proportion would be increased to 100 percent in three stages. It is stated that fund budgets would be revised in connection with this.

There is a notable decrease in state outlays for finance funds, 1.7 billion krona less than in the budget of Tomas Arnason. Outlays for the state construction fund are decreased by 1.9 billion, for the fisheries fund by 387 million, for the agricultural foundation loan department by 191 million, for the rural communities loan fund by 60 million, for the resources fund by 33 million, for the business loan by about 70 million, for the business operations fund by 18.5 million, for the agricultural achievement fund by 6 million, and for the transportation fund by 7 million. Outlays are increased for the workman's building fund by 50 million, for the burial fund by 22.7 million, and, finally, a fund has been newly created, called the accommodations fund, and 850 million are to go into it. Outlays for other investment loan funds are unchanged.

## FINANCE MINISTER ARNALDS DEFENDS BUDGET IN NEWS CONFERENCE

Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 12 Mar 80 p 15

[Unattributed article: "Ragnar Arnalds, Minister of Finance, on the Draft Budget: No Provision is Made for a Base Wage Increase"]

[Text] "With this draft an effort has been made to make it more pragmatic than other draft budgets which have been presented," said Ragnar Arnalds, minister of finance, at a press conference yesterday when he explained the draft which was presented to the Althing the day before yesterday. "A definite effort has been made to allow the draft to accord with estimated price and loan changes for 1980." The draft is to be taken in terms of pricing premises of the government covenant of the administration, wherein it is stated that prices should increase by only 8, 7, and 5 percent during a three month period during the year. "Provision is made that wage improvements will be paid," said Arnalds, "but we have not calculated for a base wage increase."

The draft makes provision for a 31 percent price increase in 1980. Arnalds was then asked what the government's answer was to the demands of the Association of State and Municipal Employees and whether it would include a base wage increase. He answered in the negative and said that the answer would be published in a day or so. Arnalds said that, although calculations were based on these definite pricing premises, he could not be sure that things would not turn out differently. Together with the minister of finance at the press conference yesterday were Hoskuldur Jonsson, ministerial chief, Brynjolfur Sigurdsson, economics chief, Gretar Ass Sigurdsson, state auditor, Hallgrimur Snorrason, economist of the Icelandic Economic Institute, and Magnus Torfi Olafsson, press agent of the ministry.

Arnalds gave a report, at the beginning of the press conference, on the draft in broad outlines. He began by laying emphasis on the fact that the disparity between total income and total expenditures was 5.5 billion krona and the payments balance, that is, with loan changes taken into account, was favorable by 2 billion krona. He called that the breathing space available to the appropriations committee to restore the financial payments balance. He said that the Ministry of Finance made the draft budget known



to the appropriations committee a week ago and that that was done because effort is being made to bring the budget up before the Althing. This has been done, for the first time, because of the exceptional circumstance that it is the middle of March and the budget has still not been approved.

The minister of finance later compared the budget draft with the draft of Tomas Arnason, minister of finance of the leftist government. He said that major changes were of three kinds: changes resulting from changed price premises, changes resulting from better information of probably expenditures for 1980, and third, changes which the government has made in the draft. Changed price premises have lead to 10.6 billion krona of increased expenditures and it is estimated that changes from the same premises will result in a 9.6 billion krona income increase. Price supports will be increased by 1.400 billion krona, outlays for the arts by 252 million. A 5 percent income security increases expenditures by 500 million and expenditures for leave and education matters of labor unions will amount to 115 million krona. In all these increases amount to 2.2 billion krona. Some categories are increased over the draft of Tomas Arnason and the greatest increase is to the wage fund of Icelandic educators, which will be increased by 1.221 billion krona, and payments to the accommodations fund for industry, 850 million. Outlays for export payments will increase by 800 million krona. In all the increase is 6.140 billion krona. On the other hand, some categories are decreased. Fuel aid, for example, is completely eliminated from the draft, and it was 2.3 billion krona, and outlays for the finance loan fund are decreased by 2.8 billion krona. Decreases of various other expenditures amount to 750 million. In all expenditure categories the decrease has been 5.9 billion krona.

Arnalds said, when he explained the elimination of appropriations for fuel aid, that the state had decided to impose a special energy tax, which would pay into the energy fund, and the fuel aid would subsequently be paid out of it. For this reason fuel aid was no longer in the budget draft. Through special laws 4.5 billion krona will be raised for this purpose. He said that the minority People's Party government had produced a draft of such an energy tax which the government proposed to take over with changes. No decisions have been taken in the government and many possibilities are under discussion.

In terms of the draft as it is now, the tax burden is now 28.3 percent of the GNP. With the energy tax Arnalds said that it would rise to from 28.7 to 28.8 percent.

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## PAPER ATTACKS BUDGET FOR INFLATIONARY FACTORS

Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 12 Mar 80 p 17

[Editorial: "Increased Drain, More Taxes"]

[Text] The draft budget has now seen the light of day. It is the third of its kind from as many ministers of finance. Nothing in it is surprising if taken in connection with the government covenant, read correctly, and statements by individual ministers of finance. But it is doubtless that the draft budget will give rise to disappointment for many, for those who hoped that, at the least, a firm hold would be taken of state finances and a serious attack made against inflation, preferably without sacrifice for the public. The fact that final figures have increased by almost 63 percent over the budget tells us, unmistakably, that we have to deal with a budget of lavish expenditure in this year of 1980. And the fact that the income taxes of individuals will increase by 65 percent also tells us something, namely that we are in the same fix as before in terms of overtaxation. It is clear, and a premise of the draft, that purchasing power will continue to worsen or by 3-4 percent over last year. Under such conditions it may be expected that the fathers of the country would seek their honor in reducing lavish treasury expenditures. But that is not the case. Operating expenditures increase uncontrolled and it may also be said that, in spite of increased tax collections, and in spite of the fact that the actual tendency is towards a treasury payments deficit, the government has been forced to resort to cutting outlays to business funds, by billions, and the same is true for practical achievements, that is, outlays for building schools, harbors, hospitals and air fields, in addition to urgent road building plans.

In an article in MORGUNBLADID on the draft budget yesterday Althing delegate Larus Jonsson expressed himself in the following terms: "This, the first draft budget of the government of Gunnar Thoroddsen, is largely in conformity, in its main lines, with the government conceptions of the People's Alliance and Progressive Party. It is a logical development of the division of ministries, whereby the large ruling parties have the real power, and of the government covenant, which is aimed in the same direction, if it is carried out." Nothing, in fact, can be said to improve upon these words.

This first month of the government of Gunnar Thoroddsen has brought home the truth to us of the fact that movement is not towards increased freedom for the individual and for business in Iceland. Unfortunately we have to realize that things will still be on the slide during the long period to follow the government formation. Devotion to government conceptions which, among other things, finds expression in negative actions in livelihood is not, in the least, likely to stop the negative evolution which is now taking place and has, among other things, found expression in worsening living conditions.

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## BUDGET BILL PROPOSES 65.3 PERCENT INCREASE IN OUTLAYS

Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 12 Mar 80 p 48

[Unattributed article: "People's Alliance Ministries with by Far the Greatest Increases"]

[Text] The increase of total expenditures in the draft budget is 65.3 percent, compared with the 1979 budget.

Total expenditures will increase, according to the draft, by 334.5 billion krona. In that expenditure package the Ministry of Health and Social Security receives by far the greatest increase of 115.3 billion krona, according to the draft.

The increase of expenditures by ministry is very uneven. The least expenditure increase is for the Office of the Prime Minister, or only 13.3 percent. Greatest, on the other hand, is the expenditure increase for the Ministry of Finance, no more or less than 214.2 percent. The expenditure increase for this same ministry in the draft of Tomas Arnason is, on the other hand, 155.9 percent, compared with the 1979 budget. There the Office of the Prime Minister was also lowest with 10.6 percent of total expenditures increased, compared to the budget.

The next largest expenditure increase is for the Budget and Economics Establishment, 131.4 percent in terms of the 1979 budget, and the figure was 125.1 percent in the draft of Tomas Arnason. Listed below are expenditure increases for those ministries now already mentioned: The President's Office, 48.3 percent, the Ministry of Education, 54.1 percent, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 64 percent, the Ministry of Agriculture, 51.7 percent, the Ministry of Ocean Resources, 25.7 percent, the Ministry of Justice and Church Affairs, 41.4 percent, the Ministry of Community Affairs, 34.1 percent, the Ministry of Communications, 59.4 percent, the Ministry of Industry, 93.7 percent, the Ministry of Trade, 23.8 percent, the Icelandic Economic Institute, 45.5 percent, and the State Auditor's Office, 57.4 percent.

Noteworthy in this list of increased expenditures by ministries is that those ministries which have received real increases above inflation, 55 percent in 1979, are the Ministry of Health and Social Security (minister: Svavar Gestsson), the Ministry of Finance (minister: Ragnar Arnalds), the Ministry of Industry (minister: Hjorleifur Guttormsson), the Budget and Economics Establishment (minister: Ragnar Arnalds), and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (minister: Olafur Johannesson).

## FINAL CALCULATIONS SHOW INFLATION REACHED 61 PERCENT IN 1979

Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 13 Mar 80 p 48

[Unattributed article: "Inflation in the Last 10 Years: Most Last Year, Almost 61 percent, Least in 1971, 1.7 percent"]

[Text] Inflation, from the beginning of 1979 until year's end, was almost 61 percent or 60.8 percent, which is the highest inflation rate in Iceland ever. The next highest rate was in 1974 when inflation, from the beginning of the year to the end, amounted to 50.2 percent. The year of the last 10 years in which the inflation rate was least was 1971 when the rate was only 1.7 percent.

When we examine the inflation rates for the 10 years just passed, we find that living costs increased by 13.4 percent in 1969, 12.9 percent in 1970, 1.7 percent in 1971, 14.1 percent in 1972, 34.9 percent in 1973, 50.2 percent in 1974, 40.0 percent in 1975, 33.7 percent in 1976, 35.8 percent in 1977, 38.3 percent in 1978, and 60.8 percent in 1979.

As may be seen from these figures, inflation was least in 1971, the last year in which the recuperative government held power. In the autumn of that year the leftist government came to power and inflation grew, from year to year, and reached a high point in 1974. In that autumn the leftist government left power. The coalition of the Independence Party and the Progressive Party took over and reduced the inflation rate. In 1978 the leftist government was back again and inflation increased and a new inflation record was achieved last year. The leftist government left power in November.

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## BRIEFS

EFFECTS OF DOLLAR'S RISE--The Icelandic Central Bank decided yesterday, in agreement with the government, that essentially the same exchange rate would be maintained as was maintained at the beginning of the winter. According to Johannes Norddal, chief of the Central Bank, the exchange rate was frozen for a time while the creation of a government was being awaited. Norddal said that the exchange rate in the beginning of the winter was changeable on a daily basis but subject to a limit of 1-2 percent a month. The value of the dollar increased by a krona yesterday. Norddal said that the dollar had become stronger recently and for this reason the krona had increased against other currencies while the value of the dollar was kept unchanged. [Text] [Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 13 Mar 80 p 48]

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SCIENTIFIC RESEARCHERS FORCED TO SEEK JOBS ABROAD

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 18 Mar 80 p 25

[Article by Peter Sandberg, journalist: "Researchers forced to leave Sweden..."]

[Text] Eric Tornqvist will take his doctor's degree in physics shortly. That is why he is on his way to the United States. There he will take part in developing a new laboratory at the University of Pennsylvania. In this country he cannot continue his research work. Like many other researchers he is forced to work abroad.

...and this is where his colleagues have moved

Eric Tornqvist is not the only one from the Institute for Solid State Physics in Gothenburg to leave Sweden. Most migrations go, as shown, to North America.

In Sweden the researchers are both insecure and poorly paid. But things will improve following the proposals of the Commission on the Appointment of Teachers on giving more researchers the chance to have permanent positions. The Minister of Education hopes that this will attract Swedish researchers to move back home.

Eric Tornqvist is going to defend his doctoran thesis in physics next week. In April, he moves to the United States to continue research work at an institute where there is a Swedish professor. Some ten researchers have come to the United States and to the Federal Republic of Germany from the Institute of Physics in Gothenburg alone. Researchers often want to return to Sweden but do not have any jobs to return to. The group is not large, but it consists exclusively of elite research people and is therefore important.

"After having taken the doctor's degree there are only a few positions within the university field. If I want to continue in my subject I am more or less forced to find a job abroad," says Eric Tornqvist.

He has had several positions in the United States to choose from. During a journey over there he was offered positions at Cornell University and at IBM's research department. Finally he chose a position at the University of Pennsylvania.

There one of the world's most prominent institutes in the field of surface physics is located and there Torgny Gustavsson from Gothenburg is a professor. Eric Tornqvist will work on developing a new laboratory at the university.

There is no general flight of researchers from Sweden. But now and then an institute produces research of a quality far above the ordinary. For instance, the group that deals with solid state physics in Gothenburg has accomplished internationally advanced research during a long-range period. A thing like that will often result in researchers from the institute being scattered around the world.

"Of course, there is nothing wrong in going abroad. The exchange across the borders is important to the quality of the research and traveling broadens your own mind. But there should also be a chance of coming home," says Eric Tornqvist. He has no family and is therefore free to go.

For Torgny Gustavsson in Philadelphia things are worse. His wife has a good position in Sweden and can hardly imagine moving to the United States. They have a son aged two and a half.

#### A lower salary

"I have a lifetime position at one of the best institutes in my field in the United States. I would like to move back home and I am also applying for positions, but if so it has to be a permanent research position," says Torgny Gustavsson.

When their son is about to start school the final decision has to be made. Then, if not earlier, the family must be reunited. In the United States or in Sweden, Torgny Gustavsson says.

If he moves back home he will get a lower salary but higher taxes. Swedish researchers have, from an international point of view, a lower salary level.

"There are other things than money that matter and if we both work in Sweden and, for instance, obtain a place for our son at a day care center the difference will be reduced," says Torgny Gustavsson. What is lacking in Sweden, in his and in other researchers' views, is what in the United States are called "post-doc-positions." These are positions following the taking of a doctor's degree. The Swedish Natural Science Research Council this year announced a couple of scholarships of this type. The laboratory for physics, created by Volvo, also gives opportunities to continue basic research.

Still, there are few chances for most scientists. An exception is medicine, where the labor market is very good in the drug industry and where extensive research--supported by the industry--is carried out at the universities.

"It must be considered a merit to be a doctor"

"The question regarding the flight of scientific researchers is always difficult to discuss. The variation between different subjects is very large," Ingvar Lindqvist, professor at the Natural Science Research Council says. But he agrees that we look after our skilled researchers poorly. He does not, however, believe in independent research institutes and also Parliament has rejected them.

There are no studies to prove if any general flight of researchers from Sweden really exists. But there are several specific examples within this subject area where this has taken place.

One example is nuclear physics and nuclear technology, a subject that was popular at our universities during a period. Here a large number of researchers were educated and we did not have any possibility to take care of them at home. So they had to re-educate themselves or look for positions abroad.

Not prepared

"At the Irina Curelarus Institute in Gothenburg very advanced research, from an international point of view, is carried out. The Institute is simply not prepared and organized to accept all the advanced researchers that are being trained in the subject," Ingvar Lindqvist says. The subjects at the universities can hardly be expected to expand in proportion to the quality of the research.

"On the other hand one would hope that our industry could utilize more of the capital of proficiency that has been built up," Ingvar Lindqvist says.

Last year Parliament decided not to create any independent research institutes in Sweden. Instead, the state will carry out its own research in cooperation with the universities.

Left behind

The underlying argument is that independent research institutes will impoverish the universities and that they easily can be left behind by scientific developments. This is said to have happened, e.g., in France and in Eastern Europe. There is a general consensus about this policy in Sweden.

"The link between research and development (R & D) and teaching is important. There is a conflict between the quality of research and [job]

security, since the best research very often is carried out by quite young persons, Gunnar Hambreus at the IVA (the Swedish Academy of Engineering Sciences) says.

In his opinion the root of the problem is that there does not exist any labor market for doctors outside the universities. Society simply has no place for people who have penetrated "narrow" subjects very deeply.

According to the IVA this is a dangerous development, because we will in this way limit our horizon and reduce the means to meet future requirements.

#### A new reform

According to the IVA, industry as well as the public sector should ask for highly educated persons. "It must be considered a merit to have taken a doctor's degree," the IVA states. Lately, several Swedish corporations have taken on qualified basic researchers but, in the IVA's opinion, industry can hardly be expected to provide for a greater share of the scientific researchers' labor market. Instead, research education should be considered a merit also for public service.

Recently, the report from the Commission on the Appointment of Teachers was presented. The report proposed a sharp expansion in the number of permanent positions at the universities. These will be "amalgamated positions" combining teaching and research. The intention is to shift the proportions in relation to local requirements. In practice this implies a total reform of the university system.

Following the initiatives of the Commission on the Appointment of Teachers, from which increased resources are proposed, the Committee for Cooperation in Research will, later this year, present another proposal.

The intention of this is to make it easier for corporations and for public agencies to have their research located in the universities. Among other things the restraints affecting cooperation between institutions will be removed. The corporations and the public agencies often have requirements of an interdisciplinary nature while the research is carried out in separate fields.

A positive aspect of this is partly that it gives more resources to the universities, partly that it generates needs for personnel which is trained in research work.

"Let us just carry out our research--on a career basis"

"To be a scientific researcher in Sweden is insecure. Many skilled researchers are being educated but permanent positions are few, resulting in a perpetual export of skilled researchers to, primarily, the United States. Why are there not more independent research institutes in Sweden,



why must all research work be linked to the universities and academies," asks Irina Curelaru, active for six years as a researcher at Chalmers University of Technology in Gothenburg.

Irina Curelaru is a physicist. She has 23 years of experience from research work in many fields: nuclear physics, nuclear technology, material science and a wide international research background. She is now working in the field of solid state physics at Chalmers.

#### Insecurity

"Sweden is very advanced in many different research areas and Swedes have made and still make large contributions internationally in the field of scientific research. Nevertheless, the Swedish educational and research system is constructed in a rather inefficient way," says Irina Curelaru.

To be a researcher in Sweden means, above all, insecurity. After taking a doctor's degree it is possible to continue working on projects with deadlines. At best, three plus three years and in a few cases one additional year. After that, it is definitely over if the doctor does not succeed in getting one of the very few permanent positions in the universities and the academies.

Professors and university lecturers, a fraction of the researchers, can sleep well. The others are inexorably barred after a couple of years. "The result is that our researchers have to move abroad. We have several persons from this institute that now work in the United States or in Germany. They belong to the international elite in their field and do not wish anything more than coming home. One of them recently asked us in a letter to keep our eyes open for positions he could apply for."

She, herself, is in a difficult situation, typical for Swedish researchers. In December next year her position at Chalmers terminates. At the institute she has been told that there will hardly be any prolongation because of the competition. In the industry she is doubly handicapped; she is a woman and she comes from an Eastern European country.

That is why she is now applying for a lecturer's position at Chalmers, positions at universities in the United States and in Canada, and a position at a research institute in the Federal Republic of Germany.

#### Support system

The main problem is, in her opinion, the link between teaching and research being practiced in Sweden. Teaching is a part of the support system for the doctoral candidates and for researchers during their work at the universities. This is not good, either for the research or the researchers, or for the students.

Irina Curelaru points out that there are independent specialized research institutes abroad, that solely devote themselves to advanced scientific research and that are being supported and utilized by industry. Such institutes exist in the United States, England, France and Germany but also in a small country such as The Netherlands. Sweden, too, ought to be able to afford this and would not have any difficulties in recruiting researchers.

In France, e.g., many industrial corporations also have their own advanced research departments.

"It is possible that there is a theory behind this system. That they think the things we do are enough. It may be a good system for young researchers who really are forced to concentrate on their projects, but it must be wrong that old researchers should have to depend on two to three-year contracts.

I urge the researchers in Sweden to speak up and start a debate about this. We lose researchers to the United States every year. It is a loss to Sweden and it causes personal tragedies. If we cannot create more positions for researchers we ought to restrict entrance to the education more so that we can take care of those trained.

The solution has to be letting the researchers stay on as primarily researchers for their whole lives. Not all of them have to become professors."

END

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**DATE FILMED**

8 May 1980

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